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Preface
This book emerged from my participation in a great number of policy, academic, 
and public engagements on the reform of global economic governance in the 
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. While much of the global discussion con-
cerned the impact and governance implications of the crisis on the industrialized 
world, I and many of my closest colleagues were equally concerned about the im-
plications for the emerging-market and developing countries—where financial 
fragility is quite different from the experience of the industrialized countries. To 
name just a few of these engagements, I served on a subcommittee of the US State 
Department Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, cochaired 
and founded the Pardee Task Force on the Regulation of Capital Flows, and en-
gaged on these topics with policymakers at the International Monetary Fund, at 
the G24, at the United Nations, and in several national capitals.
In this book, I examine the extent to which emerging-market and developing 
countries have become better equipped to govern the global capital flow cycle at 
both the domestic and global levels. I find that there have been significant and 
positive developments. That said, my analysis suggests that such changes have 
not been adequate to prevent or mitigate the next financial crisis. Nevertheless, 
an understanding of the economic and political forces that led to these incre-
mental changes may help us understand how more comprehensive reform may 
be achieved in the future.
Generous grants from the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) and 
the Ford Foundation allowed me to get at arm’s length from these discussions 
and devote a considerable amount of time to thinking more analytically and 
conducting empirical research about the process of change in emerging mar-
kets and in the global system. I thank INET and the Ford Foundation, especially 
Leonardo Burlamaqui, for this opportunity. With this financial support, I was 
able to write a first draft in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as a visiting scholar at the 
Centre for the Study of State and Society. Leonardo Stanley, Martin Rapetti, and 
Roberto  Frenkel couldn’t have provided a better atmosphere for writing about 
the political economy of macroeconomic policy. Thank you.
This work also benefited enormously from engagement with my collaborator, 
colleague, and friend José Antonio Ocampo. Dr. Ocampo served as finance minis-
ter in Colombia and as head of two key United Nations bodies, and he is now per-
haps the leading economic thinker on the economics and governance of capital 
ix
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flows in developing countries. Conversations with and the writings of  Ocampo, 
as well as Stephany Griffith-Jones, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Anton Korinek, Jan 
Kregel, Daniela Prates, Ilene Grabel, and others, were indispensable to me.
But this book looks very different from my previous books because of my 
dialogue with international political economists. I realized early on that to fully 
answer the research questions I had set out for myself I would have to seriously 
confront the political as well as the economic forces of change in the global eco-
nomic system. I have greatly appreciated the time that Cornel Ban, my colleague 
at Boston University (BU), took to read an entire early draft of the manuscript 
and provide advice on how it could engage a broader audience in the political 
economy literature. William Grimes, also at BU, was an enormous help. I had 
emptied half his bookshelf by the time this book went to press. I am also enor-
mously indebted to Eric Helleiner, Jeffrey Chwieroth, and Kevin Young, who also 
provided extensive commentary and advice along the way. Rawi Abdelal’s 2007 
book was also foundational. Finally, I thank Mark Blyth for asking me to serve on 
the board of the Review of International Political Economy (RIPE). Being on the 
board of RIPE was a real gift while writing this book; I was able to review cutting-
edge research in this field and engage with great co-editors in Juliet Johnson, 
Leonard Seabrook, Cornelia Woll, Daniel Mugge, Catherine Weaver, Gregory 
Chin, and Ilene Grabel.
I discussed these issues with a great number of people. I thank Peter Chowla, 
Aldo Caliari, Sarah Anderson, Lori Wallach, Todd Tucker, Arvind Subramanian, 
Manuel Montes, Yilmaz Akyuz, Shinji Takagi, Paulo Nogeira Battista, Rakesh 
Mohan, Atish Ghosh, Sean Hagan, Olivier Blanchard, Jonathan Ostry, Atish 
Ghosh, Deborah Siegel, Vivek Arora, Amar Bhattacharya, Meg Lundsager, Leon-
ardo Burlamaqui, Hung Tran, Sandrine Rostello, Nelson Barbosa, Barney Frank, 
Rubens Ricupero, Luis Bresser Pereira, Jose DeGregorio and many others who 
have asked not to be attributed.
BU continues to be a great home for conducting research. At BU, I codirect 
the Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI), whose mission is to advance 
policy-relevant knowledge about economic governance for financial stability, 
human development, and the environment. GEGI is an initiative that spans three 
entities at BU: the Pardee Center; the Center for Finance, Law and Policy; and 
the Pardee School of Global Studies. All three have provided me with incred-
ible support. The work for this book is a part of the GEGI Political Economy of 
Global Finance program. I thank the entire group for engagement, especially my 
codirector Cornel Ban. Cynthia Barakatt deserves special thanks for her tireless 
and meticulous work in the production and editing of this project. Victoria Puyat 
has also been a strong arm of GEGI events throughout this process, as has Jill 
Richardson, in advancing the work to a broader audience.
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Several students assisted in this work, either through GEGI or directly as re-
search assistants. I thank Brittany Baumann, Bruno Coelho, Elen Shrestha, and 
Xuan Tian for serving as research assistants on five of the core statistical analyses 
for this book. I also thank June Park, Amos Irwin, Juliana De Costa Plaster, and 
Alex Hamilton for very strong and useful research assistance. Finally, I thank the 
graduate students in my December 2012 Global Development Capstone course 
and my spring 2013 graduate seminar Globalization, Governance, and Develop-
ment, which I designed entirely around the subjects in this book. Engaging with 
those students and the material gave me excellent ideas for the structuring of and 
 execution of this work.
I sincerely thank Roger Haydon at Cornell University Press, as well as Eric Hel-
leiner and Jonathan Kirshner, who edit the Cornell Studies in Money. I quickly 
realized that the majority of the key works in the field had been published in this 
series and aspired to have my book on their great list.
I am eternally grateful to my family. Kelly, Theo, and Estelle, you are the source 







In 2010, Brazilian Finance Minister Guida Mantega made global headlines by 
scolding the West for starting a “currency war.” Mantega singled out Ben Ber-
nanke, then chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, as the most egregious 
warrior for pushing interest rates down and debasing the dollar relative to the 
Brazilian real. In response to this, Mantega announced yet another round of capi-
tal controls—curbs on short-term financial flows into Brazil—to mitigate the 
appreciation of the real and to stem growing asset bubbles. Mantega continued 
such charges, and responses, for the next two years.
As the Republic of Korea (South Korea) hosted the 2010 G20 Summit, it too 
took almost identical actions to curb a surge in capital flows. Rather than branding 
its efforts as capital controls, however, South Korea insisted that the measures were 
“macroprudential” instruments aimed at regulating the build up of systemic risk 
due to foreign exchange holdings. Indeed, South Korea, Brazil, and other emerg-
ing-market and developing countries (EMDs) developed a third generation of reg-
ulations to mitigate the harmful impacts of excessive capital flows in the wake of 
the financial crisis. These countries were able to incorporate their concerns about 
needing clarity on regulating capital flows into the 2010 G20 communiqué, which 
said the global community would conduct “further work on macro-prudential 
policy frameworks, including tools to help mitigate the impact of excessive capital 
flows” (G20 Information Centre 2010a). Many other nations, including Costa Rica, 
Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, and Taiwan, had taken action to prevent 
currency appreciation and asset bubbles by regulating the inflow of capital as well.
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Bernanke and central bankers in other industrialized countries repeatedly 
defended their actions. To them, the expansion of central bank balance sheets 
was an important tool to recover from the crisis (Bernanke 2013). Bernanke ac-
knowledged that his actions and those of other central bankers triggered capital 
flow volatility but insisted that such changes were unfortunate side effects of oth-
erwise good and important policies. After all, given that industrialized countries 
make up more than half the global economy, if the industrialized world didn’t 
recover from the crisis the costs to the EMDs would be high.
When the United States announced in May 2013 that it would eventually taper 
off its expansionary monetary policy by the end of that year, there was a reversal 
of capital flows from many emerging markets. Currencies in Brazil, India, In-
donesia, South Africa, Chile, and Turkey, which had soared from 2009 to 2012, 
then nose-dived in 2013 and early 2014. This caused the most alarm in Indone-
sia, South Africa, and India, countries with significant current account deficits 
and relatively less foreign exchange reserves than other EMDs. India put in place 
capital controls on the outflow of capital in an attempt to stem capital flight from 
the country. Not surprisingly then, economic discussions at the 2013 G20 meet-
ings in Russia were dominated by capital flow volatility once again. In the final 
communiqué for 2013, the G20 leaders pledged to be clearer and to coordinate 
monetary policy so as to ease the volatility in global capital markets (G20 Infor-
mation Centre 2013). If capital flows reversed simply on the announcement of 
a change in US monetary policy, EMDs were quite concerned about what would 
happen when the policy actually changed.
Both parties—EMDs and the industrialized countries—were partly right in 
taking the positions they did. Because of the financial crisis, the industrialized 
nations wanted to stimulate domestic investment and demand to recover, and 
they saw expansionary monetary policy as a tool to achieve that goal. Because 
many EMDs rebounded relatively quickly from the crisis and continued their 
fast growth, they wanted to ensure that their economies did not overheat. Yet the 
crisis led the EMDs to get caught in yet another global-capital-flow cycle, one 
in which too much capital surged into EMDs during good times and too little 
was available during hard times. EMDs knew all too well that capital flows could 
surge into their economies in such times, only to suddenly reverse course. Such 
exogenously determined volatility has played a big role in creating numerous 
financial crises in EMDs and is responsible for lost decades of growth, lost liveli-
hoods, and lost elections.
So this time around, industrialized nations expanded the monetary base to 
recover from the crisis, and some EMDs put in place domestic regulations aimed 
at curbing the negative spillovers from Western monetary expansion. Although 
incremental, this was a significant change in policy direction. This time, EMDs 
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boldly reregulated cross-border financial flows in the wake of the crisis. Accord-
ing the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2011 164 countries used capital 
controls, compared to 119 in 1995 (IMF 2012a; Helleiner 1998). This time, the 
West did not crack down on a bilateral basis or through the IMF when EMDs 
regulated cross-border capital flows.
In this book, I trace how several EMDs reregulated cross-border financial 
flows in the wake of the crisis and moved to create more policy space for such 
measures in global economic governance institutions. I also show how the regu-
lation of cross-border finance has become justified in the economics profession 
more than ever and how the diffusion of new economic thinking partly enabled 
the EMDs to achieve policy change. In the book, I also highlight how, at the 
IMF and at the G20, EMDs have succeeded in creating more room to regulate 
cross-border finance but have been less successful in opening up space in the 
trade and investment regimes. These positive steps may not be enough to pre-
vent or mitigate the next crisis, however. The result is a complicated patchwork 
of overlapping regimes that sends mixed signals to countries looking to regulate 
cross-border finance.
Global Governance of capital Flows:  
What Has changed?
One of the central pillars of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s has partially 
fallen. Under the Washington Consensus, developing states were encouraged to 
liberalize trade and investment and generally reduce the presence of the govern-
ment in economic affairs. Note that the original articulation of the Washing-
ton Consensus did not extend to short-term capital flows (Williamson 1989). 
That didn’t stop the United States, the World Bank, and especially the IMF from 
pushing for capital account liberalization (the deregulation of restrictions on the 
movement of cross-border financial flows) throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Stiglitz 2002).
In comparing the earlier era to today, the central research question of this book 
is: To what extent has the governance of cross-border financial flows changed in 
the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008? To fully answer this overarching 
question, a number of other questions also have to be asked:
•  Has economic thinking about the regulation of capital flows, at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels, changed?
•  To what extent has new economic thought diffused into policy circles?
•  To what extent have surges of capital inflows, sudden stops, and capital 
flight continued to be prevalent?
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• What political and economic factors led some countries to regulate capital 
flows and others not to do so?
• To what extent were the measures taken effective at achieving their goals?
• To what extent has the IMF changed its policy regarding the regulation 
of capital flows?
• To what extent has the G20 emerged as a new forum to coordinate global 
and domestic regulation of capital flows?
• To what extent has the trade and investment regime supported the ability 
of nation-states to coordinate global and domestic regulation of capital 
flows?
The key policy instruments under analysis are regulations of cross-border finan-
cial flows. To avoid redundancy, throughout the book I refer to these regulations 
as cross-border financial regulations, capital account regulations, capital manage-
ment techniques, capital controls, and capital-flow management measures. There 
are three generations of such regulations: (1) outright quantitative controls on 
the inflow or outflow of capital, (2) price-based measures on financial flows such 
as taxes, and (3) regulations (either quantity- and price-based) on foreign ex-
change derivative transactions. In chapter 2, I trace how such regulations had 
fallen out of fashion in the West to the point of scorn by the 1990s. To manage 
capital flows, a common recommendation was to float the exchange rate, inter-
vene in currency markets (lightly), reduce public debt, tinker with the interest 
rate, establish capital requirements for banks, and deepen domestic capital mar-
kets. Each of these measures can be important for the management of capital 
flows. But they often are unavailable, are too costly, take too much time, or are 
inadequate responses to surges and sudden stops of capital. The need to couple 
those responses with regulations on cross-border finance is increasingly seen as 
legitimate and important.
My primary focus in this book is on the international political economy of 
cross-border financial regulations. Such a focus does not suggest that the other 
measures are not important or that capital account regulations are a substitute 
for those measures. I focus on cross-border regulations because they were so 
strongly out of fashion in many EMDs, in academia, and in global economic 
governance institutions by the turn of the century but made a comeback after 
the global financial crisis in 2008.
The period I analyze in this book is roughly 2007 to 2014, with an intense 
analysis of the period 2009–2012. As shown in Figure 1.1, the period 2007–2013 
includes a peak in capital inflows to EMDs (in 2007), a sudden stop and capital 
flight (in 2008–2009), a surge in capital inflows to EMDs from 2009 to 2012, and 
another slow down and partial reversal in 2013 and 2014. As I show in chapter 3, 
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this is a typical capital flow cycle, characterized by surges of inflows, sudden stops, 
and capital flight.
I deploy a variety of methods to answer these research questions. To answer 
those questions that are economic in nature, I draw on economics and perform 
econometric analyses. To answer those questions that are political in nature, I 
draw from the international political economy (IPE) literature and rely on con-
tent analysis, coding, and in-depth interviews with key actors and observers. Fi-
nally, to examine the extent to which the regulation of capital flows is permissible 
under various trade and investment treaties, I conduct a legal analysis. My aim in 
examining the political and economic dynamics of the 2007–2013 global capital 
flow cycle is to help understand that turbulent period in global economic history 
and to help scholars and policymakers think about how to prevent and mitigate 
further manifestations of capital flow cycles.
I find that the 2008 global financial crisis is indeed associated with significant 
changes in the governance of capital flows. These changes include that (1) regu-































































FiGure 1.1. Capital flows to emerging markets, 2005–2013 (Collyns et al. 
2013).
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the 1990s, (2) more countries have put in place domestic regulations on financial 
flows than in past crises or during the boom preceding the crisis, (3) the IMF and 
the United States are now less likely to be in outright opposition to countries that 
chose to regulate capital flows, (4) there is at least a temporary understanding at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) that nations will not be subject to disputes 
for regulating capital, (5) free-trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investments 
treaties (BITs) are now seen to be very restrictive in this manner, although a 
handful of countries have negotiated carve-outs in their trade treaties that allow 
them to regulate capital flows (or have refrained from signing new ones), and 
(6) the newly elevated G20 has proclaimed that countries have the policy space 
to regulate capital flows as well.
These changes are positive, but the international monetary system is still 
plagued with obstacles that make the reregulation of cross-border finance dif-
ficult. Although new thinking in economics is converging on the need to regulate 
capital flows at the domestic and global levels, many countries across the world 
lack the political space and the policy space to regulate them effectively. Collec-
tive action problems are accentuated by institutional arrangements that make it 
more difficult for countries to put in place regulation at the domestic level and 
formulate policy for global coordination. Often the actors that stand to bear the 
cost of regulation are more powerful and supported by institutions even though 
the broader benefits of regulation outweigh those costs. These factors play a big 
role in EMD political economies, and they are compounded by the lack of at-
tentiveness by industrialized countries to the global impacts of their monetary 
policies, to financial regulatory reform, and to the restrictiveness of their trade 
and investment treaties. Moreover, the IMF still does not endorse capital con-
trols in many circumstances, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is beginning to brand cross-border financial regulations 
“investment protectionism” under the auspices of the G20, and a proliferation 
of US trade and investment treaties restrict and penalize the ability of nations to 
regulate capital flows.
outline of the book
In this book, I draw on a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches 
from economics, political science, and law to explain the extent to which emerg-
ing market and developing countries were able to gain the political and policy 
space to reregulate cross-border financial flows in the wake of the financial crisis. 
Political space refers to the power of states to act given a convergence of parties 
and interest groups, institutions, and ideas on a desired policy output. Policy 
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space refers to the flexibility of international institutions to allow sovereign states 
to deploy and coordinate desired policy outputs (Gallagher 2005; UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2012b).
From economic theory, I draw on work dating back to the Tract on Monetary 
Reform by John Maynard Keynes (1929) and am also highly guided by new break-
throughs in economic theory stemming from the work of Hyman Minsky, Ken-
neth Arrow, and Joseph Stiglitz. In addition, a number of econometric exercises 
are performed to answer questions that form the core of this book.
From political science I draw heavily on the IPE literature, which recognizes 
that a number of factors can integrate to explain outcomes and attempts to ex-
plain how the relative interaction of power (often exercised through interest 
groups), institutions, and ideas led emerging markets to reregulate cross-border 
financial flows. For this analysis, in some chapters I rely on case study research in 
four emerging market countries—Brazil, Chile, South Africa, and South Korea—
all of which attempted to preserve the policy space to regulate cross-border fi-
nance at the IMF and/or in trade and investment treaties; two deployed capital 
account regulations on the domestic level, and two did not. For the case studies, 
I supplemented extensive analyses of major national news outlets with in-depth 
interviews with key in-country actors, as well as with data analysis.
This book looks at the sudden stop in capital flows that resulted from the 
crisis of 2008, the surge in capital flows that occurred from 2010 to 2012, and an 
episode of capital flight in 2013. My aim is to analyze how nation-states respond 
to these episodes at the national and global levels to understand the political and 
economic forces that may help prevent and mitigate such surges and sudden 
stops into the future.
In chapter 2, I frame the previous literature on regulating capital flows from 
the wake of the Great Depression to the financial crises that plagued EMDs in 
the 1990s. Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari (2011) characterize international 
financial regimes as having either strong international standards, where each na-
tion adheres to a uniform standard, or cooperative decentralization, where there 
is international cooperation across a variety of national standards. The trade 
regime may be an example of strong international standards; the IMF is an ex-
ample of cooperative decentralization, at least with respect to capital account 
regulations. As shown in chapter 2, Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement 
grants nations the policy space to deploy capital account regulations as they think 
necessary and allows nations to cooperate on such measures across international 
borders. I trace the literature showing the many challenges to cooperative de-
centralization since the 1940s, when the regime was established. The regime was 
challenged during its very inception and throughout the twentieth century, cul-
minating with an attempt to formally change the regime from one of cooperative 
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decentralization to strong international standards through an amendment to the 
IMF articles in the late 1990s. The chapter synthesizes the previous literature 
showing how economic power, institutions, domestic interests, and ideas inter-
acted to erect, challenge, and maintain the regime for regulating capital flows.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, thinking and action with 
respect to regulating capital flows began to change. In chapter 3, I trace the evo-
lution of economic thinking from the early 1900s to 2014 with respect to capital 
flows. I discusses the major breakthroughs that have occurred in our understand-
ing of how capital flows work in the economy and the extent to which regulating 
capital flows is justified and effective. Understanding these changes is impor-
tant in general, but it is also important for tracing the changes in policy that are 
analyzed in later chapters. Why are these new ideas accepted and advocated by 
some actors in the global system but not by others? In the wake of more than 
two decades of financial crises at the end of the twentieth century, a new wave 
of theoretical and empirical research has ensued. This work has yielded results 
that challenge conventional thinking about capital account liberalization and the 
regulation of capital flows. In the econometrics literature, capital account lib-
eralization was shown not to be associated with economic growth or financial 
stability in EMDs. Moreover, econometric evidence in the 2000s began to show 
that regulations to mitigate the harmful effects of capital flows have been (at least 
partly) effective in meeting their goals.
Advances in economic theory began to show the regulation of cross-border 
finance as the optimal way to correct for inherent market failures in global fi-
nancial markets. According to this thinking, externalities are generated by capital 
flows because individual investors and borrowers do not know (or ignore) the 
effects of their financial decisions on the level of financial stability in a particu-
lar nation. This classic market failure argument calls for the introduction of a 
Pigouvian tax that corrects for the market failure and make markets work more 
efficiently. Of course, economists such as Keynes argued long ago that capital 
controls are important to prevent crises and give nations the ability to deploy 
an independent monetary policy. And the idea of curbing the inflows of capital 
for financial stability originated in Latin American countries in the 1990s. In the 
chapter, however, I spell out how it was a breakthrough for such relationships to 
be shown to hold true in the traditions held by most mainstream economists, 
central bankers, and finance ministers. These theoretical and empirical advances 
expanded the political space for emerging markets to deploy capital account reg-
ulations because they were increasingly seen as legitimate.
In chapter 4, I shift to the global financial crisis and its aftermath. There I show 
how loose monetary policy in the United States made the carry trade attractive 
to investors and exogenously triggered a massive influx of capital flows to EMDs 
counTerVailinG MoneTarY PoWer      9
from 2009 to 2012. This surge in inflows presented those countries with signifi-
cant currency appreciation and asset bubbles that threatened their recovery from 
the crisis. Many EMDs put in place capital controls on the inflow of capital to 
stem the harmful effects of volatile capital flows. Moreover, EMDs such as Brazil, 
Peru, South Korea, and Taiwan invented a third generation of capital controls 
that targeted the foreign exchange derivatives market. Cross-country evidence 
has shown that these measures succeeded in stemming the worst of the crisis and 
that countries that put such regulations in place after the crisis were less vulner-
able and grew faster. After unpacking these dynamics, I present new econometric 
evidence on the effectiveness of capital account regulations in Brazil and South 
Korea versus the foreign exchange interventions in Chile and South Africa. As 
we will see, that capital account regulations had an independent and significant 
impact on exchange rates and asset bubbles; however, those impacts, although 
positive, were relatively small. These findings, which are consistent with the pub-
lished literature on the subject, reinforce the idea that, although cross-border 
financial regulations are important and useful, EMDs cannot carry the burden 
of regulating cross-border finance on their own.
In chapter 5, I show how domestic and international political factors led a 
number of nations to put in place regulations on the inflow and outflow of capi-
tal at the domestic level. Nations such as Brazil, Indonesia, Peru, South Korea, and 
Taiwan have regulated capital inflows; Argentina, Ecuador, Iceland, India, South 
Korea, and Ukraine regulated capital outflows. Why, when so many nations were 
faced with similar levels of capital flows and had similar pressures on exchange 
rates and asset prices, did some nations act and others not? Through case studies 
of Brazil, Chile, South Africa, and South Korea, I trace the comparative political 
economy nation-states that exerted such power in the form of capital account 
regulations and foreign exchange intervention. In each case, the interplay among 
domestic and international institutions, interest groups, ideas, and party politics 
led to the use of different instruments in unique ways.
In chapter 6, I examine the political economy of the partial change in the IMF 
position on the capital account. Prompted by EMD concerns voiced to the IMF 
and at the G20, the IMF staff was charged with coordinating a process to formu-
late a new institutional view on managing the capital account that could be used 
in the IMF surveillance activities and country programs. I base the chapter (and 
chapter 7 on the G20) on in-depth interviews with the majority of the executive 
directors at the IMF and their staffs. I also interviewed senior staff in each of the 
three IMF departments engaged in the institutional-view process and in a simi-
lar process at the G20. In addition, I interviewed the director of the Institute for 
International Finance (IIF), the chief economist of the international division at 
the US Treasury Department, Representative Barney Frank (D-Massachusetts) 
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and his staff at the House Financial Services Committee, and staff at a number 
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were engaged in the process. In 
essence, I conduct an analysis to understand what really changed at the IMF with 
respect to capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. 
What is new is that the rationale for these changes is often framed in the language 
of new welfare economics, discussed in chapter 3. The new IMF view reframes 
capital controls as capital-flow management measures (CFMs). CFMs are rec-
ommended on inflows in the case of surges after other macroeconomic policies 
have been implemented, such as interest rate and fiscal policy management, the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and macroprudential financial regu-
lations. The IMF also sanctions the deployment of CFMs on outflows of capital 
in the event of a crisis. The IMF notes that this new IMF advice could clash with 
the trade and investment treaty commitments of members and recommends es-
tablishing safeguards granting nations the right to regulate using CFMs without 
this being in conflict with trade commitments. Finally, and in stark contrast with 
previous analyses of the IMF position on the capital account, the IMF notes that 
industrialized countries may need to regulate the outflow of capital in concert 
with developing countries regulating inflows. The most significant change is that 
the institutional view is an official board-endorsed view that the staff will incor-
porate into surveillance activities.
Also in chapter 6, I return to some of the themes in chapter 2 and examine how 
EMDs and IMF staff interacted in an attempt to preserve the policy space granted 
by the IMF for capital account regulation. The institutional view looks the way 
it does because of new ideas among key IMF staff that were partially consistent 
with the demands of many EMDs—particularly a previously formed coalition of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Although the process of 
rethinking the IMF view of the capital account was prompted by EMDs, it was 
coordinated and controlled by IMF staff. The final version of the IMF institu-
tional view also reflects a partial acceptance of cross-border financial regulation 
by some industrialized countries, although the core industrialized countries were 
initially not supportive of engaging in this process. I show that the BRICS nations 
punched far above their IMF voting weight throughout the deliberations for three 
reasons. First, EMDs, especially BRICS, formed a coalition that often had a unified 
voice. Second, EMDs used extra-forum leverage by exploiting networks within the 
G20 to wedge their views into the discourse at the IMF. Third, given that some 
IMF staff were pushing a view that overlapped significantly with the EMD posi-
tions, EMDs used intraforum leverage by using these IMF staff views as a wedge to 
combat industrialized countries that opposed the BRICS positions.
In chapter 7, I examine the extent to which the newly invigorated G20 nations 
has succeeded at coordinating global monetary policy to mitigate the  volatility of 
counTerVailinG MoneTarY PoWer      11
capital flows in the wake of the crisis and coordinated national financial regula-
tory reform to prevent the next crisis. The G20 is improvement over the G7 and 
G8 models of global economic coordination because it now includes some sig-
nificant EMDs. Through the G20, EMDs—particularly the same BRICS coali-
tion that formed in the IMF—were able to elevate the long-held EMD concern 
of capital flow volatility, which was reflected in numerous G20 communiqués. 
Moreover, in 2011 a set of “Coherent Conclusions” (G20 Information Centre 
2011b) about the regulation of global capital flows was signed by the G20 that 
reiterated the right of nations to regulate capital flows as they saw fit. That said, 
these changes in policy outputs were not matched by changes in economic out-
comes. The G20 was also intended to serve as a coordinator of monetary policy 
and financial reform. With respect to capital flows, five years after the financial 
crisis those goals are yet to be achieved. The industrialized countries, especially 
the United States, did not coordinate their monetary policies with or clearly 
communicate them to other G20 nations, especially EMDs. I also find that im-
portant components of financial regulatory reform that could have regulated 
cross-border capital movements were largely exempted from the US Dodd-Frank 
bill. Moreover, the OECD rebranded cross-border financial regulations as “in-
vestment protectionism” and is publishing annual monitoring reports under the 
auspices of the G20.
In chapter 8, I trace how capital account liberalization was reconstructed as 
“trade in financial services” and inserted into various global, regional, and bilat-
eral trade and investment agreements. Using a legal analysis, I show that WTO 
members must partially liberalize their capital account if they are committed to 
liberalizing trade in financial services under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). In the wake of the crisis, however, the exceptions to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have been implicitly deemed to provide 
WTO members with the policy space to regulate cross-border finance to prevent 
and mitigate a future crisis—even though legal scholars are still concerned about 
whether such exceptions would survive an actual WTO case. Unfortunately the 
WTO is losing favor to free-trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), especially to those with the United States. These treaties cover 
financial services and all forms of investment, including currency trades, deriva-
tives, and portfolio flows. Many of these treaties legally mandate that the transfer 
of investment occurs freely and without delay between signatories and have few 
or no exceptions.
Also in chapter 8, I show how some EMDs have been able to maintain policy 
space to regulate cross-border finance at the WTO and in their FTAs and BITs. 
The most successful saw cross-border finance as something that needed to be 
regulated and were able to flex their newfound economic power in institutions 
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that gave EMDs a more equal say. The least successful were not particularly con-
vinced that capital flows need to be regulated or were weaker states in institu-
tional arrangements that favored more powerful states.
In chapter 9, I summarize the key findings of the book and outline some 
implications for both policy and further scholarship. I then use the concept of 
countervailing monetary power to hypothesize how global economic governance 
institutions may change with respect to the governance of capital flows in the 
future.
Toward a Theory of countervailing 
Monetary Power
Throughout this book I argue that the changes in the global economic gover-
nance of capital flows were in part a function of countervailing monetary power, 
whereby at the national level EMDs were able to counter political pressure and 
sophisticated global capital markets to manage their financial stability between 
2009 and 2012. I also argue that, at a global level, EMDs were able to somewhat 
counter hegemonic and state-centric power at the Executive Board of the IMF, at 
the G20, at the WTO, and, to a lesser extent, in the world of regional and bilateral 
trade and investment treaties to defend or create policy space to take domestic 
action.
The theory of countervailing monetary power is not universal, nor was it 
pervasive in the post-crisis period under study. Countervailing monetary power 
explains only how some EMDs deviated from and countered the structural power 
of global markets, on the one hand, and the power of industrialized countries 
in global economic governance institutions that remains pervasive in the world 
economy today, on the other. The existing literature continues to provide strong 
explanations for why so many nations did not reregulate at the national level and 
why advances in global economic governance institutions were only incremental, 
albeit significant.
There is a strong literature that explains why many nation-states now face se-
rious hurdles when contemplating the regulation of cross-border finance. David 
Andrews presents a capital mobility hypothesis that “policy options available 
to states are systematically circumscribed” because of the structural power of 
global capital markets (1994, 193). Moreover, John Goodman and Louis Pauly 
(1993) and Benjamin Cohen (1998) argue that the veto power of foreign in-
vestors over national regulation (by threatening to exit with their capital) re-
inforces the structural power of the markets. Foreign investors are bolstered by 
domestic agents, such as exporters, that are most connected to global markets 
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and  dependent on such markets for finance. Those sectors that benefit the most 
from capital flows become relatively stronger and support political parties that 
support the deregulation of the capital account as well (Freiden 1991; Lieteretz 
2012). These forces combine to devise institutions that make it harder for other 
actors to put regulations in place. Finally, technocrats who are placed in those 
institutions have economic ideas that favor capital account liberalization over 
capital account regulation. Capital account liberalization becomes the dominant 
way of thinking within the economics profession and thus permeates the central 
banks and finance ministries the world over (Fourcade 2006; Chwieroth 2010a. 
Finally, these actions become supported and sometimes conditional on good re-
lations with the United States and Europe and with the international financial 
institutions where those nations hold the most voting power and or can exercise 
their market power (Woods, 2006; Abdelal 2007; Chwieroth 2012; Wade and Ven-
eroso 1998; Narlikar 2003).
But what is perhaps the most significant reason that EMD nation-states fail 
to regulate the negative impacts of surges and sudden stops of capital flows is 
largely missing from the literature. This is probably because there is very little 
literature on the political economy of regulating capital flows in EMDs, while 
there is a great deal on capital flows in the advanced economies. Because capital 
flows are pro-cyclical and occur in accentuated surges and sudden stops, all the 
forces against regulation are precisely at their most powerful during the inflow 
surge, when capital most needs to be regulated. Exchange rate appreciation al-
lows firms to borrow more in dollars; asset price bubbles make people feel richer 
and strengthen the economic and political power of global finance. During the 
subsequent boom, most agents across an economy think that things are going 
well and this strengthens the case of those who advocate that free-flowing capital 
is a good thing. New work on advanced economies supports this view, referring 
to a similar process (although not with the exchange rate effects) as “political 
bubbles” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2013).
In chapter 5, I show how these insights go a long way in explaining why some 
nations did not reregulate capital flows in the wake of the crisis. In South Africa, 
the finance ministry and central bank held strong ideas about capital controls 
not being appropriate and shared the concerns held by the domestic and foreign 
private sector about the exit of foreign investment if such instruments were used. 
Indeed, South Africa further liberalized the capital account in its attempt to send 
the “right” signals to markets. Chile also lacked a strong private-sector voice to 
regulate cross-border finance. Moreover, the right-of-center political party that 
was in place put economists who had negative views about regulating capital 
flows in the central bank. In addition, Chile cited that such regulations would 
violate its commitments under a trade treaty with the United States.
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Industrialized nation-states also exert significant power over EMDs in the 
economic sphere of global statecraft. There is close to a consensus across most 
schools of thought that the industrialized nations exert power over EMDs in 
global monetary relations because of the significant economic power held by the 
industrialized world and by the global economic institutions that were created to 
reflect the image and interests of those nations (Cohen 1998, 2007; Andrews 2006 
Babb 2009; Copelovitch 2010; Thacker 1999; Wade and Veneroso 1998; Bhagwati 
1997). The industrialized countries, or great powers, are seen as holding power 
due to the large size of their economies. This economic power allows the in-
dustrialized world to create institutions and global regulations that solidify and 
embolden that power (Drezner 2007). When such institutions are created, they 
are stacked with technocrats and managers who hold ideas that reinforce the 
dominant ideas held by the great powers (Chwieroth 2010a).
The literature goes a long way in explaining why the hoped-for changes in the 
global economic governance of capital flows by the EMDs were only partially 
realized. As I show in chapter 6, the EMDs were able to obtain a formal blessing 
from the IMF for certain kinds of capital controls. Yet the industrialized coun-
tries on the IMF Executive Board ensured that certain kinds of capital controls 
remained shunned, especially specific references to the need for industrialized 
countries to coordinate the global governance of capital flows by putting regula-
tions on the outflow of capital in source countries. EMDs were able to get open-
ings in G20 communiqués and other documents that legitimized the need to 
regulate capital flows, but the industrialized countries were not willing to change 
their policies so that regulating cash flows would impact economic outcomes in a 
major way. Larger EMDs were able to maintain the policy space to regulate cross-
border finance under the WTO, but weaker states were forced to trade away their 
right to regulate capital flows when they engaged in bilateral and regional trade 
deals with the industrialized countries.
Nevertheless, some EMDs did, indeed, reregulate capital flows at the domestic 
level and were able to work together to carve out or maintain some of the policy 
space they enjoyed in global economic governance institutions. These excep-
tions to the currently prevailing literature are what I call countervailing mon-
etary power. The idea of countervailing monetary power over powerful market 
forces borrows from John Kenneth Galbraith’s (1952) concept of countervailing 
power. In Galbraith´s assessment of post-war US capitalism, he saw a natural 
tendency for the concentration and accumulation of economic power in large 
industrial firms. The concentration of such power squeezed the ability of input 
providers, workers, and consumers to get fair prices for the goods and services 
they produced or consumed. But economic power could be balanced by coun-
tervailing power at the micro and macro levels. At the micro level, workers and 
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input providers could counter economic power by bargaining collectively with 
the larger firms. At the macro level, the state could create regulations to intro-
duce market competition or other boundaries that would limit the accumula-
tion of economic power. Indeed, Galbraith saw countervailing power as one of 
the key characteristics of the post-war era, which that others have called the 
golden age of capitalism because of its relatively robust and egalitarian economic 
growth (Marglin and Schor 1992). Interestingly, Galbraith focused on industrial 
firms and did not discuss the financial sector because it was no longer a symbol 
of economic power. At the time of Galbraith’s seminal work, the financial sector 
was heavily regulated and cross-border finance was minimal. Thus, he turned 
his attention to the rebirth of market power in industry. Market power creates 
distortions in an economy; thus, correcting for such power makes markets work 
more efficiently. Such a notion has been extended to capital flows by Anton Ko-
rinek and others (discussed in chapter 3). Countervailing monetary power is 
also a way of thinking about traditionally weaker states in global economic gov-
ernance institutions.
Based on the analyses in this book, there are ten factors that can enable EMDs 
to exert countervailing power over the structural power of global markets, on 
the one hand, and in global economic governance institutions, on the other. The 
first five pertain to countervailing monetary power at the national domestic level, 
where nation-states exert power over domestic political pressure and capital 
markets. The second five pertain to state-centric countervailing monetary power 
in global economic governance institutions.
1. Governments seeking to regulate cross-border finance can exert coun-
tervailing monetary power if they have institutions that allow financial 
regulators to act in a timely and countercyclical manner.
As I show in chapter 3, the short-term benefits of surges of capital flows are as-
sociated with increases in aggregate demand. Moreover, firms and households 
feel richer as asset prices rise and as they have more purchasing power due to ex-
change rate appreciation. If a government seeks to regulate cross-border capital 
at this time, it will face steep opposition because all the forces that will oppose 
regulation are at their strongest.
Both Brazil and South Korea have legislation and institutional frameworks 
that allow financial authorities (both the finance ministry and central bank) to 
act quickly and at their discretion to put regulations in place in a countercycli-
cal manner. The financial authorities, thus, do not have to engage in a legislative 
battle during a boom. Not only would such a battle be difficult to win, but legisla-
tion often takes a significant amount of time to enact, at which point the capital 
flow cycle may have already played itself out.
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Having legislation in place also gives a government the institutional space to 
deviate from the increasing trend in central bank mandates of inflation targeting 
and price stability. Finance ministers and central banks, if they deem it prudent 
to regulate in the first place, can do so and only have to justify their actions to the 
political system rather than go through a full on legislative process.
2. Governments will more likely have the political power to regulate 
cross-border finance if they are backed by an export sector that is more 
concerned about the exchange rate than about access to global finance.
At the national level, regulations on cross-border financial flows are a form of 
countervailing monetary power. In the case of Brazil, countervailing monetary 
power was in part made possible because of a strong export sector that was very 
motivated by the need to limit exchange rate volatility. This concern overrode the 
traditional alliance between exporters and the financial sector in EMDs. Many 
researchers have shown that the sectors with the closest ties to major cross- 
border financial actors are the exporters of tradable goods, which are less apt to 
bite the hand that feeds them through regulating cross-border financial actors 
(Freiden 1991; Leiteritz 2012). It has been noted, however, that sometimes these 
two groups of actors have divergent interests because exporters are hurt by ex-
change rate appreciation while finance benefits from inflows (Frieden 1991). In 
Brazil, the export sector is not as interconnected with the global financial sector 
as it is in many other countries. The Brazilian national development bank and 
the commercial banks have to provide significant levels of finance to Brazilian 
 exporters—often at different terms than global capital markets. The Brazilian in-
dustrial export sector was thus very concerned about the exchange rate and pro-
vided a well-organized constituency that rallied for government policy change.
3. Governments will more likely have the political power to regulate cross-
border finance if they are backed by workers who are more concerned 
about job security than about the consumption benefits that come with 
exchange rate appreciation.
As consumers, workers may be less apt to support regulation that would reduce 
upward pressure on the exchange rate and asset prices. Exchange rate apprecia-
tion allows workers to purchase more goods, and asset bubbles allow them to feel 
more wealthy as well.
In the case of Brazil, however, maintaining job security can override these 
more short-term concerns. The most organized workers in Brazil are in the ex-
port industrial sectors. These workers also form a formidable component of the 
Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), which was in power 
during the entire period when capital controls were put in place in this study. 
counTerVailinG MoneTarY PoWer      17
When the exchange rate appreciated in Brazil, many firms began to lose their 
competitiveness and shed jobs, thus deviating from one of the fundamental te-
nets of the PT government. Regulating capital flows became part of a broader 
job security package and had strong backing from workers. Indeed, the implicit 
alliance between the export sectors and their workers gave the PT very strong 
backing.
4. Governments can get backing for the reregulation of cross-border finance 
by evoking the collective memory of past crises with workers and con-
sumers.
Governments can also evoke past crises to gain further support. There is a large 
literature on the politics of memory that discusses how past traumatic events 
(or golden years) play a big role in the decision making of many political actors. 
The majority of this literature focuses on traumatic political events such as war, 
genocide, and dictatorship (for a recent analysis, see Berger 2013). Past traumas 
impact the collective memory of a nation and, in part, shape the identities of 
political actors. Much has been written about the politics of memory in Germany 
and Japan after World War II, and about Latin America after the dictatorships of 
the later part of the twentieth century. What has received relatively less attention 
is that past financial crises can also impact the collective memory of nations.
The collective memory of national trauma from past economic crises is tapped 
into by political actors. Indeed, in the wake of the financial crisis the US adminis-
tration evoked the memory of Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression to 
justify a government-led fiscal stimulus as an instrument for recovery. Although 
fewer Americans were old enough to remember the Great Depression, the period 
is such a part of the collective memory that it motivated some to act in ways 
they might not have in calmer times. In Germany, a significant amount of atten-
tion has been paid to the impact of inflation on the German collective memory. 
Unlike in the United States, leaders in Germany have pushed for more austere 
responses to the global financial crisis. Those leaders have been able to harness 
support for this approach by raising the specter of inflation experienced during 
and after the First World War (Feldman 1997; O’Callaghan 2012; Blyth 2013).
In Brazil and South Korea, the collective memory of past crises is very much 
on the minds of the populace and of their leaders. This memory played a sig-
nificant role in the politics of reregulating cross-border finance in both of these 
countries. Brazil had major financial crises in the 1980s and in the 1990s that 
were characterized by hyperinflation, capital flight, and many lost livelihoods. 
Brazilian leaders were very aware of this, which gave them the political space to 
act more boldly than they might have been able to otherwise. Collective mem-
ory of this sort also makes workers reframe their interests with relation to the 
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exchange rate. Of course, as consumers, workers enjoy exchange rate apprecia-
tion because a stronger currency helps consumers purchase more products from 
abroad. But as workers they also see that their wages and jobs are dependent on 
the strong performance of the firms they work for. The Brazilian crises are recent 
enough that the experience of capital flight and high inflation still send shivers 
down Brazilian spines.
This is case in South Korea, as well. Indeed, the collective memory of national 
economic trauma turned out to be a stronger determinant in South Korea than 
in Brazil. South Korea had a center-right political party in power during the crisis 
and did not have the support of the export sector or the financial sector when 
the government took action. Key leaders (and their advisor, Hyun Song Shin) 
went ahead with regulation anyway because they had the legislative authority to 
act quickly. In defense of their actions, leaders evoked the memory of the crisis in 
the 1990s. South Koreans still refer to their crisis in 1997–1998 as the IMF Crisis, 
and regardless of political party, leaders have strived to accumulate reserves and 
regulate finance so as not to have another crisis (Korea Times 2012). The specter 
of inflation and hardship is strong in the minds of the general public—thus, the 
public salience of financial stability is much stronger in South Korea than in 
other nations (Pagliari 2013).
5. Policymakers can temper opposition by reframing regulations in the new 
welfare economics of capital controls.
The new welfare economics and related thinking about capital controls caught 
on and are linked to the macroprudentializing of post-crisis regulation that has 
occurred since the crisis. Andrew Baker sees macroprudential tools as spreading 
like wildfire since the crisis for four reasons (the four Ps):
P1.  presence—the prior intellectual and institutional presence of ideas;
P2.  professional positioning—advocates of ideas becoming better posi-
tioned in professional policy networks;
P3.  promotion and persuasion—individual insiders (norm entrepreneurs) 
willingly engaging in networking and persuasion strategies, actively 
promoting ideas when the opportunity arose; and
P4.  plausibility—a seeming increase in the explanatory capacity of those 
ideas based on their diagnosis of the situation and their advocacy of 
a feasible programme of action that could be accepted by a range of 
relevant actors, together with the rising professional esteem, status and 
standing of the advocates of those ideas, based on their prior analytical 
performance, which increased the  plausibility, both of them as individ-
uals and the ideas they were advocating. (2013, 114)
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In both Brazil and South Korea, the new economics of capital controls and 
the new terminology of macroprudential measures were cloaked to help con-
vince or calm potential opponents. In Brazil, the finance ministry reframed the 
 rationale for regulating cross-border financial flows as the need to internalize 
an externality to gain the backing of the central bank for regulation. In South 
Korea, the regulations were formulated by well-known economist Hyun Song 
Shin from Princeton University. Shin is one of the pioneering economists who 
has contributed to the new thinking on cross-border financial flows. In press 
conferences, the Bank of Korea, associated financial ministries, and Shin him-
self together asserted that the South Korean measures were macroprudential 
in nature and were pragmatically needed to deal with the massive inflows of 
capital. Such a reframing calmed investor fears and also distracted the United 
States and other actors from focusing so much on the regulation (as happened 
in Brazil).
Figure 1.2 synthesizes the domestic political dynamics of countervailing 
monetary power using the classic work by Randall Henning (1994), which is very 
useful for putting the domestic politics of countervailing power in more theoret-
ical terms. In Henning’s treatment of exchange rate politics in Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, he finds that two conditions were necessary for  central 
banks to act to make currencies more stable: (1) a tight alliance between the 
financial sector and industry and (2)access by that alliance to a finance minister 
who held sway over central bank decision making on the exchange rate. Henning 
finds that a tight industry-finance alliance makes the financial sector more apt 
to support the need for industry to have a competitive exchange rate because 
competitiveness brings more profits to industry. Figure 1.2 re-creates Henning’s 
matrix, adding my case studies from this book. In Henning’s classification, Japan 
is in the bottom left quadrant because there was a strong  industry–banking sec-
tor alliance and the central bank was subordinate to the finance ministry. In the 
top right quadrant, he places the United States, where (at the time) there was a 
weaker link between finance and industry, and the central bank was very inde-
pendent. In that case, the United States did not act to defend the exchange rate, 
but Japan did.
Figure 1.2 shows how the emerging market cases deviate from industrialized 
countries, given that the key interest group alliance in EMDs is global finance 
and the export industry rather than domestic industry and domestic finance (as 
in the Henning’s study). In Brazil (upper left quadrant), there was a weak alli-
ance between global finance and the export industry, and a semi-subordinate 
central bank (at least for managing capital flows); nevertheless, Brazil regulated. 
In South Korea (lower left quadrant), there was a strong global finance–export 
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 sector alliance, but that alliance was against regulation. This was because, when 
debt and finance are denominated in US dollars, both the export sector and 
global finance bear a material cost. South Korea did have a semi-subordinate 
central bank on these matters, however, and government officials were able to use 
that mechanism to override interest-group opposition by reframing regulation 
and by drawing on the collective memory of the broader public.
In the emerging market cases, a significant portion of corporate debt is not 
issued in the domestic currency and a significant portion (especially during a 
surge) of the domestic asset accumulation comes from foreigners (see chapters 3 
and 4). This puts Chile and South Africa in the bottom right quadrant of 
Fig ure 1.2. These actors were tightly allied in that exporters in both rely on 
global finance for credit. The global banks bear the cost of regulation because 
controls are an explicit or implicit tax on their activities. Successful regulation 
also increases costs for exporters, which rely heavily on foreign finance. If a 
capital account regulation is successful it will reduce upward pressure on the 
exchange rate and, thus, increase the cost for the firm of paying back its debt 
when the currency depreciates. As in the case of the United States, the Chilean 
exporters were not tightly allied with the financial sector.
In Chile, South Africa, and even South Korea, this global finance–exporter 
alliance was strongly opposed to regulation. The central bank in Chile and South 
Africa had full independence on these matters but also shared the view of the 
finance-export alliance. In Chile, the central bank had legislation on the books 
that allowed it to regulate the inflow of capital; however, a right-wing political 
party that was in power represented the global financial–exporter alliance and 



























FiGure 1.2. Political economy of regulating capital flows at the national level. 
Countries in parentheses are Henning’s (1994) original classification. N/A, not 
applicable (Adapted from Henning 1994).
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alone decides when Chile can draw on its infamous Encaje law, which allows the 
central bank to put capital controls in place. The central bank at the time was very 
cautious, having just been reorganized after a conservative government had won 
an election. The Chilean case was further influenced by the fact that the country 
had a trade agreement with the United States that would have caused Chile to pay 
significant damages (and sent concerning signals to markets) if it had deployed 
capital controls.
In South Africa, there was a tight alliance between industry and finance that 
was also against taking significant action. Banks were against the measures for 
material reasons. Despite the massive exchange rate pressure, exporters were 
reluctant to support capital controls because they were very concerned about 
being punished by the capital markets that fed them. The finance ministry held 
the same view and was concerned about financing a growing current account 
deficit. The central bank was very independent and was very cautious about 
the use of capital account regulations, despite the fact that the IMF suggested 
that such measures might be in order. These factors overpowered the trade 
unions, some manufacturers, and IMF recommendations for temporary capital 
controls.
Again, South Korea is in the bottom left quadrant. In South Korea, there was a 
tight global finance–exporter alliance. Indeed, chapters 4 and 5 show that South 
Korean exporters used the carry trade to borrow at low interest rates in the United 
States to finance their activities and hedge against other risks. These actors were 
against regulation. The finance ministry and central bank had legislation that al-
lowed them to deviate from the central bank price-stability mandate. Hyun Song 
Shin and others in the finance ministry and central bank used this mechanism to 
circumvent the pressure from the global finance–exporter alliance. As discussed 
in chapter 9, South Korea also negotiated hard to keep the policy space to regulate 
capital flows under its FTA (Chile did not).
Brazil, in the upper left quadrant, deviates from the traditional Henning 
model in a different way. In the Brazilian case, there was a wedge between fi-
nance and industry because industry received a significant portion of its credit 
from the national development bank and from private banks operating under 
heavy regulations to subsidize credit. This wedge made the distribution of 
the costs and benefits of regulation manifest themselves in different ways in 
 Brazil—and thus led to the formation of different preferences. The interna-
tional banks were against the regulations because they would have to bear the 
cost of taxation and regulation. Exporters (and their workers) supported the 
effort because it would provide exchange rate relief. They did not as rely on 
foreign loans, which are more easily paid off with an appreciating currency and 
harder to pay off if the regulations succeed in weakening the currency. Thus, the 
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Brazilian firms rallied for the government to apply measures to stem exchange 
rate appreciation. Brazil also had the support of workers and legislation on the 
books to act quickly.
Henning’s model uses the relationship between interest-group pressure and 
institutions to explain policy outcomes. Such forces are also very strong in the 
cases examined in this book. In addition, however, the role of ideas and beliefs 
is also important in our cases, and it is hard to depict such a dimension using 
Henning’s matrix format. In Brazil and South Korea, policymakers also believed 
that capital account regulations were the proper responses to the build-up of 
systemic risk in their economies, and thus ideas are an interaction term in many 
ways. South Korea is perhaps the most interesting case because ideas and institu-
tions overrode interest-group pressure. Decision makers believed that regulating 
capital flows was an appropriate response. They had the power to respond despite 
interest-group pressure because they had institutional cover to enact regulation 
on a timely basis. The authorities also evoked the collective memory of past crises 
to gain popular support. The Brazilian financial authorities also believed that 
regulating capital flows was appropriate. For them, it was relatively easier to enact 
regulation because they had the backing of exporters, workers, and the general 
public through the collective memory of past crises. Moreover, although initially 
the central bank was not supportive of the measures, the finance ministry had the 
legislation that allowed authorities to act anyway. In contrast, in South Africa and 
Chile the key decision makers were less than convinced that regulating capital 
flows was an appropriate response to the problems at hand.
Henning’s formation demonstrates the conditions under which nations might 
counter the capital mobility hypothesis, outlined by Andrews (1994) for indus-
trialized nations. In this book, I provide further evidence showing that global 
capital markets do not have insurmountable power over nation-state action. 
Nevertheless, the conditions in emerging markets are different from those in the 
industrialized world. In general, subordinate central banks—or legislation that 
allows central banks to temporarily deviate from price-stability mandates in a 
countercyclical manner—continue to be important in deploying capital account 
regulations in EMDs. It is not clear, however, that a tight finance-industry alliance 
is a precondition, especially when it is a global finance–export industry alliance 
in developing countries dependent on foreign finance for trade and investment. 
In such cases, interest groups may have policy positions that are opposite to the 
ones Henning found in industrialized countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, 
the case studies presented here suggest that a nation is more apt to act on the 
exchange rate when there is a wedge between exporters and the global finan-
cial sector that has to bear the cost of regulation or where the finance ministry 
and central bank act independently and pragmatically to override  interest-group 
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pressure. What still appears to hold strongly for applications of Henning’s model 
to EMDs is that there needs to be a temporary subordination of the central bank 
to the finance ministry, or at least an institutional arrangement that allows the 
bank to deviate from its core mandate.
We now move to a discussion of how EMDs can use countervailing power 
to counter the state-centric power of industrialized nations in global economic 
governance institutions.
6. Governments will be more likely to attempt to regulate cross-border 
finance if they have the policy space to do so under global economic 
governance institutions such as the IMF and WTO.
The final domestic policy condition that allows a nation-state to exercise coun-
tervailing monetary power over capital markets is having the policy space to 
regulate under its global economic governance commitments. To satisfy this 
condition, EMDs need to enter into the realm of monetary statecraft. In global 
economic institutions, EMDs are seen to have relatively less power because the 
industrialized countries have a great deal of economic power and the interna-
tional financial institutions explicitly or implicitly reinforce that power over 
EMDs. My research suggests that EMDs can also exert countervailing monetary 
power over hegemonic and state-centric power at the Executive Board of the IMF, 
at the G20, at the WTO, and, to some extent, in the world of regional and bilateral 
trade and investment treaties to defend or create the policy space they need to 
take domestic action.
7. As EMDs gain more market power, they obtain more conducive policy 
outcomes in global economic governance institutions.
Perhaps the most significant factor that has allowed some EMDs to either pre-
serve or expand their policy space to regulate cross-border finance is their rising 
level of market power in the global economy. Up until the 1990s, the industrial-
ized nations made up close to three-quarters of the world economy. As Albert 
Hirschman (1945) notes, market power gives nation-states significant leverage 
in global negotiations regardless of whether the voting structure of the particu-
lar negotiating body is by consensus. Of course, voting at the IMF is skewed 
against EMDs because voting power is a direct function of the economic size of 
members. In institutions such as the WTO where final decision is by consensus 
vote, however, outcomes are largely determined by market power. When the in-
dustrialized world made up three-quarters of the world economy, negotiations 
were largely over what conditions the industrialized world put on access to those 
large markets (see Gallagher 2013). Nations, such as Brazil, that had the domestic 
conditions of countervailing power in place have flourished in global economic 
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governance institutions where they have a more equal share in voting and deci-
sion making. The most significant example of this is in the WTO, where Brazil 
was able to leverage its significant market power to maintain its ability to regu-
late cross-border financial regulations when it was negotiating GATS (see chap -
ter 8). Moreover, Brazil has been able to leverage its economic power in bilateral 
negotiations with industrialized countries. Many EMDs, especially BRICS, have 
been able to elevate the conversation about capital flows as they have entered the 
G20, which has a more equal distribution of membership than the G7 does. As 
EMDs increase the size of their own markets, they can (slowly) gain more say in 
the traditional international financial institutions as well.
8. EMDs can concentrate their market power through coalition building in 
institutions where voting power is less equal or by consensus.
Obviously, coalitions of EMDs can further concentrate market power and fur-
ther advance the ability of nations to create or maintain the policy space to regu-
late capital flows. At the IMF, a coalition of BRICS countries formed to challenge 
the quota system for decision making in that institution. This gave EMDs slightly 
more voting power. During the process of reevaluating the management of capi-
tal flows at the IMF, the BRICS coalition was also a useful platform for EMDs to 
influence the institutional view. These coalitions were able to punch above their 
voting weight because they leveraged stronger forces in the IMF and in regimes 
outside the IMF, such as the G20, where the BRICS coalition had more sway. 
Coalitions also play a key role in the WTO, although the BRICS do not have a 
formal coalition in that venue. Other coalitions have arisen in the WTO that 
have limited the ability of industrialized nations to put investment rules into the 
WTO. As a counterfactual, however, in regional and bilateral deals, where EMDs 
have relatively less market power (and less opportunity for coalitions), they are 
often forced to trade measures to ensure financial stability for the market access 
to industrialized nations.
9. EMD coalitions can exploit the fragmentation of the global economic 
governance, and institutions can be leveraged by EMDs to exert counter-
vailing monetary power.
The BRICS nations were able to exercise power as autonomy by protecting 
their ability to exercise cooperative decentralization to regulate capital flows 
under the IMF and at the G20 (Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). New thinking 
might lead scholars to see the fragmentation of the international financial legal 
arenas as a means whereby industrialized countries could further consolidate 
their power of influence. In this light, Daniel Drezner quotes Eyal Benvenisti and 
George Downs (2007): “a fragmented legal order provides powerful states with 
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much needed flexibility. . . . the existence of multiple contesting institutions re-
moves the need for them to commit themselves irrevocably to any given one. This 
helps them to manage risk, and it increases their already substantial bargaining 
power” (in Drezner 2009, 67). Instead, EMDs engaged in a financial jujitsu that 
used multiple fora to defend cooperative decentralization. I show how, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, it was actually the EMDs that used the multiple contest-
ing institutions to their advantage; they especially used the G20, the eurozone 
crisis, the establishment of a BRICS bank and reserve currency pool, and the 
global financial press to forge communiqués and global policymaker opinion to 
garner support in the club of the IMF Executive Board, where the institution was 
stacked against their positions due to IMF voting quotas, and at the G20.
Using the realist perspective developed in international relations theory, coun-
tervailing monetary power can be seen as the willingness and ability of follower 
states (EMDs) with plebeian currencies to mitigate the impacts of the economic 
power exerted by nations at the top of the hierarchy of money and power (Cohen 
1998). EMDs gained enough economic growth, armed themselves with alterna-
tive ideas, and forged alliances with key parties and interest groups to project 
their own countervailing power into this international regulatory regime. They 
did this in the sense articulated by Hirschman (1945), who shows how states 
with larger economic size use market access to exert power over other nations. 
Jonathan Kirshner (1995) extends this Hirschmanian notion of power to the 
monetary realm, a definitional extension that comes in handy in the twenty-first 
century, a period when EMDs make up more than half of the world economy and 
are growing faster than industrialized countries. And as industrialized growth 
stagnates, the new markets are in the emerging markets. Thus EMDs have, for 
the first time, new leverage points in global economic relations. Granted, some of 
these states have enjoyed a configuration of domestic politics and international 
position such that they could reassert this power, but others have not. Counter-
vailing monetary power does not change the fundamental structure or transfer 
power from one set of agents to another. Still, it is important that this form of 
power leaves open the possibility that the weaker states can maintain, or at least 
attempt, stability and autonomy.
If Western powers had their way at the IMF or the G20, there may well have 
been a new push to make capital account liberalization a global mandate again. 
Rather than a change in the Articles of Agreement, the result was an Executive 
Board–endorsed institutional view that translates into the IMF giving nonbind-
ing advice through its country surveillance activities. BRICS were able to use 
multiple global economic fora to wedge their concerns into the IMF decision-
making process. Finally, EMDs wedged similar thinking into and obtained le-
gitimacy from IMF staff, which had undergone its own transformation. In line 
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with institutionalist perspectives on international economic regimes, BRICS 
resorted to intra- and extra-forum institutional leverage to punch above their 
voting weight at the IMF. BRICS have exercised countervailing monetary power 
to help shape new institutions (i.e., guidelines) for the use of capital account 
regulations in a manner that did less harm than they might have if such rules 
had been created solely by the developed countries or had fully exercised the 
power of industrialized nations over BRICS in the IMF and G20. They achieved 
this outcome by forging BRICS coalitions, using extra-forum leverage at the G20 
and beyond. Moreover, they also used intraforum leverage by highlighting the 
epistemic alignment emerging between new IMF and EMD thinking—often by 
working alongside the IMF staff holding similar ideas—and then stressing the 
differences between these shared positions and the stance of the industrialized 
nations. The combined efforts of each set of actors resulted in an outcome in 
which there was no change in the Articles of Agreement and that included some 
issues proposed by EMDs and IMF staff that would not otherwise have been 
included in the final institutional view.
The structure of IMF voting power explains why many of the recommenda-
tions made by staff and by EMDs did not end up in the final institutional view of 
the IMF. Nevertheless, EMDs, especially the BRICS, formed a coalition that often 
had a unified voice and used extra-forum leverage by exploiting networks in the 
G20 to wedge EMD views into the dominant discourse. Moreover, EMD views 
were often shared by IMF staff, allowing the use of intraforum leverage.
10.  EMDs can reframe and leverage the new ideas and discourse on 
macroprudential regulation to support their domestic regulations in 
 mitigating capital flows in global economic governance deliberations.
In this book, I also provide insights into theories of ideational change applied 
to international economic regimes coming from the constructivist tradition in 
political economy (Chwieroth 2010a; Baker 2013). The IMF senior staff mem-
bers charged with rethinking capital account liberalization did not simply change 
their views given the merits of the literature. Although the merits of the litera-
ture are surely explanatory, what made the idea of prudential capital controls 
so widespread across the IMF was that key research in the literature fit into the 
most cutting-edge thinking in neoclassical economics. Current and former IMF 
staff members had published papers in the peer-reviewed literature showing that 
capital account liberalization was not strongly associated with growth and was 
likely to be associated with banking crises.
But, when it came to regulating cross-border finance, a sea change in thinking 
overtook the rationale for such regulation. That rationale came from the theo-
retical breakthrough in welfare economics, a school of thought at the core of the 
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mainstream neoclassical tradition. The idea of capital account regulation for the 
sake of financial stability diffused across the IMF from the highest levels of its 
research infrastructure to Article IV reports because the IMF did the economet-
ric work and the breakthrough, cutting-edge, new welfare economics of capital 
controls fit right into its mainstream economics.
New work in political science supports this interpretation. Whether it is called 
“translation” (Ban 2013b) or “constitutive localization” (Acharya 2009), the pro-
cess that is most likely to enable ideational change is the one in which high-status 
insiders build bridges between institutionalized ideas and the new ideas. Even 
though the heterodox (Minskian) developmentalists had ideas and policy recom-
mendations similar to those coming from new welfare economics, the latter were 
easier to translate quickly into policy advice because of the goodness of fit of new 
welfare economics with the theoretical apprati already shared by high-status IMF 
insiders at the time. Scholars have established that, given the increasingly US-
centric nature of the international scientific power hierarchy that governs mod-
ern economics (Fourcade and Babb 2002; Fourcade 2006) and the staff selection 
practices of prominent international policy fora such as the IMF (Chwieroth 
2010), the holders of prestigious US degrees enjoy higher status capital, superior 
material resources for research, and easier access to international and domestic 
policy institutions. This means that new ideas about the regulation of the capital 
account could nudge the old capital liberalization orthodoxy as long as the ideas 
resonated with, or were made to resonate with, the neoclassical fundamentals of 
this epistemic elite.
In line with this argument, I find that this shift happened when empirical 
research done by economists within the IMF came into contact with empirical 
work done by academic researchers who came from a school of thought embed-
ded in neoclassical economics (i.e., Olivier Jeanne’s and Korinek’s welfare eco-
nomics) and whose work had been endorsed by high-status policy economists 
such as Olivier Blanchard and Kenneth Rogoff. The new welfare economics and 
the preponderance of econometric evidence were highly present when the IMF 
was charged with reevaluating capital account liberalization and the manage-
ment of capital flows. Jonathan Ostry, Blanchard, and others on the inside, as well 
as Jeanne, Arvind Subramanian, and others on the outside, now had perfect pro-
fessional positioning as high-ranking staff at the IMF and highly public experts. 
Staff members on the inside and outside actively promoted their work—on the 
inside by working with EMDs and on the outside through blogs, op-eds, books, 
and beyond. Finally, the plausibility of their ideas had great force because they 
were founded in a fundamental new breakthrough in economic science.
This speaks to the process through which transformative economic ideas dif-
fuse, shape policy, and perhaps even change the interests of certain agents by 
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working through mainstream sites of high economic theory and empirical evi-
dence. Innovations within new welfare economics were based on a breakthrough 
in the core theory that was quickly hot and important. In the case of the econo-
metric evidence on capital controls, such analyses were done using the most 
mainstream and significant econometric modeling and execution techniques. 
These two findings in theory and evidence fit right in with the prevailing neoclas-
sical paradigm, making it easier for IMF staff and decision makers to change their 
minds. The importance of translation is underscored by the fact that, although 
the EMDs had been articulating a rationale for capital account regulation that 
was very similar to the policy implications of new welfare economics for over 
twenty years, they did so using theoretical and evidence gathering apparati that 
were situated outside the boundaries of neoclassical economics. This translation 
process resulted in the new welfare economics and related thinking about capital 
controls catching on and being linked to the macroprudentializing of post-crisis 
regulation that had occurred since the crisis.
To summarize, the domestic aspects of countervailing monetary power over 
capital markets have five pillars: domestic institutions that allow financial au-
thorities to regulate in a timely and countercyclical manner; the backing of ex-
porters who are more concerned about the exchange rate than about access to 
global finance; the backing of workers (and worker political parties) more moti-
vated by job security than by short-term consumption benefits; the backing by a 
general public haunted by the collective memory of past crises; and the successful 
translation of economic ideas to decision makers and the general public. The 
global statecraft aspects of countervailing monetary power have five additional 
pillars: the policy space in nations to regulate under global economic governance 
institutions; the market power in the global economy that allows nations to gain 
policy space; the concentration of market power by nations forming coalitions to 
leverage the fragmentation of global governance to their benefit; and the transla-
tion of new economic ideas to gain leverage.
In many ways, the global governance aspects of the theory of countervailing 
monetary power confirm and expand classic theories in the negotiation litera-
ture. Roger Fisher (1983) and William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin (2002) argue 
that, under conditions of power inequality, the parties with more power tend to 
exploit the weaker states except under special conditions: when the weaker states 
form coalitions, when the weaker states have similar ideas and ideology, when 
there are interpersonal relations among coalition members, when there is the 
power of a good alternative to negotiation, and when there is power of legiti-
macy. BRICS exercised these special conditions by exerting countervailing mon-
etary power. They formed key coalitions and exploited the fragmented nature 
of global economic governance, they coalesced around a series of similar ideas, 
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they worked in networks (many of the same negotiators at the IMF represented 
their nations at the G20, although not at the WTO), they had an alternative in 
the form of large levels of reserves and the creation of a development bank and 
reserve pool, and they had the power of legitimacy in the sense that they were 
not the cause of the financial crisis and that what they were doing was justified.
Countervailing monetary power has been limited in the wake of the economic 
crisis, but in this book I unpack the dynamics of those limited changes to draw 
out lessons for theory and policy. In the rest of this book, I develop this theory 
in an inductive manner. Through a series of empirical investigations, I show how 
some EMDs were able to reregulate cross-border finance and to maintain the 
policy space under global economic institutions to do so. Other EMDs did not 
reregulate and may have lost the policy space to reregulate cross-border finance. 
Unfortunately, the gains to the EMDs that did reregulate have been limited by do-
mestic politics, the lack of policy space for such regulation under various global 
economic governance institutions, and the lack of willingness of industrialized 





Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system, a system where regulations on 
cross-border capital flows were a global norm, the world community has lacked 
a forum for governing global capital flows. In the meantime, cross-border capital 
flows have increased by orders of magnitude, so much so that international asset 
positions now outstrip global economic output. Most cross-border capital flows 
occur among industrialized nations, but emerging-market and developing coun-
tries (EMDs) are increasing participants in the globalization of capital flows. Al-
though it is widely recognized that capital investment is an essential ingredient 
for economic growth, there is a growing concern that certain capital flows can be 
destabilizing to EMD financial systems by causing asset bubbles, that is, exchange 
rate appreciation during periods of massive capital inflows followed by sudden 
stops and capital flight that can jeopardize stability and growth (see Ocampo, 
Kregel, and Griffith-Jones 2007).
There is a long history of debate over volatile capital flows and the appropri-
ate government policies relating to them. The global financial crisis has opened 
a new chapter in this debate because pro-cyclical capital flows have been char-
acteristic throughout (Chinn and Frieden 2011; IMF 2010a, 2010b). At the turn 
of the twenty-first century, many international financial institutions and strands 
of economic thinking remained either hostile to or silent regarding regulating 
capital movements. In this chapter, I outline a modern history of the governance 
of cross-border capital flows from the founding of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to the turn of the twenty-first century.
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There is a vast literature on this subject, and by no means is this short chapter 
to be seen as a comprehensive review of that literature. In this chapter, I synthe-
size that literature to provide a backdrop for the chapters to come, which exam-
ine the global governance of capital flows.
The IMF governance of capital flows is a regime of cooperative decentraliza-
tion, and this regime has been contested since at least the 1970s. Despite such 
contestation, EMDs and interests in the industrialized world were able to stave 
off attempts in the late 1990s to shift the IMF toward strong international stan-
dards that would have mandated the free flow of capital under the IMF Articles 
of Agreement. I discuss the Bretton Woods era and then examine the period from 
the 1970s until the Asian financial crisis. In the succeeding chapters, I analyze 
the period from the Asian financial crisis to the global financial crisis and its 
aftermath.
cooperative decentralization:  
The bretton Woods era
The IMF Articles of Agreement, forged at the 1944 United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, grant nations the abil-
ity to pursue their own policies to regulate cross-border capital flows. Moreover, 
the Articles permit nations to cooperate internationally to enforce such regula-
tions. For almost a quarter century after the Bretton Woods meeting, this regime 
“functioned more or less as planned” (Eichengreen 2008, 92).
Under the umbrella of the IMF articles, the regime for governing capital 
flows could be characterized as, to use Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari’s 
(2011) term, cooperative decentralization. Cooperative decentralization is a re-
gime where there is interstate cooperation across divergent national regulatory 
approaches. This stands in contrast with what they term strong international 
standards, characterized by interstate cooperation and global regulatory con-
vergence across national systems of regulation. The IMF Articles of Agreement 
are actually an example of both. The Articles set out that no country may re-
strict current transactions—all profits and dividends from foreign transactions 
must be able to flow freely and without delay among IMF members around the 
world. This is enshrined in the IMF and is now echoed at the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), where a nation can restrict current transactions only if the 
IMF sanctions it. With respect to the capital account, however, the IMF allows 
for national diversity in terms of regulating capital flows and permits nations 
to cooperate to monitor and enforce such regulations on a multilateral basis. 
The distinction is this: strong international standards are universal and cannot 
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be deviated from; cooperative decentralization allows for arrangements where 
nations can pursue their own national policies but coordinate them on a mul-
tilateral level. Louis Pauly summed up the regime as “reconcil[ing] increasingly 
liberal external relations with the retention by individual states of their right to 
intervene in their internal economies” (1997, 80).
Forging the Global New Deal
The Bretton Woods conference was envisioned as resulting in a “New Deal in in-
ternational economics,” according to US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
and other core negotiators at the conference (Helleiner 2011a). In that vision, 
the meetings yielded an IMF that would help provide what Charles Kindleberger 
(1986) referred to as the five core public goods to maintain global economic 
stability while also granting nations the flexibility to pursue their own domestic 
objectives. Those five public goods are:
• Maintaining open markets during recessions
• Providing countercyclical lending
• Policing exchange rate stability
• Coordinating macroeconomic policy
• Acting as a lender of last resort
The embryo of these ideas was the League of Nations that had preceded the 
Bretton Woods institutions (Pauly 1997), but it was at Bretton Woods that the 
creation of the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), and the fixed but adjustable exchange rate system was intended 
to provide such goods in the post–World War II era. The middle three public 
goods—countercyclical lending, exchange rate stability, and macroeconomic 
coordination—are, of course, strongly connected with the cross-border move-
ment of financial flows.
The core framers of the IMF Articles were Harry Dexter White, who rep-
resented the United States, and John Maynard Keynes, of Great Britain. The 
differences between these two men and their countries over what a post-war in-
ternational monetary system should look like were notorious and large (Skidel-
sky 2000; Steil 2013). Interestingly, relatively less attention has focused on the 
fact that they agreed on at least two things: that it was important for nations to 
have the freedom to regulate capital flows and that nations should cooperate 
to render those regulations effective (Thirwall 1974; Helleiner 1994; Boughton 
2002; Abdelal 2007).
Both Keynes and White saw capital flows as concerning. For White, regulat-
ing capital flows was a second-best strategy; for Keynes, capital controls were 
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second nature (Boughton 2002). Both men saw the need to regulate speculative 
capital flows because of the impact that such flows could have on the policy 
autonomy of the welfare state and on exchange rate stability (Helleiner 1994). 
Although the formal Mundell-Fleming model had not yet been articulated (see 
chapter 3), these economists had the insight to see that the free movement of 
capital was not compatible with a fixed exchange rate and an independent mon-
etary policy. The free movement of capital can throw off the ability of nations 
to expand and contract their economies. In such an environment, lowering the 
interest rate to expand the domestic economy could trigger capital flight rather 
than domestic investment; raising rates could attract ever more capital at exactly 
the time when cooling off an economy is called for. Such pro-cyclical capital 
flows also put real pressure on the exchange rate and can cause balance-of-
payments problems. This concern was echoed by the League of Nations report 
written by Ragnar Nurkse (1944).
Thus, the framers of the IMF saw the regulation of capital as core to sustain-
ing the international monetary system. What is more, they did not see unilateral 
regulation as sufficient to help nations have policy autonomy and maintain stable 
exchange rates. As White said, “without the cooperation of other countries such 
control is difficult, expensive, and subject to evasion” (quoted in Helleiner 1994, 
38). Keynes put it this way: “but such control will be difficult to work, especially 
in the absence of postal censorship, by unilateral action than if movements of 
capital can be controlled at both ends” (quoted in Obstfeld and Taylor 2004, 149). 
Indeed, both men articulated that nations must be required to cooperate with 
each other’s capital controls under the auspices of the agreement. After fierce 
opposition by Wall Street interests, however, the notion of requiring coopera-
tion was watered down to simply permitting such cooperation (Helleiner 1994; 
Abdelal 2007).
These proposals drew significant support from EMDs during the delibera-
tions at Bretton Woods. According to new archival work by Helleiner (2014a), 
Latin American countries wanted to make sure that they could maintain their 
capital and exchange controls during the negotiations and also supported the 
need for international cooperation mechanisms on capital flows. China was also 
very supportive. Helleiner notes that China had its own full-blown plan for a 
new international system. In it, Chinese officials were also supportive of the 
US and British plans concerning capital controls, particularly the provisions for 
the use of cooperation which they hoped might help China to control outgo-
ing flight capital. Each member of the China’s Fund would be required “upon 
request, to cooperate with any other member nation that may regulate interna-
tional capital movements.” Echoing the White plan, each member country could 
be asked “(1) to prohibit in its jurisdiction acquisition of deposits or other assets 
34      cHaPTer 2
by nationals of any member nation imposing restrictions of capital transfers 
except upon authorization of the latter nation; (2) to furnish the Government 
of any member nation on request full information regarding such deposits and 
other assets; and (3) to consider such other measures as the Board may recom-
mend” (Helleiner 2014a, 195).
Box 2.1 lists the key components of the IMF Articles of Agreement that per-
tain to global capital flows. The clear language granting nation-states the abil-
ity to deploy capital controls is found in Article VI, Section 3: “Members may 
exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital move-
ments.” Article VI, Section 1 allows the IMF to request that a nation put in place 
capital controls and even permits the IMF to withdraw support if such a request 
is not granted. In Article VIII, Section 2(b), we find the language on coopera-
tion: “members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose 
of making the exchange control regulations of either member more effective.” 
This language does not require cooperation, as White and Keynes had hoped, 
but it does stress the importance of cooperation. Other parts of Article VIII, in 
Section 5, grant the IMF authority to collect data on both capital flows and on 
the nature of capital controls—thus arming the institution with the informa-
tion that individual nations will not have to help nations identify the sources of 
capital flows and where to turn for cooperation.
Box 2.1: Capital Controls in the International Monetary  
Fund Articles of Agreement
Article VI: Capital Transfers
Section 1. Use of the Fund’s general resources for capital transfers 
(a) A member may not use the Fund’s general resources to meet a large or 
sustained outflow of capital except as provided in Section 2 of this Article, and the 
Fund may request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of the general 
resources of the Fund. If, after receiving such a request, a member fails to exercise 
appropriate controls, the Fund may declare the member ineligible to use the gen-
eral resources of the Fund.
(b) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed:
  (i)  to prevent the use of the general resources of the Fund for capital transac-
tions of reasonable amount required for the expansion of exports or in 
the ordinary course of trade, banking, or other business; or
(ii)  to affect capital movements which are met out of a member’s own re-
sources, but members undertake that such capital movements will be in 
accordance with the purposes of the Fund
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Section 3. Controls of capital transfers
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international 
capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner which 
will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers 
of funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in Article VII, Section 
3(b) and in Article XIV, Section 2.
Article VIII: General Obligations of Members
Section 2. Avoidance of restrictions on current payments
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which 
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or 
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories 
of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in meas-
ures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either member 
more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are consistent with 
this Agreement.
Section 5. Furnishing of information
(a) The Fund may require members to furnish it with such information as it 
deems necessary for its activities, including, as the minimum necessary for the ef-
fective discharge of the Fund’s duties, national data on the following matters:
(vi)  international balance of payments, including (1) trade in goods and 
 services, (2) gold transactions, (3) known capital transactions, and 
(4) other items;
(xi)  exchange controls, i.e., a comprehensive statement of exchange controls 
in effect at the time of assuming membership in the Fund and details 
of subsequent changes as they occur;
Source: IMF (2013a).
capital Flows and the Golden age of capitalism
As noted earlier, scholars generally agree that the regime of cooperative decen-
tralization for governing capital flows worked “more or less as planned” during 
the Bretton Woods era but began to break down in the early 1970s. A large num-
ber of nations, including the United States, deployed capital controls during this 
period with some success. Although in a more limited fashion than White and 
Keynes would have hoped, there was a certain degree of international coopera-
tion on the regulation of cross-border finance as well.
The earliest examples of cooperation on capital account regulations occurred 
between 1944 and 1947. During that period, a number of bilateral agreements 
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between Great Britain and several European countries included cooperation on 
capital controls among the countries. In contrast, Europeans were rebuked when 
they requested that the United States regulate inflows of capital from Europe to 
stem capital flight from Europe to the United States during that period because 
of the interests of the US banking community. Helleiner (1994), however, argues 
that there was implicit cooperation on the part of the United States during the 
period because it sent a significant amount of capital back to Europe in the form 
of the Marshall Plan.
The 1960s have been characterized more as a period of unilateral regulation, 
although in some ways they could be seen as coordinating rather than explicitly 
cooperating. During the John F. Kennedy administration, the United States was 
engaged in expansionary monetary policy and was concerned that low interest 
rates would trigger excessive capital outflows. The European nations were bat-
tling inflation and were concerned that high interest rates might attract more 
capital at exactly the time when they wanted to cool their economies. Many Eu-
ropean nations thus regulated the inflow of speculative capital while the United 
States regulated capital outflows. And the United States pushed Canada (which 
was exempt from US controls on outflows) to “plug the hole” that allowed US 
capital to leak into Europe through the Canadian exception to the US regulation 
(Hawley 1987). Aside from the US-Canadian case, Helleiner (1994), who has 
studied this period the closest, does not indicate that nations explicitly cooper-
ated on regulating capital flows. Nevertheless, the United States and Europe had 
coordinated their actions implicitly, given that they put controls on both ends, 
as Keynes had suggested.
Indeed, it may come as a surprise to many to learn that the United States 
deployed capital controls fairly successfully during the Bretton Woods era. The 
United States regulated outflows of speculative capital for close to ten years 
(1963–1973).
And for a very brief period, it regulated inflows as well. Between 1969 and 
1970, capital inflows from the Euromarket were making it difficult for the US 
Federal Reserve (the Fed) to limit domestic credit. Thus in 1969, the Federal 
Reserve restricted the ability of Eurodollar borrowing by US banks. First, the 
Federal Reserve attempted to have US banks do this on a voluntary basis, but then 
it officially put a 10 percent reserve requirement on domestic borrowing from US 
banks in the Euromarket. The Fed attempted to establish a reserve requirement 
in 1979 as well. Moreover, it pushed hard for the Bank of International Settle-
ments to require that nations cooperate with the US proposal. Both of these later 
efforts failed (Helleiner 1994).
The most significant capital controls in the United States were controls 
on outflows. In the 1960s, the United States was engaged in an expansionary 
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 monetary policy (and ramping up for the Vietnam War), but it was also experi-
encing balance-of-payments problems (Block 1977). After weighing a series of 
alternative policies, the United States enacted the Interest Equalization Tax (IET), 
a 15 percent tax on the purchase of foreign equities. For bond trades, the tax va-
riety depended on the maturity structure of the bond, ranging from 2.75 percent 
on a 3-year bond to up to 15 percent on a 28.5-year bond. Borrowers looking 
to float bonds would thus pay approximately 1 percent more than interest rates 
in the United States, thereby flattening the interest rate differential between the 
United States and Europe (Hawley 1987).
The United States was very shrewd in designing the IET so as to get the act 
passed by the US Congress. A number of factors have been attributed to this 
feat. First, the tax was specific to portfolio flows and not also to multinational 
corporations headquartered in the United States. Thus, there was not a coalition 
of capital against the legislation among finance and industrial capital. Second, 
investors had two options that eased the pain: lucrative domestic market alterna-
tives and the Euromarket in London. Third, the US government still operated 
under a Keynesian rubric that saw regulating capital flows as legitimate. More-
over, by deploying a market-based tool rather than outright quantitative tools, 
the United States wanted to show other nations that capital could be regulated in 
a more market-friendly manner (Conybeare 1988; Hawley 1987; Helleiner 1994).
The IET immediately changed the composition of US outflows of capital, but 
it took longer for it to effect the balance of payments. In an early study, Richard 
Cooper concluded that “The IET was highly successful in its narrow objective; 
taxable new foreign issues in the United States virtually ceased, and net acquisi-
tions of outstanding foreign securities by Americans became fairly substantial 
net liquidations after the tax proposal” (1965, 469). But Cooper went on to note 
that the IET had not, by 1965, shown a significant change in the US balance-of-
payments position. A later analysis by the US Congress concluded, however, that 
“The Interest Equalization Tax was first made effective in the middle of 1963 and 
used in conjunction with the limitations on extensions of credit and direct bal-
ance of payments problem. Measured on a liquidity basis, the deficit fell from an 
average of 2.5 billion dollars in the years 1961 through 1964 to 1.3 billion dollars 
for 1965 and 1966. In 1967 the deficit increased to 3.5 billion dollars and in 1968 
a surplus of 93 million dollars was recorded” (Butterworth 1970, 172).
Despite the limited level of cooperation among nations, numerous studies 
show that capital controls were effective outside the United States during this 
period as well. Work by Maurice Obstfeld (1993), Richard Marston (1993), 
and Penti Kouri and Michael Porter (1974) demonstrate that controls were ef-
fective to the 1960s in the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Italy, and the 
Netherlands.
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As the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates began to unravel in the 1970s, 
there was a last round of cooperation that led Europe to push for explicitly grant-
ing the IMF more power to mandate cooperation on capital controls, as Keynes 
and White had once urged. France convinced the United States to maintain its 
capital control on outflows in 1972 so France wouldn’t suffer the currency ap-
preciation of heavy inflows of capital from the United States. During the same 
period, France convinced Germany to tighten capital controls on outflows so 
France would not to suffer the consequences of excessive inflows of speculative 
capital. Such efforts did not last long, and efforts to reinstate the requirement to 
cooperate was neutralized by the US banking community (Helleiner 1994; Webb 
1995; Chwieroth 2010a).
The Political economy of regulating  
capital in the bretton Woods era
Why and how did the immediate era following the Bretton Woods era work more 
or less as planned? A large literature has emerged that attributes these changes 
to political power and interest-group politics, prevailing economic ideas, and 
institutions.
Table 2.1 contrasts how these forces interacted during the Bretton Woods era 
with how they interacted during the period from the collapse of the gold-dollar 
standard to the turn of the twenty-first century. The Bretton Woods era has been 
characterized as a period when the United States was a benevolent hegemon, 
the US financial sector was not as strong as in later periods, Keynesian ideas 
prevailed, and the world economy largely operated under the rubric of the IMF 
Articles.
In terms of power, Helleiner (1994) has depicted the United States as a be-
nevolent hegemon with respect to capital controls during this period. The United 
Table 2.1 The political economy of regulating cross-border capital flows
breTTon Woods 1970s To aFc
Power interests US as benevolent hegemon US (and EU) financial hegemony
Industry-labor alliance Finance-industry alliance
Ideas Keynesian economics New classical economics
Embedded liberalism Neoliberalism
Institutions Cooperative decentralization Cooperative decentralization
Weighted voting Weighted voting
Note: AFC, Asian financial crisis.
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States permitted capital controls in other nations because of concerns relating to 
the cold war. Policymakers in Japan and Europe saw controls as essential to their 
growth strategies, and the United States saw enabling growth and maintaining 
alliances with those nations as a high priority. Moreover, as we have seen, the 
United States itself deployed controls for over ten years during the period.
It is also important to note that interest-group politics in the United States 
were starkly different from later periods. With the specter of the Great Depres-
sion still looming, domestic employment and production were at the center of 
US economic policy. Therefore, there was an implicit industry-labor alliance. 
Firms relied on aggregate domestic demand for profit and production, and there-
fore, expansionary domestic policy unfettered by external shocks was seen as 
being in the interests of labor and capital alike (Ferguson 1995). What is more, 
the entire US financial system was geared toward supporting domestic demand; 
thus, the financial sector also had a stake (Eichengreen 2008). Finally, investors 
did have the option of the Euromarket and were able to water down the require-
ments on cooperation in the IMF Articles (Helleiner 1994).
In terms of ideas, the construction of the Bretton Woods system reflected the 
prevailing mode of thought (at least in the United Kingdom and United States, 
where the institutions were framed) of embedded liberalism, the dominant 
thinking about international economic regimes and domestic policy at the time 
that stressed the need for nations to strike their own balance between global eco-
nomic integration and the democratic enhancement of national welfare (Ruggie 
1982). “Embedded liberals argued that capital controls were necessary to prevent 
the policy autonomy of the new and interventionist welfare state from being un-
dermined by speculative and disequilibrating international capital flows” (Hel-
leiner 1994, 4). This thinking was backed by a coalition of Keynesian-minded 
policymakers, industrialists who gained from such a policy, and labor leaders. In-
deed, this period is seen as the heyday of the Keynesian revolution in economics.
The institutional backdrop for the Bretton Woods era was, of course, the IMF 
Articles of Agreement. These Articles allowed for a regime of cooperative de-
centralization that did not live up to its full promise but did indeed operate. As 
discussed earlier, nations deployed a wide variety of regulations to regulate the 
inflow of capital, sometimes independently at both ends and sometimes in a 
cooperative fashion.
The Push for Strong International Standards:  
1970s to the Asian Financial Crisis
By the 1990s, the industrialized countries had shifted their thinking and action 
on global capital flows. By end of the century, virtually all industrialized  countries 
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had fully opened the capital account, and many EMDs had followed suit. These 
changes reflected technological changes in the financial industry, larger global 
capital markets, and an associated political strengthening of the financial sector, 
along with new thinking in macroeconomics. As the twentieth century closed, 
industrialized nations moved to formalize this thinking through strong interna-
tional standards on all fronts—at the IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), and beyond.
To be sure, this change was sweeping in the industrialized world, but it was 
only partially transforming among EMDs. An attempt was also made to change 
the IMF Articles of Agreement to mandate capital account liberalization in the 
1990s. That initiative did not materialize because of contests within the United 
States, within the IMF, and between the industrialized nations and EMDs. The 
OECD nations now have a clear mandate for capital account liberalization, but 
such standards are relatively weak and have significant exceptions.
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation  
and Development
Informally, many individual countries began advocating for capital account 
liberalization in the 1970s, but the first formal adoption of such standards are 
the OECD Codes.1 Somewhat analogous to the IMF Articles, the original 1964 
Codes initially excluded speculative capital on grounds that short-term capital 
would disrupt the balance-of-payments position of OECD members and make 
it difficult for nations to pursue independent monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies. The original Codes were amended in 1989 when a group of nations led by 
the United Kingdom and Germany argued that all OECD nations by then had 
sophisticated enough capital markets that they could withstand the liberaliza-
tion of short-term flows. The amendment requires capital account liberalization 
and a prerequisite for OECD accession. Indeed, all nations that have acceded to 
the OECD since 1989, regardless of their level of development, also liberalized 
their capital accounts to include short- and long-term maturities. South Korea, 
in its accession negotiations in 1996, argued that it should have a grace period to 
gradually open its capital account as it developed. The OECD denied this request, 
an open capital account a condition of membership, and South Korea eventually 
conceded (Abdelal 2007).
1. The European Union formalized capital account liberalization in 1988. In this chapter, I focus 
on global economic governance spanning more than one continent.
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That said, the OECD Codes are not very strong in terms of enforceability, and 
there are fairly broad exceptions in place. Article 7 (in each set of Codes) holds 
the “clauses of derogation” that govern the temporary suspension of commit-
ments. Under these safeguards, a nation may suspend liberalization. Article 7b 
allows a member to put in place temporary capital controls to stem what may 
“result in serious economic disturbance in the Member State concerned, that 
Member may withdraw those measures.” Article 7c is the balance-of-payments 
exception: “If the overall balance of payments of a Member develops adversely at 
a rate and in circumstances, including the state of its monetary reserves, which 
it considers serious that Member may temporarily suspend the application of 
measures of liberalisation taken” (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development [OECD] 2009). Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey have 
all used the derogation. The OECD permitted them to do so because these na-
tions were seen to be at a lower stage of development than the other members of 
the OECD (Abdelal 2007).
Rethinking Capital Controls at the  
International Monetary Fund
Beginning in the 1970s, the IMF was transformed as well. What was once at the 
core of the international monetary system—regulating capital flows to maintain 
policy autonomy and to stabilize exchange rates—began to be seen as heresy. 
Initially the transformation was informal, with a shift in IMF staff and manage-
ment thinking and, thus, a different level of surveillance and different advice to 
member countries. In the mid-1990s, the IMF proposed to formally amend the 
Articles of Agreement to include the liberalization of the capital account. Ac-
cording to an IMF staff report, “the impetus for such liberalization was largely 
provided by the frameworks of the OECD Code and the EU Directives” (Evens 
and Quirk 1995, 6). This would have amounted to a revision of Article VI, which 
grants nations the ability to regulate capital flows. This attempt to impose strong 
international standards at the IMF did not materialize.
As noted earlier in this chapter, under the Articles of Agreement the IMF has 
no legal authority to force nations to liberalize their capital accounts. That said, 
the IMF began changing the advice it gave to its member states during the 1970s 
and 1980s. According to the IMF Independent Evaluation Office, however, the 
IMF did not require nations to open their capital account as a condition of a 
financial program. Indeed, the IMF interpretation of the Articles of Agreement 
is that it cannot “require a member to remove controls on capital movements” 
(IMF 2005, 31).The IMF did begin, however, to encourage liberalization through 
letters of intent and policy memorandum that were not part of official  financial 
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program documents. The IMF Exchange and Trade Restrictions Department 
recommended capital account liberalization in Nigeria, Guatemala, Egypt, 
Honduras, Jamaica, and elsewhere. What’s more, capital account liberalization 
figured prominently in the annual IMF World Economic Outlook reports and 
other publications throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Chwieroth states that “con-
trols were said to harm economic performance, create severe distortions, and 
delay policy adjustments needed to eliminate balance of payments disequilibria” 
(2010a, 152). Joseph Joyce and Ilan Noy (2008) econometrically show that such 
advice was taken—between 1982 and 1998, capital account liberalization was 
significantly correlated with a nation having an IMF financial program.
Attempts to formalize the new thinking about regulating capital flows at the 
IMF date back to the early 1970s and were led by the United States. In 1972, 
the IMF created a Committee of Twenty (C20), and in 1973, a “The Report of 
the Technical Group on Disequilibrating Capital Flows” was submitted (Pauly 
2008). Foreshadowing events in 2011, the “Report of the Technical Group” 
recommended that the IMF construct a code of conduct for the use of capital 
controls. The final C20 report that formed the basis for later amendments to 
the IMF did not include a recommendation to discriminate among kinds of 
capital control, but US influence steered the report to state that “countries 
will not use controls over capital transactions for the purpose of maintain-
ing inappropriate exchange rates, or more generally, of avoiding appropri-
ate adjustment action” (quoted in Chwieroth 2010a, 143). The resulting final 
amendments legalized floating exchange rates, but a consensus on the capital-
controls components remained elusive enough that the original Articles, and 
thus the regime of cooperative decentralization for non-OECD members, re-
mained intact.
Into the 1980s and 1990s, capital account liberalization “had emerged as a 
social norm” for the IMF (Abdelal 2007, 129). In the early 1990s, the IMF man-
agement and staff proposed an official amendment to the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment to codify this norm into strong international standards. According to Rawi 
Abdelal, the IMF would have rewritten Article VI to state that “Members shall 
not, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for capital international transactions” (2006, 189). This 
was opposed by many EMDs at the Executive Board of the IMF, but the countries 
lacked the voting power to sway management or other key members of the board. 
Ultimately, the Asian financial crisis erupted just as the United States was set to 
renew its funding for the IMF. The US executive director to the IMF and the US 
Treasury Department had pledged their support for the initiative. But key mem-
bers of Congress, after extensive lobbying from nongovernmental organizations 
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(NGOs), threatened to withhold funding for the IMF if the amendments were 
supported. The Treasury Department withdrew its support, and the amendment 
was shelved.
The Political Economy of Capital Account Liberalization
How did such a radical change in global policy come about over a relatively short 
period of time? One of the core principles of the Bretton Woods agreement was the 
ability of nation-states to regulate capital flows as they saw to be necessary. More-
over, nations were free to cooperate among themselves to make such regulations 
effective. Beginning in the 1970s, the tables began to completely turn, and capital 
account liberalization became the norm, at least across the industrialized world.
Revisiting Table 2.1, we see that a confluence of factors integrated to almost 
cause one of the most decisive shifts in modern global monetary history. US 
foreign financial power (with the European Union close by) came to dominate 
global economic politics, given the internationalization of capital markets and 
the associated political strength that came with an ever-growing global finan-
cial sector headquartered in the United States and Europe. In parallel were the 
new economic theories of capital account liberalization (see chapter 3). Michel 
Camdessus, the new IMF managing director, strode into the IMF bent on capi-
tal account liberalization and found an earnest core of IMF staff members who 
held the same view. This convergence of power, interests, ideas, and institutional 
structure gave impetus to forming strong international standards that attempted 
to replace the regime of cooperative decentralization.
Initially, the prevailing explanation for the change in thinking and policy 
output at the IMF (and OECD) was the strengthened financial sector and its 
relations with Washington. Cohen (2007) demonstrates that, although the costs 
of capital controls are directly felt by a handful of politically organized US con-
stituents (Wall Street), the beneficiaries are diffuse and don’t feel the direct ef-
fects. Thus, a collective action problem persisted when Wall Street organized 
around capital account liberalization. Moreover, whereas in the Bretton Woods 
era there had been an industry-labor alliance, that alliance had shifted to an alli-
ance between industry and the financial sector (Henning 1994). Voices as diverse 
as Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso (1998) and Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) called 
this the Wall Street–Treasury complex (analogous to the military-industrial com-
plex, a term coined during the Eisenhower era to describe the politics of that 
time). These authors argued that the US Treasury Department and Wall Street 
investment houses were pushing for the freedom of capital movements wherever 
possible, including forcing the IMF into advising capital account liberalization 
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worldwide and working to codify such a policy in the IMF Articles. Other re-
searchers, such as Kirshner (2003), Mark Blyth (2003), and Manuela Moschella 
(2011), see interests groups as key in shaping the general change in thinking 
about capital account liberalization and offer a more nuanced view of the specific 
role that those powerful interests played in actual IMF policy outputs.
The economics profession had made a profound change in thinking about 
capital account liberalization. Economic theory went through a fundamental 
revolution in macroeconomics where Keynesian economics was replaced with 
new classical macroeconomics. These economists, later joined by the “new” 
Keynesian economists, saw capital account liberalization as a way to make mar-
kets more efficient. Capital controls were seen as not only distortionary but of 
little use given that consumers and investors would factor them away in their 
economic decisions. This new thinking in macroeconomics formed the back-
drop for a different way of thinking about government altogether—this period 
is commonly referred to as the neoliberal era, rising with the arrival of Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in 1979–1980 and cresting with the Washington 
Consensus advocated by the United States, Europe, and the IMF throughout the 
1990s. In general, this era can be characterized as allowing an extremely limited 
role for the state in economic affairs; the principal role of politics was to carry out 
the economic view. Mark Blyth (2002) traces the shift from embedded liberalism 
to neoliberalism in the 1970s:
In sum, just as labor and the state reacted to the collapse of the classical 
liberal order during the 1930s and 1940s by re-embedding the mar-
ket, so business reacted against this embedded liberal order during the 
1970s and 1980s and sought to “disembed liberalism” once again. In this 
effort, business and its political allies were quite successful, and by the 
1990s a new neoliberal institutional order had been established in many 
advanced capitalist states with remarkable similarities to the regime dis-
credited in the 1930s. (2002, 6)
Despite the general interest of Washington and Wall Street in this thinking, 
newer literature on the subject finds that both Washington and Wall Street were 
conflicted on the issue and that the direct impetus actually came from within 
the IMF itself. The US executive director to the IMF during the 1990s was Karin 
Lissakers, who supported the amendment along with the US Treasury Depart-
ment. Numerous accounts, however, show that the United States was more fo-
cused on gaining financial-market access through the trade regime than at the 
IMF (Abdelal 2007; Chwieroth 2010a). Whereas the IMF could effectively enforce 
its amendment only on nations that went to it for a financial program, through 
the WTO (and later US free-trade and investment deals) the United States would 
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enjoy strong international standards that were actionable by the United States. 
(This shift of action on capital account issues from the IMF to the trade and 
investment regime is the subject of a later chapter.)
The financial industry was also less strident in its support for changes at 
the IMF than was previously surmised, according to researchers who have in-
terviewed high-level officers at the Institute of International Finance (IIF), the 
broadest collection of global financial firms and institutions. The IIF had shown 
some early support for the initiative but then called for caution in the wake of the 
financial crisis. Moreover, and perhaps more important, more than one source 
confirms that the IIF was tepid about the IMF initiative because the IIF did not 
want the IMF to move onto its turf of perceived preeminence in the global eco-
nomic policy realm (Abdelal 2007; Chwieroth 2010a).
Most recent accounts see the origin of the IMF amendment as coming from 
the IMF itself (Abdelal 2007; Chwieroth 2010a; Moschella 2011). Abdelal (2007) 
argues that this change was, in part, exported to the IMF from French social-
ists, who had originally been big advocates of capital controls. Then controls on 
outflows in 1983 adversely affected the middle class and led to a change in the 
party stance. When Michel Camdessus (a prominent French socialist at the time) 
became the IMF managing director, he found highly sympathetic staff members 
at the IMF and began to work together with them toward the liberalization of 
capital controls. Chwieroth (2010a) acknowledges that the French connection 
was important but stresses that the IMF staff members became key advocates 
as well. In the early days of the IMF, most staff members had been Keynesians 
who supported capital controls, but slowly the IMF became populated with US-
trained economists who were new classical or new Keynesian economists and 
who saw capital controls as counterproductive. Chwieroth finds, however, that 
there were tensions between “gradualist” and “big bang” camps at the IMF. Grad-
ualists advocated gradual capital account liberalization and the selective use of 
capital controls; in contrast, big bang advocates wanted the rapid liberalization 
of the capital account. The IMF was largely seen as a big bang advocate, especially 
to casual observers who saw the IMF looking to change its charter to mandate 
capital account liberalization and to those who observed IMF country programs 
where capital controls often had to be eliminated as the condition for an IMF 
loan. Big bang advocates became outnumbered in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis and were then silenced by the actions by the US Congress and the voices 
of EMDs.
EMDs certainly voiced opposition to the proposed amendment, but the coun-
tries had neither the unity nor the voting power to significantly affect a policy 
outcome that would be ultimately in their favor. Aziz Mohammed (1998) and 
Helleiner (1994) note that many developing countries were extremely  skeptical 
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of the proposed amendment. The G24, a group of finance ministers from EMD 
nations, said as much in their 1997 communiqué (Mohammed 1998). The head 
of an independent panel of academics and policymakers from developing coun-
tries wrote, “it would certainly seem premature at this time, and, quite possibly, 
inappropriate for a much longer time, to consider an amendment to the IMF 
Articles of Agreement that required all members to commit themselves to the 
achievement of an open capital account”(Helleiner 1994, 33). Such a view was 
not held by all EMDs, however. Many EMDs had elected political parties and 
appointed economic policymakers who shared the Washington Consensus view 
of global economic policy and had been trained in new classical economics (Gal-
lagher 2013).
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 put an end to discussions about changing 
the IMF Articles of Agreement to include capital account liberalization. Several 
EMDs had given the IMF supporters stiff resistance from the beginning. Even 
some industrialized countries, such as Canada, which had just granted Chile the 
right to regulate the inflow of capital through a newly minted trade treaty be-
tween the two nations, withdrew its support for the change (Chwieroth 2010a). 
There was also a split among IMF staff members on the amendment. Thus, the 
required 85 percent vote was simply not there. Then the Asian financial crisis 
came. The crisis was seen by many to be in large part due to a too rapid liberaliza-
tion of Asian capital accounts, which the IMF referred to as disorderly liberaliza-
tion. At the same time, numerous economic studies, including the IMF World 
Economic Outlook, indicated that capital account liberalization was not asso-
ciated with economic growth (Eichengreen 2004; IMF 2005; Ocampo, Spiegel, 
Stiglitz 2008). Moreover, many civil society organizations based in Washington 
began to ally with their EMD counterparts to put pressure on the US Congress 
to block the initiative (Abdelal 2006; Chwieroth 2010a). When US Representative 
Richard Gephardt (D-Missouri) got wind of the proposal, his office threatened 
to withhold US funding for the IMF—right at a time when the IMF was putting 
together funding programs across the world. That was not the end of the story, 
just the last chapter of the story of the global governance of capital flows in the 
twentieth century.
summary and conclusion
In this chapter, I have traced the history of governing global capital flows and 
presented a framework for understanding the first two eras of modern global 
governance with respect to financial flows. The chapter emphasizes how power, 
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interests, ideas, and institutions interacted in different combinations to shape 
each era and to yield different outcomes.
The Bretton Woods era can be characterized as one of cooperative decen-
tralization, during which an order was established that allowed individual na-
tions to regulate cross-border finance on their own and cooperate informally 
as necessary. That regime worked fairly well, but a confluence of market power, 
interest-group politics, and new economic ideas led to a push to create strong 
international standards that would have required the full liberalization of cap-
ital flows. That project was partially successful at the national level but failed 
at the level of global governance. This failure is fairly remarkable considering 
the consolidation of market and political power that had concentrated in the 
United States since the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the sea change 
in mainstream macroeconomics about the economics of capital flows, and 
the power that the IMF had over EMDs that had experienced over a decade 
of crises.
Indeed, during the Bretton Woods era, the United States was an internally 
united hegemon that saw the regulation of capital flows as important to its 
broader national security and economic interests. The Bretton Woods era was 
also a period of embedded liberalism, during which nations pursued the inte-
gration of goods markets but tempered financial markets in support of national 
employment and development objectives. Prevailing Keynesian economic ideas 
supported this view, and the IMF as an institution was codified to preserve co-
operative decentralization.
As the cold war ended the United States (and the West in general) was arguably 
at the crest of its power as a global hegemon. Moreover, the US financial sector 
had become the true center of global financial power by the 1990s. The econom-
ics profession had moved toward a consensus that capital account liberalization 
was the optimal choice for the global economy. Moreover, the voting structure of 
the IMF was tilted toward the Western powers. As we might expect, a Wall Street–
Treasury alliance arose, proposing an amendment to the IMF Articles that would 
create strong international standards for capital account liberalization. Indeed, 
the West had succeeded in revamping the OECD Codes to require capital account 
liberalization—and had even required disgruntled new entrants, such as South 
Korea, to sign on to such Codes despite their objection.
Surprisingly, the requirement of capital account liberalization did not hap-
pen at the IMF, where the consequences would have been more strongly felt. It 
was the IMF itself, rather than the United States or the financial sector, that was 
the originator of the idea of amending the Articles. The United States and the 
financial sector largely saw the IMF move as an effort to reestablish its waning 
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global monetary turf and, thus, tempered their support. Within the IMF, there 
was also significant opposition among the industrialized countries and EMDs 
alike. Moreover, the IMF staff was divided as well. The US government and the 
private sector had moved over to the trade and investment arena as a regime—a 
regime that already had strong international standards. Such a strategy proved to 
be far more successful for the United States and the financial sector, although a 
world of full capital account liberalization was still to remain elusive.
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FROM MANAGING THE TRILEMMA TO 
STABILITY-SUPPORTED GROWTH
For much of the twentieth century, the dominant view in macroeconomics was 
that cross-border finance needed to be regulated. This was seen as the way to 
balance the “impossible trinity” first sketched by John Maynard Keynes in his 
two books on monetary theory—especially in the post-Depression industrial-
ized countries seeking to achieve full employment. The dominant view in de-
velopment economics during the same period was that cross-border capital 
flows needed to be regulated for similar reasons and also to mobilize domestic 
resources for economic development.
A strong tradition remained in the impossible trinity literature as the century 
went on and is experiencing a revival in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
In contrast, the view that capital mobility was something to be constrained had 
fallen out of favor in mainstream economics by the 1980s and 1990s. The domi-
nant view into the 1990s was that international financial flows were efficient and 
balancing forces, and that regulating capital was inherently distortionary and 
delayed adjustment.
The experience of numerous financial crises in the past twenty years has 
spawned new economic theories that re-introduce the notion that cross-border 
finance can cause financial instability. Two of the new theories are remarkably 
similar. One strand of new theory picks up from Ragnar Nurske and builds on 
the work of Hyman Minsky and others. This view has become popular in many 
emerging market capitals and in the UN system, and in part, it inspired Brazil to 
regulate capital flows in the wake of the global financial crisis. Another strand of 
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new theory on capital flows and financial stability comes from modern welfare 
economics and is gaining ground in mainstream economics, the central banks, and 
the Bretton Woods institutions. This second strand played a key role in transform-
ing the IMF thinking on capital controls in the wake of the global financial crisis 
(see chapter 6). In this chapter, I first outline the macroeconomic stability and de-
velopmentalist approaches to regulating capital flows that dominated the Bretton 
Woods era. I then examine the theory and evidence with respect to capital account 
liberalization and outline the contours of new economic thought in the Keynesian 
tradition and the new welfare economics of regulating cross-border finance.
The Trilemma: Keynes, Macroeconomic stability, 
and development economics
Keynes’s monetary theories and their extensions became mainstream during the 
Bretton Woods era. Such thinking pointed to the need to regulate cross-border fi-
nance for nations to maintain the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime and to have 
an independent monetary policies for growth and employment. This line of think-
ing became formalized in the Mundell-Fleming model and spawned an entire eco-
nomic subtradition of its own. Economists in this tradition became the dominant 
macroeconomists in industrialized countries, at the IMF, and at the World Bank.
Development economists writing during the same era extended Keynes’s 
theories, arguing that capital flows needed to be regulated in accordance with 
the Mundell-Fleming model as well. These economists also developed models 
whereby foreign capital needed to be regulated to generate resources from do-
mestic sources to channel finance toward a process structural transformation in 
the economy—while, at the same time, preventing overspeculation that would 
result in financial crises that could derail that process of transformation and 
development. These economists came to dominate many of the UN institutions, 
as well as the finance ministries and central banks of key emerging-market and 
developing countries (EMDs).
Here I outline these two lines of economic thought to give a context for the 
movement that discredited these lines of thinking and dismantled the policies as-
sociated with it in the 1980s and 1990s. This also helps guide our understanding 
of the antecedents of the latest breakthroughs in economic theory in support of 
regulating capital flows.
The Keynes-Mundell Tradition
There is a strong and long-standing literature emphasizing the incompatibility 
of capital mobility, exchange rate stability, and independent monetary policies. 
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What was to become known as the “impossible trinity”—that, with fixed ex-
change rates and open capital markets, there can be little or no autonomy for 
monetary policy—was a widely held rule of thumb in the 1920s. In economic 
theory, it was first formulated in Keynes’s A Tract on Monetary Reform (1929) 
and A Treatise on Money (1930). “National Policy Autonomy” (chapter 36 of A 
Treatise) states:1
Can we afford to allow a disproportionate degree of mobility to a single 
element in an economic system which we leave extremely rigid in sev-
eral other respects? If there was the same mobility internationally in all 
other respects as there is nationally, it might be a different matter. But 
to introduce a mobile element, highly sensitive to outside influences, 
as a connected part of the machine which the other parts of which are 
much more rigid, may invite breakages. It is, therefore, a serious ques-
tion whether it is right to adopt an international standard, which will 
allow an extreme mobility and sensitiveness of foreign lending, while 
the remaining elements of the economic complex remain exceedingly 
rigid. (Keynes 1930)
In a 1943 article published in the Economic Journal, Keynes noted that “The fun-
damental reason for thus limiting the objectives of an international currency 
scheme is the impossibility, or at any rate the undesirability, of imposing stable 
price-levels from without. The error of the gold-standard lay in submitting na-
tional wage-policies to outside dictation” (1943, 187).
Barry Eichengreen (2008) and others have noted that this framework was 
the guiding political economy principal during the Bretton Woods era. In eco-
nomics, the Mundell-Fleming model was the first to incorporate the regulation 
of foreign capital into a general equilibrium framework, and it spawned many 
followers. Indeed, we could characterize Mundell as being to A Tract and A 
Treatise as John Richard Hicks was to the General Theory in terms of formal-
izing Keynes. The Mundell-Fleming theory refers to specific articles by Robert 
Mundell (1961a, 1961b, 1962, 1963) and Marcus Fleming (1962). The model is 
a Keynesian model of a small open economy in which world prices, incomes, 
and interest rates are exogenous in the short run (figure 3.1). Other assump-
tions include a constant price level, so that price rigidity is a feature as opposed 
to flexible prices. It is an extension of the investment saving–liquidity prefer-
ence money supply (IS-LM) framework that introduces the international sec-
tor, or balance of payments.
1. I am grateful to Jan Kregel for pointing this out to me.
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These works attempted to uncover the optimal policy mix as well as the op-
timal exchange rate regime for open economies with mobile capital. One main 
conclusion of Mundell (1963) is that perfect capital mobility, a fixed exchange 
rate regime, and independent monetary policy cannot all coexist; countries can 
maintain at most two of the three. Moreover, the Mundell-Fleming model ex-
plicitly verifies that if capital is internationally mobile and the nominal exchange 
rate is fixed, monetary policy is constrained to only altering the level of inter-
national reserves, while fiscal policy can effectively alter output. Fleming (1962) 
specifically offers these conclusions in his analysis of government policies. The 
trilemma result of Mundell-Fleming provides a basis for which policy responses 
to external shocks (e.g., capital inflows and outflows), especially in emerging 
markets, can be analyzed. Economists such as James Tobin (1978, 1998) sees 
this trilemma as the rationale for an activist monetary policy in pursuit of full 
employment. Numerous studies show that capital controls were effective outside 
the United States during this period as well. Work by Maurice Obstfeld (1993), 
Richard Marston (1993), and Kouri and Porter (1974) demonstrated how con-
trols were effective in the 1960s in the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, 
Italy, and the Netherlands.
Despite the fact that new classical economics came to dominate macroeco-
nomic thinking, work in the Mundell-Fleming tradition still held traction in 
the profession. Some economists adopted new Keynesian models that borrowed 
from the new classical models and attempted to use microfoundations to articu-
late the impossible trilemma, but under sticky wages and prices. Obstfeld and 
Kenneth Rogoff (1995) continue to follow the tradition of formalizing the tri-
lemma in such a context. A group of economists have formally modeled some of 






FiGure 3.1. The Mundell-Fleming model.
FroM ManaGinG THe TrileMMa To sTabiliTY-suPPorTed GroWTH      53
in a dynamic general equilibrium context with sticky prices and sometimes sticky 
wages. In addition, a group of empirically based economists have examined the 
extent to which nations still face a trilemma in the contemporary world. There is 
an emerging consensus in this new literature that the impossible trinity remains a 
very real challenge in the twenty-first century and that, in certain circumstances, 
restricting capital mobility is the optimal route to macroeconomic stability.
There has been a resurgence in this line of thought since the new classical 
perspective rapidly lost traction in the wake of the global financial crisis. In that 
tradition, Emmanuel Fahri and Ivan Werning (2013) use a general equilibrium 
framework with microfoundations and sticky wages and prices that builds on 
microfounded models of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). They find that capital con-
trols are the optimal way to respond to external shocks. Perhaps most interesting 
is that, in the presence of sticky wages and prices, they find that capital controls 
may be optimal even with a floating exchange rate.
Another new theory has emerged that models the distortion due to capital 
controls from a trade policy perspective. In focusing on intertemporal distor-
tions, Armaud Costinot, Guido Lorenzoni, and Ivan Werning (2011) derive 
optimal capital controls that depend on business cycle dynamics and the trade 
balance. Their model yields the optimal policy mix either of taxing inflows and 
subsidizing outflows or of taxing outflows and subsidizing inflows. Specifically, 
in an expansionary period when there is positive growth in output, the optimal 
policy is to tax inflows and subsidize outflows. Such results have important impli-
cations for high-growth economies that are catching up with the rest of the world.
More empirically grounded work demonstrates that the trilemma continues 
to be a core trade-off for nations in a globalized economy (Obstfeld 2001; Aizen-
man, Chinn, and Ito 2010; Aizenman and Pinto 2011). Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 
(2010) develop indexes related to the trilemma and test the extent to which there 
is linearity in the three poles of the trilemma. They find that the weighted sum 
of the three indexed trilemma policy variables (monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability, and capital mobility) add up to a constant and therefore 
validate the notions going back to Keynes that there is a real trade-off among 
these policy options. The trilemma remains a very real policy trade-off for na-
tions operating in the global economy.
The Developmentalists
Keynes also spawned an activist development economics where it is the role of 
the state to pursue full employment in the process of structural transforma-
tion. Although the work of Michal Kalecki may have played a more significant 
role, Keynes’s influence on this theory was very real. Among the pioneers of 
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 development economics were Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Raúl Prebisch, 
Hans Singer, Gunnar Myrdal, Albert O. Hirschman, and Arthur Lewis. Virtually 
all these scholars see the regulation of capital flows as central for macroeconomic 
stability and structural transformation. Nurkse also sees regulating capital flows 
as key to maintaining financial stability.
At this writing, perhaps the best-known developmentalist theory is the Lewis 
model. Arthur Lewis, whose theory earned him the Nobel Prize, observed that 
EMDs have surplus labor in the agricultural sector that can be attracted into a 
“modern” manufacturing sector if higher wages are offered. The manufacturing 
sector will make a profit if companies offer manufacturing wages above the agri-
cultural wage rate. This will attract surplus agricultural workers into the modern 
sector and, crucially for our purposes, capitalists will reinvest the profits in the 
form of more fixed capital into the modern sector. Firms in the modern sector 
will then demand more labor until the manufacturing sector has grown to the 
point where it has become industrialized. Central to the reinvestment of profits 
are capital controls on outflows so firms do not invest profits outside the country 
rather than in the fledgling modern sector (Lewis 1954).
Prebisch, Singer, Myrdal, and others further justify the move to industrializa-
tion. Traditional agricultural exports are likely to meet inelastic demand that will 
weaken the terms of trade over time. Following this thinking, many countries 
wishing to industrialize formed development banks that channeled credit into 
seemingly inefficient manufacturing industries, where they perceived the social 
returns to be higher than the private returns in the short and medium run. Here 
too, capital and exchange controls limited the ability of such finance to be de-
ployed overseas (Amsden 2001).
New archival work by economists Esteban Perez and Matias Vernengo (2012) 
has unearthed how Raúl Prebisch, Argentinean economist, oversaw the imple-
mentation of countercyclical capital controls during his tenure at the Central 
Bank of Argentina; they quote Prebisch as saying, “This [short-term] capital 
went to further inflate the categories of goods or assets that were already in-
flated, and did not translate, except in very rare occasions, in a real increase in 
the production of the country. . . . the measures adopted by the government to 
make an exception, to allow the inflow of these capitals if it is shown that these 
are oriented towards the increase in real production . . .” (quoted in Perez and 
Vernengo 2012, 11).
Ragnar Nurkse was a pioneer unto himself in many ways. To the extent that 
he is studied or remembered at all, it is for his balanced growth theory, which is 
analogous to the big-push theory developed by Rosenstein-Rodan (Nurkse 1961). 
To these economists, investments need to go into multiple sectors at the same time 
to boost the productivity growth, and therefore the demand, that can  eventually 
FroM ManaGinG THe TrileMMa To sTabiliTY-suPPorTed GroWTH      55
lead to the full industrialization of the economy. Like the other developmental-
ists, Nurkse sees domestic resource mobilization as the key to financing such 
 investments—and thus sees capital controls as a way to steer profits and credit 
toward the industrialization process. Nevertheless, Nurkse was among the first 
to also express concern about destabilizing speculation. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
Nurkse worked for the League of Nations and was the author of a highly influ-
ential tract on international finance and currencies in the run up to the Bretton 
Woods meetings. According to him, “If there is anything the inter-war experience 
has clearly demonstrated, it is that paper currency exchanges cannot be left to 
fluctuate from day to day under the influence of market supply and demand. . . . If 
currencies are left free to fluctuate, speculation in the widest sense is likely to play 
havoc with exchange rates—speculation not only in foreign exchanges, but also, 
as a result, in commodities entering into foreign trade” (Nurkse 1944, 137–38). 
These two traditions became secondary as the twentieth century went on. A new 
macroeconomics arose that saw financial globalization as a cure, not an ill.
Keynes Had it all Wrong? The rise and Fall of 
capital Market liberalization
As discussed in the last chapter, backed by new developments in economic the-
ory, interest groups that sought to deepen global capital markets, new technolo-
gies, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), capital account liberalization 
came into vogue in the 1980s and 1990s (Ocampo, Spiegel, Stiglitz 2008; Abdelal 
2007; Chwieroth 2010a). New economic models of capital account liberalization 
suggested that liberalizing the capital account could lead to economic growth 
and macroeconomic stability—and characterized the various Keynesian-derived 
approaches as distortionary. Many of the world’s nations liberalized their capital 
accounts in the 1980s and 1990s.
The economics of capital account liberalization is fairly simple. The basic neo-
classical model explains that opening capital markets can accelerate growth in 
EMDs, which are (thought to be) capital scarce and thus have a higher return to 
capital (Lucas 1990). The model employs two factors, capital and labor, as well 
as labor-augmenting technological progress. In defining an equation of capital 
accumulation and the steady state, the dynamics of the model can be derived. 
For example, capital will flow into a liberalizing developing country whose inter-
est rate is higher than the world interest rate. The cost of capital in the steady 
state, before liberalization, is determined by the interest rate and the rate of de-
preciation. After liberalization, however, the cost of capital is determined by the 
world interest rate. Hence, the impact of liberalization works through the cost of 
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capital, which falls on the introduction of liberalization due to the capital inflow. 
In addition, in the short run, the growth rate of capital and per capital output 
increase during the transition.
Other arguments in favor of liberalization focus on consumption smooth-
ing and make the argument that capital account liberalization brings collateral 
benefits to the banking system that are difficult to detect. Rather than being nec-
essary for macroeconomic stability and economic growth, the rational expecta-
tions view saw speculation and movements in cross-border finance as efficient 
and rational responses to market fundamentals. The actions of investors and 
speculators, according to this view, can help markets become self-correcting 
(Friedman 1953).
These ideas became commonplace across the industrialized world toward 
the end of the twentieth century. Now however, econometric evidence suggests 
that, in EMDs especially, capital account liberalization is not robustly associ-
ated with economic growth and may be correlated with financial crises (Prasad 
et al. 2003; Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson 2012). In light of this, the 
merits of capital account liberalization in developing countries came under 
great scrutiny in the early 2000s and even more so in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. Indeed, the most recent research has shown that capital market 
liberalization is associated with growth only in nations that have reached a cer-
tain institutional threshold—a threshold that most EMDs have yet to achieve 
(Kose, Prasad, and Taylor 2009; Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson 2012). 
This is partly because the binding constraint for some EMD growth trajectories 
is not the need for external investment but the lack of investment demand. 
This constraint can be accentuated through foreign capital flows because such 
flows appreciate the real exchange rate, thus reducing the competitiveness of 
goods and reducing the willingness of the private sector to invest (Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2009).
Although there is a wide consensus about these findings, some theorists con-
tinue to dispute them. For example, in his investigation of international capital 
mobility, Peter Henry (2007) explains the predictions of theory and then reviews 
the corresponding empirical studies, outlining their results, methodologies, and, 
most important, their limitations. Despite the simplifying assumptions and lack 
of market frictions in the Solow model (a neoclassical model formulated by Rob-
ert Solow), Henry shows that the theory itself still maintains predictive power for 
the short-run effects of capital liberalization as well as the rates of convergence 
to steady-state growth rates. The reasons that many empirical studies fail to cap-
ture the growth benefits of liberalization relate to their methodologies, Henry 
says. First, cross-sectional studies measure the permanent impact on growth rates 
rather than the temporary impact. Second, the measure of capital openness is 
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 binary and subject to measurement error; therefore, studies have found no sig-
nificant impact of binary measures on growth rates. Finally, many of these stud-
ies do not separate developed from developing countries in the analysis.
More recent work has addressed these objections but still finds consistent re-
lationships between capital account liberalization and growth in EMDs. Moti-
vated by the vast international capital liberalization of EMDs in the 1990s and 
their subsequent crises, Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park 
(2011) measure the differential impact of disaggregated capital flows on eco-
nomic growth before and after the 2008 global financial crisis—paying close at-
tention to and attempting to correct for the concerns raised by Henry. In their 
study, short-term debt (measured by short-term external debt to gross domestic 
product, GDP, ratio) has a negative impact on growth. Furthermore, these em-
pirical implications of the impact of external debt correspond to the predictions 
of numerous theoretical models (e.g., Aizenman 2010).
There is also considerable work demonstrating that capital account liberaliza-
tion is associated with a higher probability of financial crises. Carmen Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010) show that since 1800 capital mobility has been associated with 
banking crises. In contemporary terms, Aizenman and Brian Pinto note that:
more than any literature survey, the spate of emerging market crises 
after 1997 is eloquent testimony to the difficulty of avoiding macro-
economic and financial crises with an open capital account and a high 
degree of financial integration. In addition to these two features, coun-
tries which suffered a serious macroeconomic crisis between 1997 and 
2001 were apt to exhibit a fixed exchange rate (all; explicit in some cases 
as part of disinflation programs, e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Turkey 
and implicit in the case of Thailand and other East Asian countries); 
unsustainable government debt dynamics (Argentina, Russia) or big 
jumps in government debt as a result of private sector bailouts (East 
Asia, Turkey); and balance sheet problems (East Asia in particular, also 
Argentina and Turkey, with liabilities, often short-term, denominated in 
US dollars and assets in local currency). (2011, 7)
Rising capital market liberalization and the recent global financial crisis has mo-
tivated many studies to examine the adverse consequences of highly integrated 
markets. Joseph E. Stiglitz has been a significant skeptic of capital market liber-
alization and has presented arguments for intervention in capital flows based on 
empirical and theoretical findings (e.g., Stiglitz 2000; Stiglitz et al. 2006). The 
main arguments against full capital market capitalization arise from open mar-
kets, increased risk diversification, more pro-cyclical capital flows, increased risk 
of contagion, increased risk of capital flight, and increased financial instability.
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Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson (2012) conduct a sweeping meta- 
regression of the entire literature that includes 2,340 regression results, finding 
little correlation between capital account liberalization and economic growth. 
They conclude, “the international community should not seek to promote totally 
free trade in assets—even over the long run—because (as we show in this book) 
free capital mobility seems to have little benefit in terms of long run growth and 
because there is a good case to be made for prudential and non-distortive capital 
controls” (Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson 2012, 5; emphasis added).
Let’s now turn to that new case for regulating global capital flows.
From Trilemma to stability-supported Growth
Cross-border finance has been a key characteristic of the financial crises of the 
past twenty-five years, especially in EMDs. Hence, an outpouring of empirical 
and theoretical attention has been applied to analyzing the role of cross-border 
finance in emerging market financial crises. One strand of thinking extends the 
developmentalist tradition by drawing on Hyman Minsky and others. Another 
strand stems from welfare economics and has become known as the new welfare 
economics of capital controls. In both these strands, thinking has evolved beyond 
simply the trilemma perspective. These thinkers see monetary policy and finan-
cial stability as virtually impossible when a country has a floating exchange rate 
and capital mobility. Moreover, in this light regulating capital flows is seen as a 
corrective set of measures that enhance growth rather than distorting it.
Since the early 1980s, international capital flows to EMDs have been both 
volatile and destabilizing. Figure 3.2 shows the net private (non–foreign direct 
investment, non-FDI) capital flows as a percentage of GDP to EMDs from 1980 
to 2013. During this period, the world has seen repeated crises in Latin America, 
East Asia, Russia, and beyond. Note the sharp booms in inflows followed by sharp 
declines. Recent work characterizes large booms in capital inflows as “surges.” 
Such surges can be followed by a sudden stop in capital flows. Figure 3.2 shows 
that cross-border financial flows have been highly volatile since 1980, with large 
surges in capital flows peaking with financial crises that trigger a sudden stop (the 
arrows in figure 3.2 point to the capital flight associated with each crisis).
Atish Ghosh and others at the IMF define a surge as a net inflow (as a percent-
age of GDP) that is in the top thirtieth percentile of observations for both the 
country and the sample. Ghosh et al. (2012) identify three hundred surges for 
fifty-six emerging markets in 1980–2009. Whereas that work focuses on inflows, 
work by Guillermo Calvo (1998) focuses on the sudden stops of capital flows 
that are followed by rapid outflows of capital—the troughs in figure 3.2 (see also 
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Akyuz 2011). Research by Manuel Agosin and Franklin Huaita (2012) shows that 
capital flow surges are exogenously determined and are not a function of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of an economy. Moreover, sudden stops are not 
determined by the fundamentals either; they find that the probability of a sudden 
stop is correlated with the length of the surge rather than with the fundamentals. 
Indeed, the probability doubles when a surge lasts for two years and triples when 
it lasts for three.
Both of the new strands of economic thinking take these characteristics of 
capital flows as a focus of analysis. Although the theoretical foundations of each 
of these perspectives differs, there are numerous similarities between them. 
Minskian developmentalist thinking lacks a unified apparatus analogous to the 
general equilibrium context of welfare economics and, instead, has capital accu-
mulation as an end goal. But both examine international financial flows through 
the lens of financial stability. In so doing, both observe that emerging markets 
can overly attract inflows of capital that can lead to the bloating of exchange rates 
and asset positions to unsustainable levels. These forces inevitably unwind, trig-



































































































FiGure 3.2. Net capital flows to EMDs and financial crises, 1980–2013. 
Capital flows are pro-cyclical. AFC, Asian financial crisis; EMDs, emerging-market 
and developing countries; FDI, foreign direct investment; GDP, gross domestic 
product; GFC, global financial crisis (International Monetary Fund 2013c).
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perspectives determine a need for regulating cross-border finance at the national 
and, sometimes, multilateral levels. Both see the regulation of capital flows as 
paramount for financial stability and economic growth, although each favors 
a somewhat different policy mix to do so. These differences are summarized in 
table 3.1.
Minskian developmentalists are concerned with maintaining monetary au-
tonomy and mobilizing domestic resources while also maintaining financial 
stability. The new welfare economics of prudential capital controls is squarely 
focused on financial stability.
The New Developmentalism—Building on Nurkse and Minsky
Economists in the developmentalist tradition—often referred to as post- 
Keynesian, post-structuralist—have evolved analyses that emphasize how un-
controlled capital flows cause financial instability that can threaten development 
prospects. To mitigate these risks, these economists argue for a permanent system 
of countercyclical regulations on cross-border finance.
Many of these thinkers point to Nurkse’s work as the first in this tradition to 
highlight the need for the international monetary system to maintain financial 
stability for economic growth and the generation of employment. The work of 
Hyman Minsky has been applied to cross-border finance, as well, to understand 
the channels whereby cross-border finance can trigger financial instability. Min-
sky’s (1992) financial fragility hypothesis states that (1) economies have financ-
ing regimes that are stable and others that are not and (2) that prosperity itself 
can change an economy from a stable to an unstable state. These two theorems 
are derived from the Keynesian idea that modern wealth is often represented not 
by real assets but by monetary claims on assets (i.e., the “veil of money” of Keynes 
Table 3.1 New economic theories of global capital flows
MinsKian deVeloPMenTalisM neW WelFare econoMics
Economic goal Capital development Efficiency-equilibrium
Theoretical frame Impossibility trinity N/A
Mobilizing domestic resources N/A
Financial stability Financial stability
Policy choice Regulating cross-border finance Regulating cross-border finance
Timing of policy Countercyclical Countercyclical
Target of policy Inflows and outflows Inflows
Policymaker National policy National policy
Level of cooperation Regional and multilateral Regional and multilateral
Note: N/A, Not applicable.
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1929). Minsky adds that money assets can experience high degrees of volatility 
that can disrupt the balance sheet of both the lender and the creditor. According 
to Minsky’s own synthesis of the theory:2
In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist 
 economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge 
finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units en-
gaged in speculative and Ponzi finance. Furthermore, if an economy 
with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflation-
ary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary 
constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net 
worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, 
units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by 
selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values. 
(1992, 7–8)
Christian Weller (2001) and Philip Arestis and Murray Glickman (2002) ex-
tend Minsky’s hypothesis more formally to an open and financially liberalized 
economy. In a financially liberalized open economy without capital controls, an 
economic boom will significantly attract capital inflows from foreign investors 
looking for new investment opportunities and enable households, firms, the 
government, and banks to seek foreign sources of finance. The initial economic 
euphoria, reflected in rising asset prices, investments, and profits, acts to validate 
and encourage these foreign borrowings. Capital inflows produce an apprecia-
tion of the domestic currency and thus encourage the taking of short-term posi-
tions in foreign currency. The euphoria also causes economic units to become 
more reckless in the risks they undertake and to resort to greater speculative 
financing.
2. Minsky defines hedge, speculative, and Ponzi units as: “Three distinct income-debt relations for 
economic units, which are labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance, can be identified. Hedge 
financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash 
flows: the greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood 
that the unit is a hedge financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can meet their pay-
ment commitments on ‘income account’ on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principle 
out of income cash flows. Such units need to ‘roll over’ their liabilities: (e.g. issue new debt to meet 
commitments on maturing debt). Governments with floating debts, corporations with floating issues 
of commercial paper, and banks are typically hedge units. For Ponzi units, the cash flows from opera-
tions are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on outstanding 
debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay 
interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common stock lowers the equity of a 
unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future incomes” (1992, 7–8).
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These authors note, however, that, over time, the initial economic boom and 
resulting increase in demand also acts to increase costs in the domestic capital 
goods industries. These rising costs, combined with the surge in speculative fi-
nancing, act to generate present-value reversals and a decline in asset prices. With 
an erosion of the profit margin, some speculatively financed units are likely to 
begin to default, and the chances of more actors following suit increases. Fur-
thermore, the increase in foreign borrowings, particularly short-term liabilities, 
results in a rising debt-to-reserves ratio. Without capital controls, and given the 
tendency of short-term capital flows for rapid reversal, both these developments 
generate a panic among foreign investors, resulting in a rapid flight toward li-
quidity and a heavy selling of the domestic currency. Capital flight acts to reduce 
the values of assets, and through possible spillover effects in other sectors, it tends 
to aggravate the risk of a sharp depreciation in the domestic currency, making 
a country vulnerable to a financial crisis. This diagnosis of the relationship be-
tween cross-border financial flows and financial stability is remarkably similar to 
the one presented by the new welfare economics of capital controls.
Jan Kregel (2004, 2009) combines insights from Minsky with those of E. Domar 
(1944), who established that trade surpluses require capital outflows that will 
generate later interest and profit payments. Thus, capital inflows as a source of 
development finance can suffice only if the rate of increase of the capital outflows 
is at least equal to the interest rate on foreign lending. This implies a trade deficit, 
which can be sustained only if inflows increase at a rate equal to the interest rates 
paid to industrialized-country creditors. Kregel interprets that condition as what 
Minsky refers to as a Ponzi investment profile, which accentuates financial fragility 
with the possibility of a reversal of capital flows and a subsequent crisis. A Ponzi 
scheme is a pyramid game in which the returns to investors are paid from funds 
paid in by new investors; it is lucrative only if the rate of inflow of new funds meets 
the outflow promised to the investors. Kregel notes that:
With respect to the stability of the financial system, it is interesting to 
note that the Domar conditions for a sustained long-term development 
strategy based on external financing, on sustained positive net resource 
transfers are the precise equivalent of the conditions required for a suc-
cessful Ponzi financing scheme. As long as the rate of increase in inflows 
from new investors in a pyramid or Ponzi scheme is equal or greater 
than the rate of interest paid to existing investors in the scheme there 
is no difficulty in maintaining the scheme. However, no such scheme 
in history has ever been successful: they are bound to fail, eventually, 
because of the increasing size of the net debt stock of the operator of 
the scheme. (2004, 11)
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Given the volatile and pro-cyclical nature of free capital flows and their de-
stabilizing effects, economists in the Minskian developmentalist tradition have 
argued for a permanent system of countercyclical capital account regulations, 
which would not only regulate capital outflows during financial crises but also 
control capital inflows during economic booms (e.g., Davidson 1992–1993; 
Eatwell and Taylor 2002; Ocampo 2002; Ffrench-Davis 2012; Helleiner 1994; 
Saad-Filho 2007; Palma 2002; Grabel 2006). This could involve regulating the 
international exposure of domestic banks, regulating the availability of foreign 
exchange to domestic banks and private-sector residents, and reducing real de-
posit rates. By helping to avoid overborrowing, such a system provides a means of 
exercising monetary and domestic credit restraint during economic booms and, 
thereby, guards against unsustainable exchange rate appreciations and against 
the occurrence of crises. In the event that a crisis, nevertheless, occurs, regulating 
capital outflows can help to avoid a sharp currency depreciation and unmanage-
able increases in debt-service costs. These tendencies were hard felt in the devel-
oping world in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as figure 3.2 indicates.
For Ocampo (2003, 2008), the core problem is that capital flows are pro- 
cyclical and are among the key determinants in EMD business cycles. In addi-
tion, Ocampo stresses, pro-cyclical finance is increasingly driven by portfolio 
decisions made in industrialized nations that are completely de-linked from the 
demand for capital in the developing world. Roberto Frenkel (2002) adds that 
the destabilizing effects of unregulated capital inflows (e.g., unsustainable ex-
pansions in credit and liquidity, appreciations of the exchange rates, and ap-
preciations of financial and real assets) are exacerbated in EMDs when financial 
markets are small and not sufficiently diversified. He cites the Latin American ex-
perience, where liberalization was introduced into an environment in which the 
degree of monetization and financial depth was low, banking systems were weak, 
the menu of financial assets was poor, and credit for the private sector was scarce.
Like economists in the Mundell tradition, the Minskian developmentalist lit-
erature also draws attention to the fact that free capital flows severely reduce 
the degrees of freedom for macroeconomic management and policy autonomy 
because sustaining private foreign capital inflows requires a strong exchange rate 
and high interest rates (Palley 2009). A high interest rate acts to discourage domes-
tic investment, while an appreciating exchange rate reduces the competitiveness 
of the exports of a country. Thus, the ability to stimulate domestic investment 
(in accordance with national priorities of output and employment) is curtailed, 
and it becomes difficult for a country to use the exchange rate as a strategic device 
for gaining entry into the world market for manufactured goods (Nayyar 2002). 
Moreover, as pointed out by Davidson (2000), in addition to a loss of export-
market share, an appreciating exchange rate also threatens  domestic firms with a 
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loss of home-market share because imports become cheaper. By making it more 
difficult for domestic entrepreneurs to gauge the potential profitability of large 
investment projects involving significant irreversible sunk costs, exchange rate 
volatility can have serious adverse effects on domestic investment.
Nayyar (2002) also argues that when short-term inflows, such as portfolio 
investment, become a major means of financing trade and current account defi-
cits, the resulting appreciation of the real effective exchange rate acts to further 
widen these deficits. A vicious circle emerges, with these larger deficits requiring 
even greater portfolio investment inflows. Persistent large deficits may, over time, 
reduce investor confidence, thus, generating adverse expectations and ultimately 
resulting in a reversal of inflows and speculative attacks on the domestic cur-
rency.
In addition to constraining policies in normal times, free capital mobility also 
severely constrains policy autonomy during a financial crisis, therefore exacer-
bating problems of falling output, reduced domestic investment, and unemploy-
ment. As Ilene Grabel (2006) argues, a crisis forces a government to resort to 
contractionary monetary and/or fiscal policies (through higher interest rates and 
reduced social spending) to reverse a capital flight. This curtails its ability to 
use expansionary policies (such as government deficits and low interest rates) 
to stimulate aggregate demand and domestic investment. With respect to the 
threat of capital flight, Grabel (2006) emphasizes that policies restricting capital 
account convertibility help to reduce this risk by discouraging foreign investors 
from buying short-term assets, which are most vulnerable to capital flight, and 
by restricting their ability to liquidate such investments and send the proceeds 
out of the country. Furthermore, by reducing the vulnerability to sharp exchange 
rate fluctuations, capital flight, and financial fragility, capital controls can guard 
against the risk of contagion due to financial and macroeconomic instability in 
another economy.
Gerald Epstein and Juliet Schor (1992) develop a macroeconomic model 
that captures how capital controls allow for macroeconomic management and 
policy autonomy by controlling the links among the domestic real interest rate, 
capital flows, and real exchange rate. By providing a safeguard against capital 
flight, a system of effective capital controls allows a government to pursue an 
expansionary monetary policy by lowering the domestic real interest rate with-
out significantly affecting the real exchange rate or foreign exchange reserves. By 
stimulating domestic investment, an expansionary monetary policy can be used 
to raise domestic output and employment. Similarly, even if an expansionary 
fiscal policy raises the domestic real interest rate, by restricting capital inflows 
capital controls will cause the real exchange rate to appreciate less than it would 
have if the inflows were unrestricted. Less exchange rate appreciation, in turn, 
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means that export competitiveness is less adversely affected. Finally, by regulating 
capital outflows, capital controls also insulate an economy from adverse effects 
on domestic investment and/or export competitiveness due to changes in foreign 
real interest rates or foreign policies.
Virtually all these authors point to a need for countercyclical capital account 
regulations (or capital management techniques, or capital controls) that act as 
“speed bumps” to signal the need to move away from currency and maturities, 
short-term debt, and smooth exchange rate fluctuation (Ocampo 2003; Epstein, 
Grabel, and Sundaram 2008). Some economists in this tradition have also argued 
that such policies should be coordinated regionally by neighboring or similar 
EMDs to collectively shield them from destabilizing capital flows.
In the policy world, these perspectives come out of pragmatic work derived 
in the finance ministries and central banks in Latin America and beyond in the 
1990s. Ffrench-Davis (2010) was in the Chilean Central Bank when that country 
devised an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), which states that a cer-
tain percentage of inflows of capital has to be put in a non-interest-bearing ac-
count in the central bank. This measure has been widely acclaimed for buffering 
Chile from many of the crises of the 1990s. Ocampo (Ocampo and Tovar 2003) 
was finance minister in Colombia during the 1990s and used the URR as well. 
In general, this view of managing capital flows became championed largely in 
the UN system, especially in agencies such as the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN 
DESA), and UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), where Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo worked at one time. In addition, 
numerous countries have drawn on these insights when putting regulations in 
place. Indeed, the Brazilian finance and monetary policies were led by econo-
mists who refer to their macroeconomic policy as in the Keynesian-structuralist 
tradition regarding these matters (Barbosa 2011).
The New Welfare Economics of Capital Controls:  
Building on Arrow and Stiglitz
Path-breaking work in welfare economics has also emerged that shows that fi-
nancial markets can be made imperfect by the presence of pecuniary externali-
ties. This work consists of a seminal breakthrough in welfare economics, which 
before this had not proved that pecuniary externalities matter when markets are 
imperfect. This decades-old problem was solved in the new welfare economics 
of prudential capital controls and thus establishes a case for Pigouvian taxes to 
correct for market imperfections due to the financial amplification effects that 
can be triggered by excessive capital inflows. Extensions of this work establish 
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the need for EMDs and industrialized countries alike to coordinate their taxes 
on capital flows to reach optimal levels.
The origins of this work date back to classic work by Kenneth Arrow and 
Gerard Debreu (1954) that recognizes the presence of pecuniary externalities 
in an equilibrium economy but notes that such externalities may not be a cause 
for concern in perfect markets. Indeed, such is one of the seminal insights of the 
Arrow-Debreu model. Pecuniary externalities are externalities that are transmit-
ted through the price system rather than through external channels. For example, 
a rush to purchase a certain type of asset may cause a price bubble that keeps 
others out of the market. Nevertheless, the first theorem of welfare economics, 
developed here, establishes that, if markets are complete, then such a situation 
can be Pareto efficient because the winners could compensate the losers.
Work by Bruce Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) takes the work of Arrow and 
Debreu to another level by demonstrating that information asymmetries and 
other factors can make financial markets highly imperfect. This led Stiglitz 
and many others to surmise that cross-border finance is inherently disruptive 
and that therefore it is justified to regulate it. According to Avinash Dixit (2003), 
however, Stiglitz was not able to establish the direction of the impact of imperfect 
markets in this context.
This was achieved by drawing on models of financial crises and has been 
called the new welfare economics of capital controls (Jeanne, Subramanian, and 
Williamson 2012). The main motivation of this literature stems from the recent 
global financial crisis and the capital flow behavior in emerging markets. In the 
last decade, EMDs have been subject to substantial capital inflows and a buildup 
of international reserves. Such high levels of external borrowing raise the prob-
ability of sudden stops and capital flight. As was observed during the 2008–2009 
financial crisis, deleveraging and fire sales of assets can result. Such results are 
externalities associated with financial contagion but on the international level.
This breakthrough originated in a landmark paper, “Excessive Dollar Bor-
rowing in Emerging Markets: Balance Sheet Effects and Macroeconomic Ex-
ternalities,” by Anton Korinek (2007). The starting point for his work was the 
third-generation models of financial crises (a.k.a balance-sheet crises), which 
emphasized that modern financial crises in emerging economies involve feed-
back loops among falling exchange rates, adverse balance-sheet effects (because 
of dollar debt, which increases in value), and tightening access to credit (e.g., 
Krugman 1991). In that paper, Korinek demonstrates that the downward loop 
in these models can be substantially mitigated if borrowers take on local cur-
rency debt rather than dollar debt but that individual borrowers don’t recognize 
that. Each borrower takes the severity of financial crises as given because they 
take prices (including the exchange rate) as given and the feedback loops  during 
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financial crises are driven by falling exchange rates. A planner recognizes that 
reducing dollar debt will reduce repayments during bad times, which will reduce 
the transfer problem and mitigate the declines in the exchange rate and, there-
fore, the severity of financial crises. The fact that private agents do not internalize 
this effect in the context of models of balance-sheet crises is a pecuniary external-
ity. Korinek then extended this mechanism to global capital flows and to other 
kinds of capital flows (Korinek 2011). These interactions are referred to as the 
financial amplification effect.
The externalities arise because borrowers do not internalize the impact of 
their behavior on aggregate instability (e.g., systemic risk and the likelihood of 
fire sales). Likewise, individual investors do not internalize their contribution to 
the aggregate systemic risk in their investment decisions. Individual participants 
do not take into account their combined impact on financial fragility. External 
shocks (or surges) trigger a buildup of foreign debt and an appreciation of the 
national currency. This is followed by a rise in domestic asset prices and, thus, an 
increase in the collateral that can be borrowed against. All this can unwind with 
a shock of a sudden stop. This will lead to capital outflows and thus a deprecia-
tion of the exchange rate and a decline in asset prices. Systemic risk becomes 
heightened by the inability to repay foreign creditors in domestic currencies and 
the possibility of maturity mismatches in debt profiles given that the value of 
domestic assets has become depressed.
Working through an entirely different theoretical apparatus, Korinek’s finan-
cial amplification effect is very similar to the Minskian developmentalist diagno-
sis of the relationship between cross-border finance and systemic instability. The 
hedge finance in a Minsky model corresponds to episodes in the financial ampli-
fication model when financial constraints are loose, and the Ponzi finance cor-
responds to episodes when financial constraints are binding and amplification 
occurs. The turning point is probably during the period of speculation. More-
over, modern financial macroeconomic models do not have many of the features 
that have irked post-Keynesian economists. Although everything in their models 
does have a general equilibrium outcome, they do not start by assuming demand 
and supply. Indeed, the Korinek model is demand-driven; during a crisis, do-
mestic agents no longer have access to credit, and therefore they are forced to cut 
back on consumption (or investment), aggregate demand collapses, the exchange 
rate declines, and the economy enters a downward spiral. And there are supply-
driven features as well. A crisis occurs when an exogenous supply shock reduces 
the amount of credit that foreigners are willing to extend to domestic agents, 
and they force domestic agents to cut back on consumption. Korinek’s approach 
deploys a general equilibrium context, but it is not stochastic. It would thus not 
be considered “new” Keynesian because such models are almost strictly models 
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with sticky prices and set interest rates to smooth aggregate demand in a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) context. Korinek and colleagues do not 
deploy DSGE frameworks. Moreover, these financial models do not assume natu-
ral rates of employment and growth—output and employment are fixed.
It is important to draw a distinction, as authors in this literature do, between 
prudential controls, which attempt to maintain financial stability, and structural 
controls, which are more permanent in nature and that are part of an apparatus 
(in the trilemma tradition) to manage an exchange rate (see also Aizenman 2010).
Stiglitz (2010) presents a theoretical framework to assess the optimal degree 
of integration when an economy is prone to a system failure, that is, a crisis that 
leads to bankruptcies and output destruction. The main trade-off here is the 
benefits of risk-sharing weighed against the costs of bankruptcy and contagion. 
Using this framework, Stiglitz shows that using a system of capital controls called 
circuit breakers can increase welfare and can even allow for a higher degree of 
integration than using no controls. An interesting contribution of this theory is 
that imposing the optimal size of a risk-sharing club, as an alternative to using 
circuit breakers, would limit contagion. The overall message of the paper is that 
capital controls can reduce financial instability, thereby reducing the risk of con-
tagion, which poses significant adverse effects to output and growth.
Hyun Song Shin, an economist at Princeton, has arrived at similar conclu-
sions via a more practical route. Shin has pioneered much empirical and theo-
retical work on the mechanisms that spread risk from industrialized to emerging 
 economies—particularly, modeling how investors engage in arbitrage. His work, 
along with the work of others, shows how the pro-cyclicality of the banking sector 
is largely due to its use of cross-border funding. He outlines phenomena related 
to the financial-amplification effect to argue that countries seeking to stem sys-
temic risk through this channel should regulate the specific channel from which 
risk is being transported. He subsequently has become an advocate of regulating 
foreign exchange derivatives markets because they were a key channel that trans-
ferred the crisis of 2008 to EMDs and led to a search for yield that proved to be 
destabilizing in the years following the crisis (Plantin and Shin 2011).
Other work by Korinek and two IMF economists shows how prudential capi-
tal account regulations need to be coordinated between recipient and, some-
times, source countries under certain circumstances (Ostry, Ghosh, and Korinek 
2012). In other words, the new economics of capital controls justifies regulating 
capital flows at both ends, as Keynes stated during the Bretton Woods era. Ko-
rinek and colleagues demonstrate that the costs of capital controls increase with 
the intensity of the control and at an increasing rate. They go on to show how a 
more efficient outcome is to spread the costs across countries rather than make 
one country pay for all the costs.
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Econometric Evidence
At the same time as these theoretical breakthroughs, a consensus was emerging 
on the efficacy of capital account regulations. The majority of studies suggest that 
the capital account regulations deployed during the period from the Asian finan-
cial crisis until the global financial crisis of 2008 met many of their stated goals.
In the most comprehensive review of the literature, Nicolas Magud, Carmen 
Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff (2011) analyze studies of controls on inflows and 
outflows, as well as multicountry studies. They ask whether the controls were 
able to (1) reduce the volume of net capital outflows, (2) alter the composi-
tion of flows, (3) reduce real exchange rate pressures and (4) make monetary 
policy more independent. Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff also address the issue of 
methodological heterogeneity by evaluating the methodological rigor of each of 
the studies. Specifically, the authors give a study a weight of 0.1 if they find the 
rigor to be “low”; these are studies that consist mainly of descriptive analysis of 
events and/or time series. They give studies with a rigor they rank “intermediate” 
a weight of 0.5; these are studies that draw conclusions from a more formal evalu-
ation of events but still lack formal hypothesis testing. Finally, they give studies 
with a rigor they rank “high” a weight of 1; these have highly developed econo-
metric techniques, with well-defined hypothesis testing. They use the weights 
to create a weighted capital controls effectiveness index, which they compare to 
an unweighted capital controls effectiveness index. The authors conclude that, 
“in sum, capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more inde-
pendent, alter the composition of capital flows, and reduce real exchange rate 
pressures” (Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff 2011, 13). There were fewer studies 
on outflows to include in the evaluation, and these were mostly studies of the 
1998 Malaysian outflows restrictions. In Malaysia, Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff 
conclude, controls “reduce outflows and may make room for more independent 
monetary policy” (2011, 13).
summary and conclusion
The various strands in economic theory that have evolved have separately arrived 
at the same conclusion: that the regulation of cross-border finance is a paramount 
tool for maintaining financial stability in EMDs. Keynes’s A Tract on Monetary 
Reform and A Treatise on Money set the stage for thinking about the regulation of 
international finance. Influenced by this work and by fluctuations in world mar-
kets at the turn of the twenty-first century, new economic thinking was spurred 
by the work of Hyman Minsky and Joseph Stiglitz. Meanwhile, a consensus has 
emerged in the econometric literature that capital account liberalization is not 
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clearly associated with growth and may be associated with an increased incidence 
of financial crises—especially in EMDs that have not crossed certain income and 
institutional thresholds. Moreover, the econometric evidence concludes that regu-
lating cross-border finance can meet many of its stated goals.
Although coming from an entirely different part of the literature and math-
ematical apparatus, the new welfare economics is remarkably similar to the Min-
skian developmentalist analysis. Nevertheless, the solution to the problem differs 
between the two breakthrough literatures. In both traditions, there is justification 
for countercyclical prudential capital account regulations. In the Minsky tradi-
tion, however, there is a concern for the maintenance of macroeconomic stability, 
the mobilization of domestic resources for economic development, and financial 
fragility. Thus, the optimum level of capital account regulation and its duration 
could be larger and longer to catalyze the export component of a development 
strategy. In contrast, the new welfare economics of capital controls is focused 
squarely on financial stability and solves for an optimum rate of regulation in an 
environment of equilibrium exchange rates and for a rate that is focused solely 
on inflows.
These new ideas are diffusing into policy circles. Many UN-based organiza-
tions and center-left parties in EMDs have been advocating an approach very 
much in the Minskian developmentalist tradition, at least since the crises in the 
1990s—including Brazil (see chapter 5). In addition, the role of Hyun Song Shin 
was key to the development of the South Korean policies from a more pragma-
tist, new welfare economics perspective (also in chapter 5). In the wake of the 
2008 crisis, the IMF has been very much moved by the new welfare economics of 
controls, as well as the econometric evidence (much of it generated by IMF staff 
economists) on the efficacy of capital controls. As we will see later in the book, 
the similarities between these theoretical frameworks helped form an interesting 
coalition among IMF staff and EMD IMF board members when the IMF was 
charged with rethinking IMF policy on capital account management in the wake 
of the global financial crisis.
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LET’S NOT GET CARRIED AWAY
Emerging-Market Innovations in the  
Wake of the Crisis
In the run up to the global financial crisis, emerging-market and developing 
countries (EMDs) experienced a surge in cross-border financial inflows, fol-
lowed by a sudden stop in 2008 after Lehman Brothers fell. Capital flows were 
V-shaped, however, with the developing world experiencing a surge in finan-
cial flows once again in the wake of the crisis. Financial volatility of this sort 
threatened to cause the very financial amplification effects discussed in the last 
chapter. Exchange rates experienced significant appreciation, and many nations 
also feared subsequent asset bubbles. Much of the surge was a function of low 
interest rates and slower growth in the industrialized world and of faster growth 
and higher interest rates in key EMDs.
In an about face from the 1990s and early 2000s, when many EMDs further 
deregulated their capital accounts in response to crises, in response to the global 
financial crisis many EMDs reregulated cross-border finance. Indeed, in an at-
tempt to reduce the harmful effects of this financial volatility, many EMDs devel-
oped a third generation of cross-border financial regulations that were specific 
to the way cross-border finance had become destabilizing in that particular crisis 
and its aftermath. The econometric literature on the effectiveness of EMD regu-
lations, including two analyses for this book, indicate that these measures were 
a partial success. Nations that had deployed cross-border financial regulations 
were among the least hard-hit when the crisis initially came in 2008 and grew 
faster than countries that had not regulated in the post-crisis period. Moreover, 
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cross-border financial regulations proved to have some effect in stemming ex-
change rate appreciation and granting nations monetary independence.
In this chapter, I discuss the role of capital flows in the 2008 crisis, the factors 
that led to a surge in capital flows from 2009 to 2012, the innovative responses to 
such flows in many EMDs, and the effectiveness of those responses in four coun-
tries that experienced the most volatile capital flows: Brazil, Chile, South Korea, 
and South Africa. In chapter 5, I go on to examine the political dynamics that led 
each nation to take the measures it did (or didn’t).
The Global Financial crisis, Global capital Flows, 
and the Two-speed recovery
The 2000s were characterized by large swings in cross-border capital flows that 
were highly destabilizing for EMDs. I first trace the large surge in capital inflows 
running up to the global financial crisis, the sudden stop that followed, and the 
new surge that arose in the wake of the crisis. I then discuss the measures that 
many EMDs took to stem the most harmful impacts of these surges and sudden 
stops, and the literature to date on the impacts of those measures.
Exporting Good Capital, Importing Bad
Cross-border financial flows were characteristic of the global financial crisis—
in industrialized and EMD countries alike. Low interest rates, the lack of proper 
regulation of the financial sector, and the emergence of large public deficits in the 
United States created a large appetite for capital inflows into that country. Such 
inflows were supplied by Germany, Japan, oil-exporting states, China, and other 
EMDs. Those inflows were used by globally connected financial-sector agents to 
create the housing-backed derivatives that led to the credit boom in the United 
States that went famously bust in 2009. During the credit boom, many of those 
derivatives were then sold back to EMD banks and investors. Some observers have 
referred to this phenomenon as “exporting good capital, importing bad.” (Bhat-
tacharya 2011, slide 4). EMDs took their hard-earned savings and lent those savings 
to industrialized countries; the industrialized countries took the liquidity to make 
risky derivatives products and then sold them back to EMDs (Bhattacharya 2011).
This backdrop to the global financial crisis is referred to as the global im-
balances problem—large current account deficits in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Eastern Europe, and beyond in addition to significant current ac-
count surpluses in East Asia, Germany, and commodity-exporting countries. 
Menzie Chinn and Jeffry Freiden (2011) document how the demand for these 
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 international capital flows in industrialized countries allowed for and  generated 
large fiscal deficits during the early 2000s in the United States and later spurred 
a push for deregulation for derivatives and the shadow banking system. This 
was accommodated by exceptionally prolonged and loose US monetary policy. 
Indeed, the United States borrowed $5 trillion between 2001 and 2008 from sur-
plus nations to relend to US homeowners in the form of mortgages. The financial 
sector repackaged those investments into numerous derivatives instruments, and 
many of these instruments were then sent back to the developing world.
The channel by which EMDs sent capital to the United States was the accu-
mulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves by EMDs. Haunted by the specter of 
the crises that occurred in the late 1990s, many EMDs accumulated reserves to 
self-insure their economies from sudden stops and external shocks. This spike 
in reserve accumulation began in the wake of the financial crises in Asia and 
Latin America in the late 1990s. As noted in chapter 2, those crises were acute, 
with many nations having to resort to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
for assistance. IMF assistance was subject to many conditions that carried high 
political and economic costs, and the benefits of the IMF programs were not 
widely seen as outweighing those costs. Moreover, the global community failed to 
subsequently coordinate an adequate global system to prevent and mitigate any 
financial crises that would follow. Seen in this light, the incentive to accumulate 
reserves to defend against external shocks was quite a rational one on the part 
of the EMDs.
Reserve accumulation had costs for EMDs as well as the industrialized world, 
however. There was growing concern that the accumulation of reserves repre-
sented an enormous transfer of wealth from the South to the North—and that 
the industrialized nations were not being prudent with the use of those loans by 
creating risky investment instruments that were then sent back to EMDs. Again, 
one of the purported rationales for accumulating excessive amounts of FX re-
serves was increased liquidity, with the reserves acting as a self-insurance policy 
against potential financial meltdowns. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity 
cost associated with holding excess reserves, which are often largely invested 
in short-term US Treasury securities at relatively low interest rates. The social 
costs of FX accumulation in excess of what is deemed adequate for insurance 
purposes has been estimated to be as high as 1.8 percent of GDP for EMDs and 
could be higher than 3 percent of GDP for China (Rodrik 2006; Gallagher and 
Shrestha 2012).
Indeed, cross-border financial flows to EMDs were pro-cyclical in the 2000s. 
There was too much capital during the boom(s) and too little during the busts. 
Between 2002 and 2007, there was a massive surge of capital inflows into EMDs. 
In addition to accumulating reserves, some countries, such as Colombia and 
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Thailand, did put in place capital account regulations as well (Ostry et al. 2010; 
Gallagher and Shrestha 2012; Coelho and Gallagher 2012).
The Sudden Stop
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was sudden stop in capital flows to 
EMDs that resulted in capital flight to the safety of the US market. EMDs coped 
with the sudden stop by obtaining central bank swap lines from their own central 
banks and the industrialized countries, intervening in FX markets, and deploying 
capital controls on outflows. Note that countries with capital controls on inflows 
before the crisis were among the least hard hit by the sudden stop that occurred 
when the crisis went global in 2008.
The crisis was very painful for EMDs. These countries were severely hurt from 
the crisis through three channels (Ocampo 2009). First, countries with the largest 
exposure to the derivatives markets were directly impacted through the cross-
border financial channel. Large companies in those countries were especially 
hard hit, and the Mexican company CEMEX, one of the world’s largest cement 
companies, is one example. CEMEX had anticipated continued expansion across 
the world and borrowed heavily in the global capital markets to finance such 
expansion. When the crisis hit, Mexican currency plunged, and CEMEX was left 
with lots of debt denominated in US dollars and a weak currency with which to 
pay those debts—the classic currency mismatch identified in the previous chap-
ter. EMDs were also hard hit through the trade channel. Industrialized countries, 
such as the United States, are the destination for the majority of EMD exports. 
The lack of demand for EMD exports that ensued from the crisis affected output, 
employment, and livelihoods in EMDs while also depreciating their currencies. 
Finally, EMDs were impacted by a freeze in remittances flows. Many households 
in EMDs have family members living and working in industrialized countries 
who regularly send money home. Given that many of the jobs that provided the 
source of revenue for such remittances fell by the wayside, there was less to send 
home.
Yet it could have been much worse. The most adverse effects of the sudden 
stop were stemmed because central banks and the IMF provided significantly 
large swap lines to EMDs. The US Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central 
Bank (ECB), and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) provided over $874 billion 
in available swaps (Aizenman and Pasricha 2009). The United States, China, and 
the ECB provided a significant number of bilateral swap agreements to EMDs 
across the world. Indeed, eleven out of twenty-one total agreements were with 
EMDs, for a total of approximately US$215 billion, or 25 percent of the $874 bil-
lion. Swap lines are contracts whereby the Fed agrees to exchange (swap) a certain 
leT’s noT GeT carried aWaY      75
amount of US dollars for, say, the Mexican peso with the Central Bank of Mexico. 
This allows for relief in short-term dollar markets and for financial stability more 
generally (Baker 2013). The United States offered Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, and 
South Korea each access to $30 billion in swap lines. This is the first time that the 
Fed had extended swap lines to EMDs, except for Mexico, its highly integrated 
neighbor. These lines were highly sought after and highly welcomed by EMDs. 
As noted in earlier chapters, many EMDs had done all they could to avoid going 
to the IMF for financing. In past crises, IMF financing came with conditions and 
policy advice that had hurt their economies and the re-election prospects of the 
leaders.
Aizenman and Pasricha (2011) conducted an econometric analysis in an at-
tempt to discover the motivations of the Fed for this unprecedented move; they 
find that US bank exposure to these countries was the most significant factor 
leading to the swap lines with EMDs. Daniel McDowell (2011) also argues that 
the United States saw swaps as a move to alleviate upward pressure on the dollar. 
Chey (2013) suggests that there may have been political motivations as well, not-
ing that bank exposure to Brazil in the wake of the global financial crisis was no 
larger than it had been during the Brazilian crisis in the late 1990s, when Brazil 
did not receive swap lines. Chey notes that South Korea originally approached 
the Fed for a swap line in 2008 but that Timothy Geithner, the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank president, had initially rejected the proposal on the grounds that 
the Korean won was not an international currency and that South Korea did not 
have a AAA credit rating. Chey suggests that, preceding the first G20 meeting, 
the United States changed its position and offered Korea the swap line, implicitly 
in exchange for South Korean support for US proposals at the G20 summit. As 
evidence of this, Chey notes that South Korea did not support calls made by some 
other countries, such as China and France, for a fundamental restructuring of the 
international economic order.
The second largest set of swap lines to EMDs came from the PBOC. Like the 
Fed, the PBOC appears to have had both economic and political motives. The 
PBOC established six swap lines, all with EMDs. In 2009, the PBOC swap lines 
amounted to 650 renminbi (RMB), or approximately US$96 billion. As stated 
by the PBOC, its intentions were twofold: to provide liquidity to key countries 
and nullify financial stress, and to encourage bilateral trade with China in the 
currencies of those six countries (Allen 2013). The second motive is consistent 
with analyses by Kirshner and others, who remark that China started calling for 
a multipolar currency world in the wake of the crisis. By extending swap lines to 
key trading partners, it took one step toward that goal (Kirshner 2014). Indeed, 
as William Allen (2013) points out, the PBOC swap lines were of a much longer 
term (three years) than those of the Fed.
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Between the Fed and the PBOC, the two central banks just about evenly pro-
vided over $200 billion in swap lines to EMDs. This move was an unprecedented 
act of coordination between an industrialized nation and EMDs, on the part of 
the Fed, and among EMDs, by the PBOC. Extending swap lines has been shown 
to have played a major role in stemming the sudden stop of capital inflows to 
EMDs in 2008–2009 and the subsequent capital outflows that followed—even 
though the lines were often not drawn from.
Many countries also relied on the reserves they had accumulated since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century (Gallagher and Shrestha 2012). Moreover, 
some nations, such as Iceland and Ukraine, also put in place capital controls on 
outflows (Grabel 2011). Among the nations hit least hard from the sudden stop 
were those that had put in place capital controls on the inflows of capital before 
the crisis had started. Ostry et al. (2010), at the IMF, conducted an econometric 
analysis to examine how countries that used capital controls fared as opposed to 
countries that did not use them in the run-up to the crisis. They found that coun-
tries with controls fared better: “the use of capital controls was associated with 
avoiding some of the worst growth outcomes associated with financial fragility” 
(Ostry et al. 2010, 19).
Getting Carried Away
The immediate aftermath of the crisis has been referred to as the “two-speed 
recovery” (IMF 2011b, 37). The industrialized economies, which were at the epi-
center of the crisis, were slow to grow. The swap lines, stimulus packages (espe-
cially the Chinese stimulus package that ended up creating much demand from 
other EMDs), and other measures enabled many EMDs to bounce back from 
the sudden stop and begin to grow again, and at faster rates than the industrial-
ized countries. Meanwhile, the industrialized world struggled to recover. Both 
the United States and Europe experienced political opposition to fiscal stimulus. 
The United States put in place a very modest stimulus package. More important 
for this book, the United States also experimented with very loose monetary pol-
icy. Not only did the Fed intervene in financial markets to influence short-term 
interest rates, it also embarked on quantitative easing by purchasing longer-term 
securities to bring down long-term rates.
Helene Rey (2013) of the London Business School shows how low interest 
rates in the United States calm capital markets as measured by the VIX (the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, an indicator of stock 
market volatility) and push out capital flows from the United States, creating 
financial turbulence in EMDs despite the fact that EMDs may have floating 
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exchange rates. Rey finds that, when the VIX is lowered, there is a significant 
 expansion of bank leverage, credit flows, and equity flows to EMDs. She shows 
how such flows can be so powerful that they violate the trilemma (outlined in 
chapter 3). Regardless of whether a country has a fixed or floating exchange rate, 
says Rey, free capital mobility makes it very hard to have an independent mon-
etary policy in the twenty-first century. The channel by which these flows were 
transmitted to EMDs in the wake of the crisis is referred to as the carry trade. 
As interest rates were lowered for expansionary purposes in the industrialized 
world after 2009, capital again began to expand into EMDs, where interest rates 
and growth were relatively higher. The carry trade was a key mechanism that 
triggered these flows.
The carry trade is a type of financial process whereby an investor borrows cur-
rency in a low-interest-rate country and sells it for currency in a higher-interest-
rate country. The interest rate differential is the carry. In the world of derivatives 
trading, the carry trade can be highly lucrative because it can compound profits 
far above the size of the carry. In the wake of the financial crisis, interest rates in 
the industrialized countries were at an all time low due to an expansionary mon-
etary policy. Moreover, the industrialized countries were not growing very fast, 
if at all. EMDs, in contrast, had relatively higher interest rates (due to inflation 
targeting, risk, and other reasons) and much faster growth. Low interest rates and 
slow growth in the North, when juxtaposed with higher interest rates and faster 
growth in the South (the two-speed recovery) were perfect carry trade condi-
tions. From early 2009 to the end of 2011, hedge funds and other actors were bor-
rowing dollars in source countries, where interest rates were low, and investing 
in target countries, where interest rates were high. They were also going to short 
the dollar and go long on currencies from countries with healthier economies 
and higher interest rates. When such agents are highly leveraged, as they were, 
the profits (and risk) can be enormous. Ten banks control 80 percent of the FX 
market. Deutsche, Citigroup, Barclays, and UBS are half that market. The result, 
as figure 4.1 (left-hand scale) shows, was that capital flows returned with a ven-
geance to EMDs in the wake of the crisis.
The carry trade can be lucrative for investors in at least three ways. The first is 
the interest rate differential. If the US interest rate is 0.025 percent and the Bra-
zilian rate is 10.50 percent, then the differential could be 10.25 percent (minus 
transaction costs). The real profits come from leverage and the exchange rate 
movements. Hedge funds speculate that the higher-rate currency is going to 
appreciate in addition to earning the interest rate differential. The second way 
the carry trade is lucrative is that profits can ramp up depending on the lever-
age factor. A leverage factor of 5 on a 10.25 percent differential is a profit of 
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50.25 percent, and a leverage factor of 10 on a 10.25 percent differential could 
mean a profit of 100.25 percent. The third way is that those profits come when 
exchange rates stay stable but can be magnified if when the currency shorted 
depreciates and the long position appreciates. Given the more robust growth 
and higher interest rates in emerging markets, the carry trade resulted in another 
mass inflow of capital to the EMDs in 2009–2011.
The carry trade can also be highly destabilizing in EMDs for at least three 
reasons. First, if capital flows are large enough, such speculation can cause undue 
volatility in the exchange rates and asset prices in EMDs. Economists such as 
Marion Kohler (2010) and Robert McCauley and Patrick McGuire (2009) see 
the increase in carry trade activity as having fundamentally changed the way 
exchange rates work in the global economy. In the post-crisis period, sharp cur-
rency depreciations in EMD currencies were not due only to lack of demand 
for EMD exports but also to capital flight from carry trades unwinding. The 
subsequent appreciations of EMD currencies were partly the result of new carry 
trade positions taken as interest rate differentials and growth rates diverged in 
the wake of the crisis.
Second, the carry trade can be destabilizing because relatively small inter-






































































FiGure 4.1. Capital flows and exchange rates in emerging markets,  
1998–2012 (Tiftik et al. 2012).
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of (highly leveraged) positions causes sudden stops and capital flight. Indeed, 
Hyun Song Shin calls this the “classic pattern,” in which the carry trade leads to 
prolonged appreciation “punctuated by sharp falls” (Plantin and Shin 2011, 23, 
33) Both Plantin and Shin (2011) and Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pederson (2009) 
argue that carry trades become particularly destabilizing when new global condi-
tions reduce liquidity.
Third, in an environment where nations have open capital accounts, the carry 
trade can have further destabilizing effects in terms of policy space for indepen-
dent monetary policy. The dominant tool to stem asset bubbles or inflation is 
the interest rate. But, because of the carry trade, the intended result can be the 
reverse if interest rates are low abroad. Given that rates during the crisis were 
over 10 percent in Brazil and less than 1 percent in the United States, raising 
interest rates in Brazil to curb asset bubbles and inflation would actually attract 
more capital flows, not less (Ocampo, Spiegel, and Stiglitz 2008). This is why Rey, 
Ocampo, and others have argued that it is difficult to have an independent mon-
etary policy with an open capital account and floating exchange rate. Figure 4.1  
(right-hand scale) shows the real currency appreciation associated with the in-
creased capital flows.
Financial flows to EMDs far surpassed their precrisis levels and were followed 
by significant currency appreciation and fears of asset bubbles as well. This trig-
gered the financial amplification effect (discussed in chapter 3). Many EMDs 
then decided to reregulate cross-border financial flows into their countries in 
innovative ways.
Third-Generation regulations in emerging 
Market and developing countries
This crisis was somewhat different. In response to the crises during the decades 
preceding the global financial crisis, EMDs had tended to liberalize their capital 
accounts even further. They did so to send the right signals to global capital mar-
kets and to appease domestic and international advocates of reform (Haggard 
and Maxfield 1996). In the wake of the global crisis, rather than further deregulat-
ing cross-border financial flows many EMDs decided to reregulate cross-border 
financial flows. What is more, a few pioneering EMDs created a third generation 
of cross-border financial regulations that were fine-tuned to focus on how capital 
flows had manifested themselves in EMD economies—the FX derivatives mar-
ket. Here I trace how capital flows reflooded into EMDs in the wake of the crisis 
and discuss how many of these countries responded to those flows.
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Reregulating Cross-Border Finance
In a stark reversal of the policies of crisis mitigation used at the end of the twen-
tieth century, many EMDs moved to regulate the cross-border financial flows 
that were causing financial amplification effects in their countries. Countries that 
deployed such regulations were found to be modestly successful in meeting their 
goals and grew faster than countries that experienced similar surges but did not 
regulate them.
To review, cross-border financial regulations are deployed to help buffer from a 
number of risks that come with financial integration. Chief among those risks are 
currency mismatch risks, interest rate mismatch risks, exchange rate volatility, capi-
tal flight, financial fragility, contagion, and monetary sovereignty (Grabel 2003). 
All these risks were accentuated during the global financial crisis. As previously 
noted, the uptick in the carry trade from 2009 to 2011 put pressure on currencies 
and credit markets, and made it more difficult for nations to maintain sovereignty 
over monetary policy regardless of whether they had a floating or fixed currency.
Economists and regulators usually differentiate between regulations on cap-
ital inflows and regulations on capital outflows. These measures have evolved 
over three generations of regulation. Many of the regulations on cross-border 
finance that were enacted immediately after the Bretton Woods agreements were 
 quantity-based and can be considered first-generation cross-border financial 
regulations. These entail outright quantitative restrictions on cross-border fi-
nance, and many nations still deploy these today. Examples of quantity-based 
controls are restrictions on currency mismatches, minimum stay requirements, 
and minimum end-use limitations. Many of these have been used by nations 
such as China and India. Price-based regulations constitute the second genera-
tion of cross border financial regulations. The United States Interest Equalization 
Tax was among the first uses of price-based controls in the industrialized world; 
among the first uses of price based regulation in EMDs was the Chilean unremu-
nerated reserve requirement (URR). On the one hand, the URR is a price-based 
restriction on inflows; on the other, it also includes a minimum-stay requirement, 
which can act like a quantity-based restriction on outflows. Other examples of 
price-based controls include taxes on inflows (Brazil) and on outflows (Malaysia 
in 1998) (Epstein, Grabel, and Sundaram 2008).
These regulations most often target foreign-currency and local-currency debt 
of a short-term nature. FDI is often considered less volatile and less worrisome 
from a financial stability standpoint. The aim of inflow restrictions on currency 
debt is to reduce pressure on the exchange rate and on the overall level of such 
borrowing, steer investment toward longer-term productive investments, and thus 
reduce risk. Moreover, the goal is to give the central bank room to maneuver in set-
ting monetary policy. Taxes on such investment cut the price differential between 
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short- and long-term debt and thus discourage investment in shorter-term obli-
gations while giving the central bank breathing room. Outflows restrictions and 
measures are usually deployed to “stop the bleeding” and keep capital from leaving 
the host nation too rapidly while allowing the central bank to lower rates as neces-
sary. A variety of these techniques were used during the global financial crisis. As 
previously noted, the IMF found that nations that deployed capital account regu-
lations of this kind were among the least hard hit by the crisis (Ostry et al. 2010).
Table 4.1 provides an illustrative list of EMDs that put in place new cross-
border financial regulations in the wake of the financial crisis. The nations on 
this list experimented with first- and second-generation capital controls. Some 
also derived regulations on FX derivatives that border on macroprudential reg-
ulations. Many of these regulations target the FX derivatives market precisely to 
regulate the build up of risk in currency, credit, and other markets. In this sense, 
they form the third generation of cross-border financial regulations. The IMF 
has noted that there is an overlap between macroprudential regulation and what 
are traditionally seen as capital controls; the two overlap when regulations on 







THird GeneraTion  
(Fx reGulaTions)
China Outright bans or limits 
on the entry of certain 
 investments
India Direct limits on  
US dollar–rupee trades
Margin requirement 
on US dollar–rupee 
forward trade increased 
to 100%
Brazil Taxes on portfolio 
investments
Noninterest reserve 
requirement on bank 
short dollar positions in 
FX spot market
South Korea Withholding tax on 
nonresident holdings 
of treasury and 
monetary bonds
Numerous restrictions 
on bank FX derivatives 
positions
Peru Taxes on portfolio 
investments
Position limits on FX 
short dollar trades and 
reserve requirements 
for all FX deposits
Indonesia One-month holding period 
on central bank bills
Thailand Taxes on nonresident 
purchase of public 
bonds
Note: FX, foreign exchange.
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FX derivative markets discriminate on the basis of residency (Ostry et al. 2011). 
As we see in table 4.1, many of these regulations were deployed by EMDs.
At this writing, three large studies have been conducted that analyze the aver-
age impact of these measures across the globe. Shaghil Ahmed and Andrei Zlate 
(2013) at the US Federal Reserve Board conducted a large quarterly panel analy-
sis of the determinants of capital inflows to twelve EMDs between 2002 and 2012, 
and of the effectiveness of the measures used to regulate those flows. The Fed 
economists find that interest rate differentials and growth differentials were the 
key drivers of capital flows to EMDs in the wake of the crisis. They also find that 
capital account regulations put in place after the crisis significantly discouraged 
both total flows and portfolio inflows.
Erten and Ocampo (2013), at Columbia University, also have examined a 
large panel of post-crisis attempts to regulate capital flows. They look at fifty-one 
EMDs over the period 1995–2011 and find that regulations on inflows were sig-
nificantly associated with less FX pressure than were regulations on outflows—
and that the effects of capital outflow regulations were larger in magnitude than 
those on capital inflows. They also find that capital account regulations enhanced 
monetary policy autonomy by reducing the effect of interest rate differentials on 
nominal exchange rates. Finally, these authors find that countries that increased 
their use of capital inflow regulations between 2008 and 2011 had higher post-
crisis growth rates than nations that did not regulate.
In the third study, Michael Klein (2012) analyzes a panel of forty-four devel-
oped economies and EMDs between 1995 and 2010. Unlike the other studies, 
Klein finds that cross-border financial regulations had little impact on several 
macroeconomic variables; he also does not find a strong relationship between 
regulations and GDP growth. It is clear that these particular findings are due 
to the inclusion of industrialized countries in the sample. Klein’s sample con-
sists of twenty-three advanced economies and twenty-one EMDs. Because most 
industrialized nations did not regulate cross-border finance during the period, 
Klein assigns them a coefficient of zero, which reduces the significance of the 
coefficient estimates. Klein also includes other subindices that are assigned zeros 
coefficients, and this may explain why his study that does not find as much of a 
positive effect for cross-border controls as the others (Erten and Ocampo 2013).
The Four case studies
In this section, I report on the econometric country case studies I performed for 
this book. As in the aggregate analyses already discussed, the control measures 
adopted by Brazil and South Korea were found to be associated with less financial 
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fragility. I delineate how capital flows were attracted to the four key EMDs— 
Brazil, Chile, South Africa, and South Korea—and evaluate the extent to which 
the attempts to regulate such inflows were effective in each.
Interest rate differentials were quite large between industrialized countries 
and EMDs between 2009 and 2012. As discussed earlier, these differentials en-
abled carry trades that channeled the liquidity triggered by low interest rates in 
the United States and other industrialized countries. Figure 4.2 exhibits the dif-
ferentials (between EMD currency and US dollars) in the four EMDs.
Brazil had the widest differential, reaching 10 percentage points in August 
2010. South Africa and Chile also saw carries of over 5 percentage points. The 
interest rate differential with South Korea was just over 3 percentage points. Each 
of these nations saw a surge in capital flows that also triggered credit booms and 
currency troubles. Brazil and South Africa saw appreciations of over 40 percent, 
and South Korea and Chile saw appreciation in the 15–20 percent range during 
the period. When eurozone jitters became more serious in summer 2011, there 
was significant capital flight and a subsequent depreciation in currencies.
Stock market volatility was also acute. Volatility in Brazil, the smallest, was over 
50 percent in one year, and volatility in South Korea was at over 65 percent. Inter-
estingly, although all four of these nations faced similar levels of capital flows and 
financial amplification effects, each responded with different policies. Brazil and 































































































































































































































































FiGure 4.2. Post-crisis EMD-US interest rate differentials. EMD, emerging-
market and developing country (Bloomberg Terminal, February 14, 2012, 
accessed April 22, 2012).
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liberalized capital flows, and Chile made minor interventions in the FX market. 
Let’s explore the capital account regulations deployed by Brazil and South Korea.
Brazil
Brazil had significantly liberalized its capital account in the 1990s, although it left 
the option for capital controls on the table. The country exercised that option on 
numerous occasions between 2009 and 2012. In the 1990s, Brazil adopted a float-
ing exchange rate system, inflation targeting, and capital account liberalization. 
There was a surge in capital inflows to Brazil, especially after 2006, largely in the 
form of derivatives and portfolio flows. Then Brazil experienced a sudden stop 
in 2009, followed by a very large surge in late 2009.
For the reasons discussed earlier, after the sudden stop in non-FDI financial 
flows to Brazil in 2009, there was another surge in capital inflows from 2009 to 
2011, again largely in the portfolio and derivatives markets. As discussed, this 
was because of the large interest rate differentials, increases in commodity prices, 
and rapid growth from 2009 to 2011 and also because of its fairly sophisticated 
derivatives markets.
Indeed, the nature of the Brazilian derivatives market was a key attraction for 
global investors. In 2010, the real (the Brazilian currency) was the world’s second 
most traded currency in the derivatives market (Prates and Fritz 2012). A key 
characteristic of the Brazilian regime is its nondeliverable derivatives market. 
Nondeliverable means that investors do not have to deliver purchases, sales, or 
margins (collateral) of FX derivatives positions in a foreign currency. This char-
acteristic makes the derivatives carry trade in Brazil very attractive for foreign 
investors. In addition, unlimited access for nonresidents enticed carry trade ac-
tivities and further increased liquidity. Technically, the domestic banks in Brazil 
sold short on dollars in the FX spot market offshore and then lent Brazilian reals 
to foreign investors, who then went long on the real in the derivative and bond 
markets onshore in Brazil. In other words, a bank in Brazil would sell dollars off-
shore and bet against them (going short) and then lend reals to a foreign investor 
offshore as well. The foreigners would then bet on (go long) the appreciation of 
the real. This investment strategy meant that the foreign investors did not at all 
have to access the FX markets and made the liquidity of the FX futures market 
exceptionally higher than the FX spot market (Prates and Fritz 2012).
The FX derivatives market was the specific channel that triggered the massive 
exchange rate and credit bubbles that occurred in Brazil at the time (IMF 2011b; 
Prates and Fritz 2012). On numerous occasions, Brazil attempted to stem the neg-
ative impacts of these inflows—currency appreciation and credit expansion of 
over 20 percent per year—through a variety of cross-border financial regulations 
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Note that Brazil took these measures alongside instituting monetary and fis-
cal policies, as well as other macroprudential policies. During the period, Brazil 
raised its policy tax rate five times and pledged fiscal consolidation repeatedly. 
Brazil also increased bank reserve requirements and increased capital require-
ments, in addition to the cross-border financial regulations on the table. The first 
move of Brazil was a second-generation regulation of a 2 percent tax on bonds 
and equities purchased by foreigners, referred to as the Imposto de Operações 
Financeiras (IOF) tax. This was among the first such measures taken in the world 
economy and was reported widely in the global press. Brazilian Finance Minis-
ter Guida Mantega famously referred to these actions as a necessary defense in 
the currency war started by loose industrialized-country monetary policies and 
the undervalued Chinese exchange rate. Shortly after the announcement of the 
measure, Brazilian authorities saw that investors were evading the regulations by 
purchasing stock on the American depositary receipt (ADR) markets (a mecha-
nism in the United States where foreign stocks can be bought and sold). In an 
interesting response, Brazil then extended its tax to the ADR market, and then 
over the course of 2009 and 2010, it ramped up those taxes incrementally while 
reducing taxes and disincentives on debt and equity with a longer maturity.
It was late in 2010 when Brazil put in place a third generation of regulations, 
on the FX derivatives market. First, in October 2010 Brazil announced that it 
would extend the IOF tax on margin requirements for FX derivatives transac-
tions; moreover, Brazilian authorities were no longer able to meet their mar-
gin requirements through locally borrowed securities. In 2011, Brazil adopted a 
URR-like regulation for the FX derivatives market. Brazilian authorities required 
that 60 percent of a FX derivatives investor’s short dollar positions in the spot 
market be held at no interest. Later in 2011, Brazil created a new regime for 
FX derivatives trading, requiring that all FX derivatives be registered by clearing 
houses and putting a mandatory tax on all long positions (betting that the real 
would appreciate) of up to 25 percent (De Paula and Prates 2013. Throughout 
2011, Brazil continued to fine-tune its regulations in response to investor behav-
ior, extending the IOF to loans from foreign patent companies and corporate 
bonds. As the global capital cycle began to reverse in 2012 and 2013, Brazil eased 
the majority of these regulations to be countercyclical.
South Korea
Like Brazil, South Korea has also been characterized as a nation that has signifi-
cantly liberalized its capital account over the past twenty years. Capital inflows to 
South Korea were also triggered by interest rate differentials and strong growth, 
as well as by the unique nature of the South Korean FX derivatives market. Unlike 
Brazil, the Korean FX market is deliverable—purchase, sale, gains, and losses are 
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liquidated in US dollars (Prates and Fritz 2012; IMF 2011a). Indeed, many banks 
operating in South Korea relied on overseas credit lines to finance investments in 
South Korea and secure them in the derivatives market. Then there was a sudden 
stop of this international credit after the Lehman crisis, and there was a sharp 
depreciation of the won (the Korean currency).
In the wake of the global financial crisis, capital inflows resumed to South 
Korea via the carry trade. International banks operating in South Korea were 
borrowing US dollars short-term and selling these dollars for wons in the South 
Korean spot market; they were then buying certificates of deposits on other do-
mestic bonds and selling the wons forward for dollars (Prates and Fritz 2012). 
These banks also engaged in derivative contracts with exporter companies 
(mainly shipbuilders) in the derivatives market. The FX options allowed firms to 
sell dollars (hedge) at a fixed exchange rate because they expected the continued 
appreciation of the won (Lee 2013).
The won appreciated significantly in the years following 2009. South Korean 
authorities responded with a number of first-, second-, and third-generation 
capital account regulations (elaborated on in table 4.3). The main objective of 
Table 4.3 Fine-tuning cross-border financial regulations in South Korea
daTe Measure deTails
19-Nov-2009 Tightened rules on FX 
derivatives for export-
ers, effective January 
1, 2010
The measure aims to ensure that corporates use 
forward contracts to hedge FX risk and not to 
speculate in currency markets; namely, bank FX 
forwards to exporters were capped at 125% of 
the underlying export revenues, applying to both 
domestic banks and foreign branches
1-Jan-2010 Tighter FX liquidity 
standards for domestic 
banks
The measure aims to reduce the maturity mis-
match between the domestic bank liabilities 
and assets; thus, the ratio of mid- to long-term 
financing to lending in foreign loan portfolios 
was increased to 90% (from 80%)
13-Jun-2010 Tightened rules on bank 
FX derivative positions, 
FX forwards to export-
ers, and FX loans for 
banks and corporates
The measures include
(1) New limits on bank FX derivative positions, 
set at 50% of equity capital for domestic banks 
and 250% for local branches of foreign banks, 
to discourage speculative capital inflows that 
bet on won appreciation, effective October 9 
(for branches, “own capital” is the amount of 
long-term borrowing from the foreign parents and 
affiliates)
(2) Cap on FX forwards to firms reduced to 100% of 
exports (from 125%) to ensure that corporates 
use them to hedge FX risk and not to speculate 
in currency markets, effective August 1
(3) Stricter limits on FX loans to large corporates, 
effective August 1
(Continued)
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daTe Measure deTails
18-Nov-2010 14% withholding tax 
imposed on foreigners’ 
interest and capital 
gains from holdings of 
sovereign debt
The tax, effective January 1, 2011, was levied ret-
roactively on all debt earnings since November 
12; the impact of the tax was probably damp-
ened by an exemption provided to the residents 
of countries with double-taxation treaties with 
Korea, as well as to official investors
5-Apr-2011 Korean National As-
sembly approved a 
levy (tax) on bank FX 
liabilities other than 
deposits (the plan had 
been announced in 
December 2010)
The tax, effective August 1, applies to the FX li-
abilities other than deposits of local banks and 
branches of foreign banks; the new tax consists 
of a four-tiered system that provides higher rates 
for shorter-term external debt: 0.20% for tenors 
of less than 1 year, 0.10% for 1–3 years, 0.05% 
for 3–5 years, and 0.02% for more than 5 years
1-Jun-2011 The Bank of Korea 
prohibited financial 
companies from buy-
ing FX bonds issued 
by Korean firms in 
the domestic market 
(“kimchi” bonds) if the 
issuer plans to convert 
the proceeds into won 
for local use, effective 
July 25
The measure aims to curb the accumulation of 
short-term external debt, which resulted as 
Korean firms issued FX bonds domestically 
and converted the proceeds in Korean won; at 
the time, the outstanding amount of FX bonds 
issued within South Korea was $17.1 billion, of 
which three-quarters were held by branches of 
Japanese and other foreign banks
The measure reduced the ability of Korean firms to 
circumvent an existing limit on borrowing over-
seas for local use; however, it did not affect the 
FX bonds issued by non-Korean firms in Korea or 
the FX bonds issued by Korean firms abroad for 
use abroad
7-Sep-2011 14% tax imposed on 
foreign investors’ 
interest earned from 
holding “kimchi” bonds 
purchased in Korea
The new tax applies to the local branches of 
foreign banks, nonresident corporates, and over-
seas individual investors; domestic investors 
were already charged a similar tax on interest 
earned from “kimchi” bonds
The tax was approved in late 2011 and became 
effective on January 1, 2012
27-Nov-2012 Tightened rules on bank 
FX derivatives, effec-
tive December 1, with 
a 1-month grace period 
until January 1, 2013
The ceiling on bank FX derivative positions (such 
as FX forward agreements) was lowered to 30% 
of equity capital for domestic banks (from 40%) 
and to 150% for local branches of foreign banks 
(from 200%)
Source: Based on Ahmed and Zlate (2013); Prates and Fritz (2012).
Note: FX, foreign exchange. 
the policy was to curb short-term foreign debt and tighten FX liquidity, both of 
which contribute to capital flow and exchange rate volatility. Beginning in late 
2009, the country levied controls on bank holdings of FX derivatives, forwards, 
and liabilities. The first policy, implemented in November 2009, required banks 
to hold a designated amount of high-rated foreign treasury bonds and to re-
duce trading in FX futures. In 2010, the government lowered the limits on bank 
holdings of FX derivatives, with stricter limits for foreign-owned banks than for 
domestic banks. In the same year, subsequent policies included barring foreign 
Table 4.3 (continued)
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currency loans by banks to local companies for domestic use (a first-generation 
reform). Second-generation market-based policies were implemented in 2011: a 
levy on bank nondeposit FX borrowings, with higher levies for short-term debt, 
and an additional reduction in the limit on bank holdings of FX derivatives. In 
2012, South Korea put a tax on FX futures and option premiums, and increased 
limits on FX derivatives (Baumann and Gallagher 2012; Prates and Fritz 2012; 
Lee 2013).
In both Brazil and South Korea, authorities followed two strategies. First, they 
created a third generation of cross-border financial regulation. Borrowing from 
some of the second-generation regulations, these were extended to the FX deriva-
tives market. Second, authorities closely monitored markets to examine whether 
the regulations were working and whether they were being circumvented. When 
they saw loopholes that were being taken advantage of, both countries fine-tuned 
their regulations to make the regulations more effective. How well did these mea-
sures work?
The Effectiveness of New Regulations
Consistent with our previous discussions, many of the post-crisis cross-border 
financial regulations modestly helped EMDs achieve their goals in stemming the 
adverse financial amplification effects due to the surge in capital inflows between 
2009 and 2012 across the developing world. As background studies for this book, 
Brittany Baumann (a Boston University graduate student at the time) and I con-
ducted two econometric studies to examine the extent to which the use of post-
2008 cross-border financial regulations were effective in Brazil and South Korea. 
We juxtaposed these analyses with an analysis of two EMDs that did not put capi-
tal account regulations in place: Chile and South Africa. As we have seen, Chile 
and South Africa were faced with a set of challenges similar to South Korea and 
Brazil, but in response to the surge in capital inflows, Chile decided to intervene 
in the FX market and South Africa chose to further liberalize its capital account.
To examine whether the measures taken in Brazil and South Korea worked, we 
performed a number of regression analyses. This approach allowed us to exam-
ine the independent impact of a policy measure (an independent variable) on a 
stated goal, such as reducing exchange rate volatility (the dependent variable). It 
also allowed us to control for other factors that might impact a dependent vari-
able to determine whether a given policy has an independent impact.
EMDs that put in place capital account regulations were seeking to reduce 
the overall level of capital inflows into their countries, to alter the composition 
of capital inflows toward more long-term investment such as FDI, to stem the 
development of asset price bubbles, to reduce pressure on the exchange rate, and 
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to allow for a more independent monetary policy. Data for each of these (depen-
dent) variables are available in these countries, often on a daily or monthly basis, 
as are data on the exact dates of the capital account regulations and on other 
(independent) variables that would impact capital flows, exchange rates, and so 
forth.1 We also examined the extent to which the more conventional measures 
worked in Chile and South Africa. The general results of these analyses are pre-
sented in table 4.4.
The columns show the different policy goals (dependent variables) that we 
modeled in our regressions. In each case, we examined the independent effects 
of capital account regulations on each of these goals. For instance, controlling 
for other factors that impact the level of capital flows (table 4.4, column 1), we 
found that regulations were associated with an increase in capital flows in Brazil 
and South Korea.
For Brazil, the introduction of capital account regulations was associated 
with an increase in total inflows, but the composition was shifted from short- to 
longer-term inflows. In other words, we found that the Brazilian measures did 
not stem the tide of capital inflows but channeled it toward more longer-term 
investment rather than the most volatile types of inflows. Beyond small effects 
on the day a measure was announced, however, the Brazilian measures did not 
have the desired impact on asset prices and on stemming asset bubbles. Never-
theless, the Brazilian measures did have a lasting impact on the level and volatil-
ity of the exchange rate. Finally, measures taken by Brazil modestly increased the 
ability of Brazil to pursue an independent monetary policy.
South Korea deployed a mix of traditional capital controls and third- generation 
measures aimed at the FX markets. The regulations used by South Korea were less 
successful than those used by Brazil. According to our background studies, the 
South Korean actions had little effect on the amount or composition of inflows, 
on asset prices, or on the ability of South Korea to engage in an independent 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, and perhaps most important, the South Korean 
measures did have a lasting impact on the volatility of the exchange rate. This was 
perhaps the largest goal of the South Korean authorities because the FX deriva-
tives market was creating a significant amount of volatility and uncertainty for 
investors and exporters alike.
The moves made by Chile were more conventional. Chile intervened in FX 
markets by selling Chilean pesos and buying US dollars. The goal was to make 
the dollar scarcer and the peso more abundant and thus make the Chilean peso 
1. For a more detailed explanation, full model specifications, and specific regression results, see 
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weaker. The Chilean currency interventions were less successful, except on the 
days when they were announced. Each announcement of currency intervention 
reduced the level of the exchange rate, but not the volatility, and made the do-
mestic stock market more independent from the region as a whole. The Chilean 
interventions had no statistically significant impact on total inflows of capital, 
the composition of inflows, or the ability of Chile to pursue an independent 
monetary policy. In addition, we found that the cross-border financial regula-
tions adopted by Brazil seemed to increase the capital inflows to Chile for a short 
period, but this did not last. The Chilean reserve accumulation measures had 
only temporary effects in Chile and did not withstand the markets over time.
Rather than reregulating cross-border finance, South Africa liberalized capi-
tal outflows and intervened in the FX market. Data were not available on total 
inflows and the composition of inflows, but we were able to test for the impacts 
of capital account liberalization and FX intervention on asset prices, exchange 
rate levels, and monetary policy. The South African measures had no effect on 
asset prices or monetary policy; however, they did reduce the volatility of the 
South African rand. Why would the seemingly opposite policies of regulating 
cross-border inflows (Brazil and South Korea) and deregulating cross-border 
outflows (South Africa) have a similar effect? There are at least two reasons. First, 
if a nation has relatively strong regulations on capital outflows, the liberalization 
of such a regime could reduce the net inflows because some investment that 
had been sequestered in the nation due to outflows controls would thus be able 
to leave the country. Second, and as Haggard and Maxfield (1996) have noted, 
sometimes nations will liberalize capital flows during times of volatility if they 
believe further liberalization will send a positive signal to the markets. This also 
may be why such measures are not very successful in the long run—investors 
who were looking to exit do exit, and market sentiment moves on.
The findings reported here are in line with the peer-reviewed literature on 
capital account regulations previous to the crisis (e.g., Magud, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff 2011; Ostry et al. 2010). At the time of writing of this book, there were 
no similar analyses of the South Korean regulations but a number of studies had 
been published about the Brazilian regulations. The results of the research con-
ducted for this book are also largely corroborated by these studies.
One study (Chamon and Garcia 2013) analyzes the impact of the Brazilian 
regulations on inflows since 2009, on the prices of financial assets, and on ex-
change rate appreciation. It finds that regulations were effective in distorting 
prices by making domestic assets relatively more expensive, thereby making such 
assets less attractive to foreign investors. Yet the controls did not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on the appreciation of the real, although they may have 
helped to strengthen the effect of the interest rate cut later in the period.
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In another study, Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Andrea Kiguel (2009) quantify 
the effectiveness of a specific Brazilian control, the IOF, on the Brazilian ex-
change rate by running regression analyses similar to those of Marcos Chamon 
and Marcio Garcia (2013), and they also find that the measures had the desired 
effect. Kristin Forbes and Francis Warnock (2011) examine the IOF tax in Brazil 
but test only the impact on portfolio flows, using the Emerging Portfolio Fund 
Research database.2 Their novel data set gives fund-level investments by country 
but accounts for only 5–20% of total country market capitalization. They find 
evidence that the Brazilian regulations reduced investor portfolio allocations 
to Brazil.
Another study on the Brazilian controls (Jinjarak, Noy, and Zheng 2012) fo-
cuses entirely on gross capital inflows, using micro-level data from US and Eu-
ropean mutual funds. This study tests the effectiveness of the regulations using 
counterfactuals and finds that the controls had some short-term impact in re-
ducing inflows, although the effect disappeared a few months after imposition. 
Finally, Luiz Da Silva and Ricardo Harris (2013) find that the Brazilian measures 
reduced the volume of loans as well as the maturity level.
Fewer studies analyze the South Korean policies. Valentina Bruno and Hyun 
Song Shin (2014) conducted an econometric analysis. They find that, after the 
measures were put in place, South Korea was less sensitive to capital flows trig-
gered by global factors such as the carry trade.
From a policy perspective, we can further confirm that these measures 
can impact exchange rate appreciation and the development of asset bubbles. 
Moreover, it is clear from our analysis that such measures should not be ad-
opted alone but, rather, should be part of a wider package of macroprudential 
policies. From our analysis, capital controls alone will not be sufficient to ad-
dress the concerns about capital flow volatility unless they are much stronger 
and better enforced. Indeed, our finding that the controls were associated with 
a shift toward FDI may lend credence to claims that capital account regula-
tions encourage some investors to circumvent regulation by disguising short-
term capital flows as FDI. Finally, our parallel analysis of Chile finds that 
intervening in currency markets can have an even weaker effect than capital 
flow management measures and can be costly in terms of the opportunity 
costs (Aizenman 2010).
This has led to a debate regarding whether nations needed to make the imple-
mented measures stronger or whether nations needed to put more effort into the 
enforcement of such measures. Other research suggests that EMDs should not be 
2. http://www.epfr.com/countryflows.aspx.
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left to carry the burden alone. Echoing Keynes, Ostry, Ghosh, and Korinek (2012) 
make the case that capital account regulations should also be regulated by the 
nations that are the source of the finance.
carrying the burden
So far, I have traced the role that capital flows played in the global financial crisis 
and its aftermath in EMDs. Cross-border financial flows were highly volatile in 
the run-up to the global financial crisis and in its wake. Such volatility created 
significant financial amplification that may have had a longer-term impact on 
stability, growth, and livelihoods. A swath of EMDs deployed cross-border fi-
nancial regulations in an attempt to manage capital flow volatility throughout 
the cycle. Although nations that regulated were less hard hit during the crisis and 
were more resilient during the crisis’ aftermath, the regulations were far from 
being effective enough to mitigate the associated risks.
It is fairly remarkable that the analyses for this book and in the broader post-
crisis literature continue to find some positive effects for cross-border financial 
regulations given the sheer level of capital flows in today’s global economy, the 
lack of institutional capabilities to govern capital markets, and—foremost—the 
lack of international cooperation with (or even acceptance of) capital account 
regulations. Nevertheless, to ensure that these regulations are fully effective, they 
have to be buttressed by national and global compliance and cooperation. There 
are at least four challenges to achieving full effectiveness of regulation: designing 
effective regulations, creating effective compliance with the regulations, harness-
ing the global coordination of regulation, and, perhaps most challenging, chang-
ing the political-economic context of decision making.
First, at the national level, capital account regulations need to be designed to 
be stronger and to include significant levels of surveillance mechanisms. First-, 
second- and third-generation regulations may be necessary depending on the cir-
cumstances in different countries, or all three types of regulations may be needed 
at the same time, as in the case of Brazil and South Korea. One of the reasons why 
some of the more recent uses of regulations appear to be modest in their effec-
tiveness is that they are weak relative to the spread in the carry trade. For example, 
in the 1990s Chile and Colombia both deployed URRs (mandatory non-interest-
bearing deposits in foreign currency at the central bank for a certain period in 
an amount proportional to the size of the capital flow, here, 30% for Chile and 
47% for Colombia). The tax equivalent of the Chilean controls averaged 4.24% 
and was as high as 7.7%. The tax equivalent of the Colombian controls ranged 
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from 6.4 to 13.6% (Gallego, Hernandez, and Schimdt-Hebel 1999; Ocampo and 
Tovar 2003). These tax equivalents were almost two to seven times stronger than 
the initial Brazilian IOF tax controls.
The second challenge for national governments is the circumventing of con-
trols by investors. One of the most profound ways that controls have been cir-
cumvented has been through disguising short-term capital as FDI. In Brazil, for 
example, investors could create a public company and list it on the Bolsa de Va-
lores, Mercadorias & Futuros de São Paulo (BOVESPA; the São Paulo stock ex-
change). The investors would own all the company shares and manipulate their 
price by arranging purchases and sales at low liquidity. The foreign investor could 
then invest in the public company as a foreigner and deem the investment an 
FDI investment because it acquired more than half of the shares and then per-
formed interfirm loans that were considered FDI (Carvalho and Garcia 2006). 
At this writing, there are even more avenues for circumvention. In Brazil, many 
FX derivatives trades are conducted in offshore nondeliverable forwards (NDF) 
markets. Because the regulations can impact only domestic banks that have a 
position in those markets, the regulations can easily be circumvented by going 
through foreign banks and hedge funds that operate in those offshore markets 
(Spiegel 2012). As we have seen, Brazil and South Korea repeatedly fine-tuned 
their regulations in an attempt to stop circumvention (Epstein, Grabel, and Sun-
daram 2008).
The third challenge is that EMD efforts alone cannot be relied on to regulate 
capital flows. As Keynes and White articulated when framing the Bretton Woods 
system, global coordination is the key to effective capital flow management (see 
Chapter 2). This is of even more importance given the global nature of onshore 
and offshore FX derivatives markets. If countries such as Brazil cannot regulate 
FX transactions in their own currency, then industrialized nations need to do so. 
Indeed, at the G20, countries agreed to regulate derivatives markets and coordi-
nate at the global level. (For an analysis of those efforts, see chapter 9.)
The fourth challenge is that the political obstacles to global coordination 
and national effectiveness of cross-border financial regulations include signifi-
cant collective action problems. Although all nations and the actors within them 
benefit from financial stability, there are individual financial sectors that will 
bear short-term costs. These “losers” of a capital control regime are highly con-
centrated and very powerful politically. The “winners,” in terms of the general 
public, are diffuse across the entire system and may suffer from information 
externalities so that they cannot “connect the dots” among capital regulations, 
financial stability, and personal welfare to the extent that they will mobilize 
 politically.
98      cHaPTer 4
In addition, there are free-rider problems. If all nations do not enact coopera-
tion and control regulations, then hot money can cascade where regulations are 
most lax. Strong regulation in one nation may trigger speculation to its neigh-
bors. Although it is increasingly understood that capital controls help markets 
“get the prices right,” a bigger challenge is getting the political economy right. To 
these questions we now turn.
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THE POLITICS OF REREGULATING 
CROSS-BORDER FINANCE
After more than forty years of expansion and sophistication, cross-border fi-
nance has permeated ideology, interest groups, party politics, institutions, and, 
above all, markets across the world to such an extent that any attempt to counter 
such power is often considered futile. Against the odds, an increasing number 
of emerging-market and developing countries (EMDs) that had opened their 
capital accounts in the 1990s reregulated cross-border finance in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. Using case study analyses of Brazil, Chile, South Korea, 
and South Africa, here I examine the political factors that led some countries to 
reregulate cross-border finance in the wake of the crisis and that limited the abil-
ity of other countries to do the same.
Two nations, Brazil and South Korea, established innovative new derivative 
regulations and extended second-generation capital controls to stem the harmful 
effects of cross-border finance with modest success. Chile and South Africa saw 
similar levels of systemic risk and currency volatility and also vigorously debated 
whether to reregulate the capital account. Both nations ended up not doing so. 
Instead, Chile intervened in currency markets and South Africa further liberal-
ized its capital account.
Four factors led Brazil and South Korea to overcome the political constraints 
(as detailed in the traditional literature) when South Africa and Chile could not. 
First, both countries had legislation that allowed financial authorities to regu-
late at their discretion and not have to undertake lengthy legislative battles right 
when opposition to regulation could be strongest. Second, in the case of Brazil, 
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the  government was led by an organized labor party that put job security and 
expansion before the short-term benefits that could come with exchange rate 
appreciation and asset price increases. Third, in both Brazil and South Korea, 
the government drew support from the collective memory of past crises that was 
ever present in the broader populace. And, finally, in different ways both nations 
reframed the use of capital controls as macroprudential measures to gain internal 
and external support for their policy objectives.
I chose these four nations as case studies because each nation received 
among the largest net capital inflows as a percentage of GDP (6.2 percent in 
Brazil, 6.6 percent in South Africa, 4 percent in Chile, and 2 percent in South 
Korea). The four countries also had among the largest amount of currency ap-
preciation, with the Brazilian real appreciating by 40 percent, the Chilean peso 
by 35 percent, the South African rand by 40 percent, and the South Korean won 
by 18 percent. Moreover in these four nations there was a significant expansion 
of credit and concern that asset bubbles would arise, and in each vociferous 
debates ensued about whether to regulate capital flows between 2009 and 2012 
(IMF 2011a).
Two of these nations (Brazil and South Korea) chose to directly regulate capi-
tal flows, and two did not (Chile and South Africa). This allows a comparative 
analysis of a set of countries across the globe that were the recipients of the same 
type of capital inflows that had similar impacts but chose different instruments 
to adapt to such inflows. I conducted both fieldwork and news analyses to re-
search the case studies. Fieldwork was conducted in Brazil in 2011, 2012, and 
2013 and in Chile and South Korea in 2012. I did not physically visit South Af-
rica, but I interviewed the key players via email, SKYPE, or telephone. To further 
analyze the domestic politics of capital flows in these countries, I also performed 
separate investigations of contemporary news articles. In each country, the three 
most dominant daily newspapers were analyzed. Every article about capital flows, 
the exchange rate, and related issues from 2009 to 2012 was mapped to learn 
what specific interest groups were saying on the record about the inflows and the 
measures taken (or not taken) by the government to mitigate such flows. For the 
four countries, over 125 articles were analyzed.
I begin this chapter by examining the previous literature on the political econ-
omy of capital account liberalization in the 1990s to frame how we might expect 
the changes to be explained. I then present the four case studies.
The Politics of regulating the capital account
As noted in the previous chapter, the global financial crisis was plagued by accen-
tuated surges and sudden stops in many EMDs. And, as we know, many EMDs 
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reregulated cross-border finance in attempts to stem the harmful effects of this 
volatility. There is a significant amount of literature about the deregulation of 
the capital account in industrialized countries, and also some literature on capi-
tal account liberalization in EMDs and the international financial institutions. 
There is, however, no contemporary literature on the reregulation of the capital 
account in the nations that liberalized in the 1990s. Here I use the literature on 
the deregulation of the capital account to draw hypotheses regarding how we 
might expect nations to reregulate cross-border finance.
The prevailing view that explains how capital accounts became liberalized 
over the past thirty years is that capital flows became so immense and sophisti-
cated that they were virtually impossible for nation-states to regulate. The sheer 
power of the markets themselves, and the ability of foreign investors to have 
veto power over national regulation by threatening to withdraw their capital, 
eventually tilted national institutions and ideologies to shift in favor of capital ac-
count liberalization as well. Those sectors that benefited most from capital flows 
became relatively stronger and supported political parties that supported the de-
regulation of the capital account as well. Moreover, capital account liberalization 
had become the dominant way of thinking within the economics profession and 
thus permeated central banks and finance ministries the world over. Finally, these 
actions became supported and sometimes conditioned on maintaining good re-
lations with the United States and Europe and with the international financial 
institutions where they held the most voting power.
Put more formally, the prevailing view is of a capital mobility hypothesis, 
where in a world of high capital mobility “policy options available to states are 
systematically circumscribed” because of the structural power of global capi-
tal markets (Andrews 1994, 193). John Goodman and Louis Pauly (1993) and 
Benjamin Cohen (1998) reinforce this notion by showing how capital mobility 
empowers the actors that stand to gain the most from deregulating capital ac-
count regulations by providing more leverage for private interests over govern-
ment regulators. Evoking Hirschman (1970), Cohen argues that private finance 
is empowered with “Exit, voice, and loyalty” (1998, 132). Private finance becomes 
more equipped to circumvent capital account regulations, thus giving less loy-
alty to government regulators. They have the leverage of exit or capital flight, 
and thus their voice becomes more accentuated in the political process. In some 
sense, capital mobility gives private finance veto power over public policy to 
manage capital flows. Layna Mosley (2003) shows that such power has its limits 
in industrialized countries but is stronger in EMDs because investors are more 
concerned about default and the relative power of global markets over smaller 
and weaker states.
Freiden and Leiteritz extend this logic to the case of EMDs in separate stud-
ies on Latin America. The sectors with the closest ties to major cross-border 
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 financial actors are the exporters of tradable goods and the foreign financial 
sector. Sometimes those actors have divergent interests because exporters are 
hurt by exchange rate appreciation while finance benefits from inflows (Frieden 
1991). Big exporters, however, often rely on foreign credit markets. Thus they 
exert pressure against measures to regulate such financial flows and usually push 
for capital account liberalization (Leiteritz 2012).
Randall Henning (1994) adds that institutional arrangements play a role as 
well. In an examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, he finds that 
countries that relaxed regulations on capital account and exchange rates often 
had highly independent central banks and a weak alliance between finance and 
industry, whereas countries that were more apt to intervene had a subordinate 
central bank and a strong alliance between finance and industry—with finance-
industry lobbies putting pressure on the finance ministry to intervene.
These interest groups support right-of-center political parties that seek to 
deregulate the capital account through dismantling previous regulations and in-
stitutions. Scott Kastner and Chad Rector (2003) show how right-of-center par-
ties played a large role in liberalizing capital accounts in nineteen industrialized 
countries over the period 1951 to 1998. Geoffrey Garret (1995) shows that global 
capital mobility still leaves room for left-of-center governments to maneuver but 
that those governments are penalized through higher interest rates than are their 
right-wing counterparts. Right-of-center governing parties are often advised 
by experts trained in the new classical tradition (Haggard and Maxfield 1996; 
Blyth 2002, 2003; Kirshner 2003). These governments appoint economists and 
policymakers who hold such views to the central banks and finance ministries 
(Fourcade 2006).
These factors are reinforced by the international financial institutions and by 
Western governments. Joyce and Noy (2008) find that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) implicitly linked capital account liberalization with its country pro-
grams. Abdelal (2007) shows that the Organisation for Economic Co- Operation 
and Development (OECD) Codes and credit-rating agencies also penalized na-
tions for regulating capital. The US government has also long pushed for capital 
account liberalization (Wade and Veneroso 1998; Cohen 2007).
One other observation was made during my fieldwork that is not prevalent 
in the literature. Recall from chapters 3 and 4 that cross-border finance is in-
herently pro-cyclical in emerging markets and susceptible to large surges and 
sudden stops. When I talked with policymakers who attempted to put capital 
account regulations in place, they confirmed that many of the forces identified 
in the literature were dominant. Moreover, they emphasized that all those forces 
were most powerful at exactly the time when regulation was needed most—the 
surge. As we recall from chapter 3, a surge is initially associated with exchange 
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rate appreciation, asset price increases, and an increase in GDP; thus firms, work-
ers, and households can purchase more goods and services during a surge, feel 
wealthier due to asset price increases, and see that the economy is growing. In the 
absence of regulation during the surge, people who believe that regulation is not 
the optimal policy argue that their observations confirm this. As one regulator 
communicated, “it is hard to take the punch bowl away when the party is just 
getting fun!” New research on the United States has pointed out similar dynam-
ics. In an analysis of the political economy of the United States leading up to the 
2008 global financial crisis, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal 
(2013) show that financial bubbles were associated with a political bubble that 
are also pro-cyclical. During booms, investors think that “this time is different” 
and that prices and prospects will continue to increase. These researchers show 
that political actors also take on those beliefs and are thus reluctant to act dur-
ing a boom. Indeed, during booms more new politicians with ideologies that do 
not support regulation come into power. Of course, the financial sector itself 
also becomes stronger during the boom and supports politicians who are against 
financial regulation.
This integration of forces largely explains why virtually all industrialized 
countries and many EMDs liberalized their capital accounts during the second 
half of the twentieth century. These insights can also go a long way in helping 
to unpack the period of financial volatility in EMDs between 2009 and 2013. By 
analyzing the extent to which different variables deviate from the relationships 
established in the previous literature, we can better understand why some na-
tions reregulated cross-border finance in the wake of the global financial crisis.
As noted earlier, political parties were already in place in South Korea and 
Brazil that had the institutional structures and political backing to intervene in 
global capital markets. That backing came in the form of interest groups that 
stood to benefit from intervention, on the one hand, and a collective memory 
of crises and inflation, on the other. These parties appointed technocrats to the 
finance ministries who enjoyed relative authority over the central banks on mat-
ters related to the capital account. The finance ministry technocrats framed the 
need to regulate in the terms of the new welfare economics and the pragmatic 
new terminology of macroprudential regulation. And after some initial push 
back, these two nations were either blessed or ignored by the Western powers 
and international financial institutions.
In contrast, in Chile right-of-center parties had just been elected, which led 
to the appointment of new Keynesian economists to the Central Bank who were 
relatively not supportive of regulating capital, and the interest groups that were 
concerned about capital flows were politically weak. Moreover, Chile has a trade 
treaty with the United States under which the use of capital account regulations is 
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illegal. In South Africa, the power of the markets was too strong to be countered 
by the faction of the African National Congress and IMF advisors who recom-
mended regulations on cross-border finance. The Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank were concerned about the possible exit of capital and were backed 
by similar private-sector concerns. Based on these cases, to exert the countervail-
ing monetary power to regulate cross-border finance in the twenty-first century, 
political parties with political backing and technocratic expertise need to be 
equipped with the proper institutions to regulate cross-border finance and need 
the policy space to do so under their international commitments.
brazil: Taming the Tsunami
As outlined in the previous chapter, between 2009 and the end of 2012 Brazil in-
troduced measures to manage capital inflows into the country more than eleven 
times. In October 2009, it put in place a 2 percent Imposto de Operações Finan-
ceiras (IOF) tax on inflows of private equity. And throughout the period, the 
Brazilian authorities fine-tuned the tax to 6 percent and expanded it to bonds, 
derivatives, and the purchase of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange. When 
capital inflows began to reverse in 2011 and 2012, Brazil eased off these coun-
tercyclical regulations. Brazil and South Korea are among the first countries to 
devise regulations on foreign exchange (FX) derivatives to stem the harmful ef-
fects of capital inflows. There was a great deal of political debate throughout this 
whole process and in response to each measure. Table 5.1 maps the major actors, 
their position on capital account regulations, and the arguments used by each 
actor during the debate. As shown chapter 4, the Brazilian measures are widely 
seen as being moderately successful.
Each measure was publicly announced by Guido Mantega, the Brazilian min-
ister of finance since 2006. Mantega has long held positions in the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT; Workers’ Party), a center-left party with roots fighting Brazil-
ian dictators and neoliberal economic policies. The PT came to power in January 
2003 after two terms of neoliberal policies and a subsequent financial crisis in 
the late 1990s. The PT ran on a platform of full employment, workers’ rights, 
and productive development. Mantega had been on the economic coordinating 
council for PT presidential elections in 1984, 1989, and 1998. He also articulated 
Brazilian policy globally. Throughout the course of speeches on the use of these 
measures, Mantega repeatedly referred to the capital flows as a “tsunami” that 
was a result of loose monetary policy in the United States and beyond. He said the 
IOF tax and related measures were the only defense of Brazil against the tsunami 
and the “currency war” thrust upon Brazilians by the United States and China.
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In terms of party politics, we should also note that the first three measures 
were taken in the midst of a heated election campaign that pitted the PT against 
the center-right Parted da Social Democracies Brasilia (PSDB; Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party). Capital flows and controls played well because they could 
resonate with the PT base of trade unionists and progressives who had a long 
history of disdain for the United States, the IMF, and other external forces inter-
fering with the ability of government to conduct pro-growth and employment 
strategies. Whereas the IMF, many in the banking sector, and the PSDB were 
saying that Brazil should cut its fiscal budget to deal with capital flows, Dilma 
Rousseff, the PT candidate, repeatedly argued that the Brazilian budget would 
not be subject to the whims of foreign finance and she would not let foreigners 
hold domestic growth and employment “hostage.” (Ennis 2010). Employment 
creation and job security are the central tenets of the PT and drove all major 
macroeconomic decision making. Thus the exchange rate appreciation and lack 
Table 5.1 Regulating capital flows and domestic politics in Brazil
acTor arGuMenT
Supportive of measures
Finance Ministry, Central Bank Asset bubbles, appreciation, Dutch disease
Exporters (FIESP, CNI, AEB, FACESP) “Something” to control appreciation






Best of bad alternatives




Domestic finance Evasion too easy, distortionary
International finance Evasion too easy, distortionary
IIF Evasion too easy, distortionary
Economists/analysts Evasion too easy, distortionary
BNDES Commodities prices
Focus on innovation, productivity
US too powerful, okay but “tsunami”
IMF Tackle budget deficit, interest rates
Note: AEB, Brazilian Foreign Trade Association; BNDES, Brazilian National Development Bank; BOVESPA, São 
Paulo Stock Exchange; CNI, National Confederation of Industry; FACESP; Federation of the Commercial Associa-
tions from the state of São Paulo; FIESP, Federation of Industries of São Paulo; IIF, Institute for International 
 Finance; IMF International Monetary Fund.
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of competitiveness of Brazilian firms became one of the largest concerns of the 
PT government from 2009 to 2011. Firms were losing competitiveness, shedding 
jobs, and thus eroding the base of support for the ruling party.
The PT was also backed by the general public, who were well aware of the 
potential for crises and inflation. Brazilians had experienced at least three major 
financial crises since the 1980s, and the specter of crises and inflation haunted the 
memories of many. They thus saw a longer-term view, recognizing that the cur-
rency appreciation can lead to the loss of export markets and the subsequent loss 
of jobs. Moreover, Brazilians remembered the capital flight that often followed. 
The related inflation was something that no Brazilian wanted to go back to. These 
memories were strong and were evoked by PT leaders and proponents of capital 
account regulations throughout the process.
The PT put in place myriad technocrats and policymakers who saw the inter-
vention in capital markets as good policy. Many of these economists came from 
the Minskian developmentalist tradition (outlined in chapter 3) and had been 
trained in Brazilian universities and in Western universities where such ideas 
continued to thrive. The training and background—as well as some post-election 
turnover—of some of the key players in Brazil provided the basis for the country 
to design and implement innovative regulation. The thrust of the new ideas—to 
impose the IOF tax and to create new FX derivatives measures and fine-tune 
these measures as markets reacted—came from the Finance Ministry. As noted 
already, the Finance Ministry had long been headed by Guido Mantega. Mantega 
holds a PhD in development sociology from the Philosophy, Sciences and Liberal 
Arts School of the University of São Paulo, and he also studied at the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Sussex, United Kingdom. Both 
of these universities have strong developmentalist traditions.
The real mastermind behind of the effort was the deputy minister of finance, 
Nelson Barbosa de Filho. A younger economist, he was hired by the Brazilian 
government in 2005 and worked his way up to become the economic policy sec-
retary from 2008 to 2010 before serving as deputy minister from 2010 to 2013. 
He and his team were behind the design and introduction of the capital account 
regulations in Brazil. Barbosa (2011) describes his approach to macroeconomic 
policy in Brazil as structuralist-Keynesian. Structuralism is a deep-rooted school 
of thought in Latin America, tracing its origins to Raúl Prebisch. The core themes 
of this school are the need for the state to provide macroeconomic stability and 
channel finance toward productive sectors that can change the structure of an 
economy toward higher valued-added and employment-intensive goods. Bar-
bosa studied under Lance Taylor at the New School for Social Research in New 
York and moves in the same circles as Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and José Antonio 
Ocampo (both discussed in chapter 3). Taylor, a former Massachusetts Institute 
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of Technology (MIT) professor of Paul Krugman, among others, is a pioneer of 
structuralism and has inspired many high-level financial policymakers across 
the developing world. Barbosa would be quite sympathetic to being considered 
a Minskian developmentalist.
Paramount to understanding the outcome of innovative capital account 
regulation in Brazil is an understanding of the varying jurisdictions assigned to 
different Brazilian institutions. The Brazilian Finance Ministry, like many of its 
counterparts, has jurisdiction over all tax policy, including any taxes on cross-
border finance (Prates 2012). Moreover, all monetary, credit, and exchange rate 
policies in Brazil must be agreed on by consensus by its Conselho Monetário Na-
cional (CMN; National Monetary Council). Founded in 1964, the CMN has as 
its members not only of the president of the Central Bank but also the minister 
of finance and the minister of planning, budget, and management (Paula 2011). 
The initial IOF taxes were put in place by the Ministry of Finance under its own 
discretion. It was at the CMN that the Ministry of Finance introduced the inno-
vative measures to regulate FX derivative markets.
During the administration of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Barbosa was 
not able to garner support for broader measures in the CMN, and he resorted 
to the taxation measures that did not need CMN approval. After the election, 
however, there were moves in the Central Bank that brought individuals to power 
who saw more eye to eye with Barbosa’s team. Henrique Meirelles, who headed 
the Central Bank through the Lula administration (and the IMF loans), made 
numerous public statements about being on the “same page” as the Finance Min-
istry about the measures but privately was much less supportive. Meirelles had 
been educated in Brazil and at the Harvard Business School and had headed the 
Brazil operations of BankBoston from 1984 to 1996; he then was head of global 
finance for FleetBoston Financial in Brazil. Interviewees noted that under Meire-
lles and Lula the goal was to regain credibility with the markets (Brazil had had a 
severe crisis under the Fernando Cardoso administration, and Lula had to regain 
global market confidence thereafter) and that Meirelles was concerned that regu-
lating inflows might send the wrong signals. On Meirelles’s watch, Brazil repaid 
its debts and accumulated enough reserves (enough for almost twelve months of 
imports, or 90 percent of external debt at the time the IOFs started) by the time 
consideration of these measures occurred. The Central Bank thought it had the 
space to act using controls in this post-credibility phase but may not have done 
so earlier. Indeed, while many nations, such as Colombia next door, had deployed 
controls on inflows between 2003 and 2009, Brazil had not.
The appointment of Alexandre Antonio Tombini after the election changed 
things somewhat. Tombini is largely seen as being more flexible in his think-
ing than Meirelles. Tombini is largely credited (or chastised) for loosening 
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 inflation target scheme of Brazil as he entered office. Tombini had received a 
PhD in economics from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. The draw 
of Urbana-Champaign for Brazilians, far from being a bastion of new classical 
macroeconomic thought, had long been Werner Baer, a development economist 
who had graduated from Harvard in 1958. Those Harvard years were a high- 
water mark for developmentalist thought, with Albert O. Hirschman and many 
others on the faculty. Tombini had been at the Brazilian Central Bank for some 
time, negotiating country programs with the IMF throughout the 2000s. Tom-
bini was part of a more pragmatic group in the Central Bank, where there was a 
long history of using capital controls, even during the liberalization period (Paula 
2011; Cardoso and Goldfajn 1998). The amount of inflows became so large that 
many of those tools were seen as already in use and up against economic and 
political limits, especially the accumulation of reserves, which were costly given 
the interest rate and becoming increasingly difficult to sterilize. Finally, according 
to Barbosa, he had to reframe capital flows as externalities to his colleagues in the 
Central Bank. To key members within the bank, the welfare economics of capital 
controls and statements by the IMF (see chapter 7) “spoke the same language” as 
the Central Bank economists with more neoclassical training than those in the 
Finance Ministry. This group was much more willing to go along with ideas of 
Barbosa’s team.
In addition to the jurisdictions of the CMN and the Finance Ministry, another 
institutional feature of Brazilian political economy also played a key role. Export-
ers in EMD contexts, in cases where debt is denominated in dollars, tend to be 
against regulating capital flows because if such measures devalue the currency, 
the value of their debt will increase (see Freiden 1991; Leiteritz 2012). As noted 
earlier, export industries are often supportive of cross-border finance because 
they rely on foreign capital markets to finance their trade. But in the case of 
Brazil much of the export sector received subsidized credit from both commer-
cial banks and the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES). This partly 
explains why many export capitalists in Brazil were supportive of the measures 
taken to regulate cross-border finance.
The 40 percent nominal appreciation was affecting the Brazilian export indus-
try, and exporters let their voices be heard. All of the major business groups, in-
cluding the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP; Federation 
of Industries of São Paulo), Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI; National 
Confederation of Industry), Fundação de Amparo À Pesquisa do Estado de São 
Paulo (FACESP; Federation of the Commercial Associations from the state of São 
Paulo), and the Associacao de Comircio Exterior do Brasil (AEB; Brazilian For-
eign Trade Association), made statements throughout 2009–2011 in support of 
the IOF and related measures. Both Paulo Skaf, president of FIESP, and Armando 
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Moneiro Neto, president of the CNI, told the press that the measures would save 
exporters, divert speculators, and prevent layoffs (O Estadao de Sao Paolo 2009). 
Individual exporters weighed in as well, such as Brasil Foods (BRF), one of the 
biggest exporters in the country, with external sales around US$5 billion a year. 
BRF issued a statement that the measures taken by the government to tax deriva-
tives will be “positive for exporters” (Reuters 2011).
The strong party ideology, the technocrats, the CMN institution, and the 
backing from exporters all integrate to explain how Brazil acted as it did. As the 
theory predicts, many in the financial sector were not supportive of the measures. 
The domestic banks, international banks, the Institute for International Finance 
(IIF), and even IMF all weighed in on the measures. The main narrative of each 
of these actors, as suggest by Goodman and Pauly’s (1993) research, was that 
the measures would be evadable and thus wouldn’t work. They argued that the 
Finance Ministry and Central Bank should work instead to lower interest rates 
and trim fiscal budgets.
These interests prevailed over those of the private banking system and inter-
national banks, the head of the Brazilian stock market, the IIF, and some inter-
national experts from ratings agencies and investment banks. As Cohen (1998), 
Goodman and Pauly (1993), Frieden (1991), and Kirshner (1995) would predict, 
these actors stood to gain from inflows of foreign finance and to lose from efforts 
to curtail such flows. Edemir Pinto, president of the Brazilian stock exchange, was 
continually telling the press that each measure would hurt the Brazilian futures 
market and/or be circumvented.
International players weighed in as well. Three representatives from JP Mor-
gan, as well as experts from Barclays, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Bank 
of America were quoted as saying that the measures taken by the Brazil were wor-
risome because they would cause uncertainty among investors about Brazil and 
also warning that the measures would probably be ineffective in meeting their 
goals. The IMF, too, was initially not supportive of the Brazilian measures. In-
stead, the IMF told Brazil that its main problems were with its public budget and 
public provision of credit; if these two trends were curtailed, the problem would 
be alleviated. Because the IMF loan to Brazil had been paid back under the Lula 
government, Brazil was no longer bound by IMF commitments; it therefore had 
full policy space under the IMF Articles. Moreover, Brazil had not made many 
commitments in financial services liberalization at the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO; see chapter 8), nor did Brazil have regional and bilateral treaties with 
neighbors that curtailed its ability to deploy capital account regulations.
In the face of overwhelming capital flows and a well-organized financial sec-
tor, Brazil reregulated capital flows and achieved a modest success. A strong PT 
armed with economists and technocrats that had the power to channel party 
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 policy into the Central Bank were essential factors, as was the ability of the Fi-
nance Ministry to reframe the regulations as corrective rather than distortive. The 
PT had the backing of its traditional workers and general public, and it also had 
the backing of strong international capitalists who were not as linked with global 
finance, as they were in other countries, because of the Brazilian national develop-
ment banks and regulations on commercial banks. Finally, Brazil had preserved 
its policy space to regulate capital flows at home under the IMF and the WTO.
south Korea: Macroprudential Jujitsu
South Korea put in place and fine-tuned regulations on cross-border finance seven 
times between 2009 and 2012. Like Brazil, South Korea has an independent Cen-
tral Bank, but the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) also has authority 
to charge the bank with intervening in FX markets. Like Brazil, South Korea de-
ployed more traditional controls, such as limits on bank loans and levies, but also 
devised innovative regulations on derivatives to stem inflows. South Korea barred 
foreign currency loans to local companies for domestic use to reduce short-term 
debt and to protect local firms from exchange rate risk. It also put caps on bank 
FX forward operations relative to equity capital and on forward contracts between 
banks and exporters relative to their export receipts. Unlike Brazil, South Korea is 
a party to many trade and investment treaties, but South Korea has ensured that 
these treaties grant it the flexibility to regulate capital flows. Also like Brazil, South 
Korea reframed regulation in the new economic thinking of the time and con-
tinually referred to their measures as macroprudential. But unlike Brazil, South 
Korea framed its measures in the new language of macroprudential regulation to 
assimilate into newfound industrialized country views regarding financial regula-
tion on the world stage rather than declaring war on the “tsunami.”
Unlike Brazil, South Korea did this under the auspices of a right-of-center 
party, the Grand National Party. This party had its roots, however, in the Demo-
cratic Republican Party of Park Chung-hee, who is largely credited for establish-
ing South Korea as a developmental state (a state where the key role in economic 
transformation is played by the state). The party had a long history of regulat-
ing capital markets. During the days of the developmental state, however, Park 
Chung-hee’s administrations were more apt to regulate capital flows for resource 
mobilization (the developmentalist tradition discussed in chapter 4; both South 
Korea and Brazil have strong traditions here; Nembhard 1996) than for financial 
stability.
The deployment of cross-border financial regulations by South Korea in 
2009–2012 was planned and devised by bureaus within its economic and  financial 
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agencies: the MOSF, the Bank of Korea (BOK), the Financial Supervisory Service 
(FSS), and the Financial Services Commission (FSC). Each time a measure was 
announced, the measures were echoed by the Blue House (the nexus of the ex-
ecutive branch of the Korean government, analogous to the US White House). 
Table 5.2 lists the key actors for and against the measures in South Korea and 
their arguments.
A defining institutional characteristic is the South Korean Foreign Exchange 
Transactions Act. This law, established in 1961 when Park came to office and 
amended numerous times (including during 2009–2012) to incorporate new 
types of regulations, grants South Korean financial bodies authority over FX in-
terventions. Although the act largely gives MOSF and its counterparts the obli-
gation to accelerate the liberalization of exchange rate and related restrictions, it 
also allows for temporary derogations in times of instability.
The pragmatic ideas about crises held in the MOSF were the origin of change 
in South Korea and were enabled by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act. 
Leiteritz (2012) refers to pragmatism in monetary policy as a shared mental 
model whereby the government deploys selective but firm regulation that does 
not over-regulate but sends strong signals to the private sector and markets. Of 
course, as in Brazil, the recent financial crises loomed over financial regulators in 
South Korea. South Korea had witnessed massive outflows of capital and a loss 
Table 5.2 Regulating capital flows and domestic politics in South Korea
acTor arGuMenT
Supportive of measures
BOK, MOSF, FSC Asset bubbles, stability of banking sector, won 
appreciation
Macroprudential response
Grand National Party, Blue House Macroprudential response; financial reform
NGOs Re-regulation necessary to reform finance
Economists/analysts Prudential measure
IMF(eventually), FSB Appropriate response
Against measures
Exporters Cut off access to finance
Domestic banks (Shinhan, Hana) Market sentiment, too much intrusion in private 
sector
Foreign banks Could cause capital flight, wrong signal
Economists/analysts Evasion too easy, distortionary
IMF(initially) Easily evaded, float exchange rate
Note: BOK, Bank of Korea; FSB, Financial Stability Board; FSC, Financial Services Commission; IMF, International 
Monetary Fund; MOSF, Ministry of Strategy and Finance; NGO, nongovernmental organization. 
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in  exports immediately after the crisis. But as growth picked up, so did capital 
inflows and signs of bubbles were everywhere. Because of that history, and the 
training of ministry officials and their teams, South Korea had a very pragmatic 
approach to regulating inflows.
Jae-wan Park was the minister of strategy and finance at the time. The FSC was 
headed by Dong-soo Jin, who has received his degree in economics from Boston 
University. The BOK was headed by Joong-soo Kim, who had been trained at the 
University of Pennsylvania. Park’s PhD was from the Harvard Kennedy School, 
which emphasizes a problem-solving approach as opposed to purely theoretical 
economics. What is more, the economists at the Kennedy School (e.g., Rodrik, 
Hausmann, and Velasco) are among the leading economists who see a need for 
the regulation of cross-border finance. The BOK had been dealing with inflows 
by accumulating reserves and sterilizing them. But, as early as 2005, the BOK had 
run up against the limits on its capacity for effective sterilizations. What is more, 
it had accumulated significant reserves already and saw further intervention as 
risky given the low rate of return on US securities and the economic cost of ac-
cumulation. There were few other tools in the toolkit.
When the first of the measures was taken in 2009, it was referred to by Dae-rae 
Roh, deputy minister of strategy and finance, as capital controls. Korean officials 
then quickly began to reframe it using the macroprudential terminology sur-
rounding the G20, Basel, and other discussions that were ongoing at the time. 
Indeed, in a heated exchange with the press in 2010, Hyun Song Shin, former 
Blue House aide for international economy “dismissed the notions that recent 
announcement on curbing banks’ forward exchanges are controls on capital 
flows. He restated that it was a ‘macro-prudential’ measure for banks and that 
raising interest rates would bring yet more destabilizing inflows into the econ-
omy” (Hankyung Economy 2010). Recall that Shin is one of the pioneers of the 
new economics of cross-border financial flows (discussed in chapters 3 and 4). 
Shin served as aide to South Korea when on leave from the Economics Depart-
ment at Princeton University (and, more recently has moved to the Bank for 
International Settlements, BIS), where he wrote extensively on carry trades, the 
volatility of global financial flows, and the need to regulate cross-border finance. 
From then on, South Korea went out of its way to discuss the measures as macro-
prudential. Interestingly, South Korea was hosting the G20 in the middle of im-
posing these measures and was able to insert a clause into the G20 communiqué 
granting nations the right to deploy macroprudential regulations to deter capital 
inflows. Such an approach brought approval from both the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) and the IMF for the Korean measures (Asia Today 2009). Jeffrey 
Chwieroth refers to how South Korea and other East Asian nations recast their 
measures as what was becoming the “new normal” across the globe as an exercise 
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of “productive power” because they were able to reshape the contours of legiti-
mate policy (2012, 2,1).
There was significant opposition to the measures, which was along the lines 
that theory would predict, but that opposition was muted by the institutional 
structure of decision making and the ideas and beliefs held by the key decision 
makers. Again, as Goodman and Pauly (1993) have noted, many institutions 
in finance, especially foreign finance, threatened exit: “Foreign banks domestic 
branches mainly make businesses by delivering short-term capital from foreign 
headquarters for bond market investment and foreign currency lending, if such 
high rates are applied for our branches here in Korea, these businesses will be 
transferred to Hong Kong and Korean branches will be left penniless” (Kyung-
hyang News 2010). Baek-soon Lee, president of Shinhan Bank, a domestic bank, 
warned to the press that South Korea should not resort to the “arrogance of the 
past” toward financial markets (Herald Economy 2010).
There were also civil society voices that expressed a need for regulating cross-
border finance as an issue of justice. The Korea Civil Society Network on Finan-
cial Reform was a civil society organization coordinating protests around the 
G20 meetings; one of its main demands was capital controls on inflows (Korea 
Civil Society Network on Financial Reform 2010). South Korea saw the years 
after the crisis in the last 1990s as the “IMF years,” and a significant portion of 
the population still remembers that period with disdain—associating it with a 
period when the IMF forced Korea to deregulate capital flows (Blustein 2001). 
Thus, the reregulation of capital was seen as beneficial, and the actors used stron-
ger rhetoric, analogous to that used by Brazil.
Initially, the IMF was not supportive of the South Korean actions (IMF 2010c, 
19). In its 2010 Article IV report to South Korea, the IMF noted that the control 
measures were likely to be largely ineffective. Indeed, the IMF argued that the 
regulations might inspire investors to circumvent them and create a bubble in 
portfolio flows instead; the best and first line of defense for South Korea was a 
commitment to a floating exchange rate and monetary tightening. Interestingly, 
the IMF stance changed as South Korea continued to fine-tune its regulations 
(and as the IMF changed; see chapter 6). The IMF opposition became less pro-
nounced; the IMF 2012 Article IV report went so far as to say that the measures 
had a “somewhat positive effect” on short-term external debt (IMF 2012d, 15).
Another key international feature is that South Korea was able to explicitly 
carve the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act out of the South Korea–United States 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). South Korean authorities noted that the United 
States had not permitted Chile and other nations to deploy some of the capital 
account regulations they had put in place in the past (see chapter 8) and worked 
hard to create Appendix III-A and Annex 11-G to the transfers provisions out 
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of the KORUS chapter dealing with investment. These exceptions provided a 
safeguard in the treaty that largely exempts measures taken by Korea under the 
Foreign Exchange Transaction Act from being actionable under the treaty.
South Korea exhibits many similarities with Brazil, and key differences as 
well. South Korea had technocrats appointed by the MOSF (i.e., Shin) who un-
derstood the source of financial fragility and helped design and frame macro-
prudential regulations under the rubric of the new welfare economics. These 
actors enjoyed institutions that gave the MOSF jurisdiction over such polices. 
The leaders acted given their historical capacities, pragmatism, and the specter 
of past crises looming in the public’s mind. They also had the policy space to do 
so under the IMF and their trade commitments. They were able to do all this 
and achieve modest success despite strong opposition from international and 
domestic banks, exporters, and initially even the IMF.
chile: Weathering the storm
The Chilean currency appreciation was not as acute as in its counterparts, but 
Chile did have one of the more severe asset bubbles. In early 2010, the center-left 
party of Chile was voted out of office and replaced by a right-wing government 
headed by Sebastian Pinera, a billionaire. There was considerable debate within 
Chile about the appropriate course of action to take with respect to the exchange 
rate and asset bubbles. Some argued that Chile should re-install its Encaje mea-
sure, whereas others thought no action was needed. In the end, party politics 
and a lack of interest-group backing led Chile to intervene in the foreign cur-
rency markets with a $15 billion accumulation scheme rather than relying on the 
famed unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) that had worked for Chile in 
the past.
Chile’s (in)famous Encaje policy, from 1991 to 1995, created the URR. Recall 
that this measure required foreign investors to put 20–30 percent of their invest-
ment in a non-interest-bearing account in the Central Bank for a specific period 
(ranging from six to twelve months). This measure, in many ways, served as a tax 
on inflows combined with a minimum stay period that would serve as an out-
flows measure in the event that there was a sudden stop during the stay period 
(Ffrench-Davis 2010). Indeed, the Encaje is perhaps the inflows-based capital 
control that has gained the most legitimacy since then; it has been used in Co-
lombia, Thailand, India, and now (covering derivatives) in Brazil. The majority 
of econometric evidence sees the Encaje as having positive effects, although some 
of the analyses by analysts such as Felipe Larrain and others suggest otherwise 
(Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff 2011).
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The Encaje remains Chilean law but is dormant. The law allows the Central 
Bank to deploy controls to maintain financial stability (which, unlike in many 
countries, is part of the mandate of the bank). To be activated, the Encaje needs 
the votes of at least three of the five advisors to the Central Bank and also requires 
the approval of the finance minister. If the finance minister vetos such a restric-
tion, it requires the vote of all five advisors to overturn the veto.
As capital flows poured into Chile during 2010, a debate ensued over pos-
sible remedies. Some exporters, numerous members of past finance ministries 
and central banks from opposition parties, and academic economists urged the 
government to deploy the URR. Pinera’s new government would have none of it. 
Larrain made repeated statements that echoed his earlier academic work—that 
the URR would be easily evaded, that it may not work, and that it may bring sig-
nificant costs to certain sectors of the economy. José De Gregorio Reboso chimed 
in as well, saying the measures might not be effective and could choke the supply 
of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Unlike South Korea, Chile was not able to safeguard the use of Encaje in its 
trade treaty with the United States (although it did safeguard its use in treaties 
with Canada, the European Union, and most other countries; see chapter 8). 
Miguel Marfán, vice president of the Central Bank, emphasized in the press that 
the FTA with the United States restricted capital controls in Chile. This concern 
was also echoed by the editors of Mercurio, the conservative newspaper in Chile 
(Mercurio 2011).
Although some exporters did call for controls, others did not or were okay 
with the reserves accumulation. Ronald Brown, president of the Associatión de 
Exportadores de Chile (ASOEX; Chilean Fruit Exporters Association), called on 
the government to institute capital controls to complement its dollar purchasing 
strategy to control speculative capital, a move that he considered essential to pre-
serving Chilean economic competitiveness (Diario Pyme, 2011b). He suggested 
controls that would vary according to the interest rate differential between Chile 
and the United States, the spot and long-term copper prices, and the current 
and long-term exchange rates. Luis Mayol, president of the Sociedad Nacional de 
Agricultura (SNA; National Agricultural Society), and Rene Merino, president of 
Vinos de Chile, by contrast, appeared satisfied with the dollar-buying measures 
and did not ask for capital controls. Antonio Walker, president of Fedefruta, cred-
ited pressure by the fruit industry for the dollar-buying measures and lamented 
that dollar-buying did not happen earlier; he did not mention capital controls 
(Estrategia 2011).
Interestingly, in its Article IV reports for Chile the IMF did not weigh in on 
the use of capital account regulations specifically. The IMF did acknowledge the 
asset bubbles and concern over the exchange rate but focused on the need for 
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prudential regulation. Miguel Savastano, Western hemisphere subdirector for the 
IMF, however, did weigh in with the press, saying that Chile did not need capital 
controls because Chileans could invest abroad, which would enable the country 
to absorb more capital (Diario Pyme 2011a).
The prevailing thinking by Pinera himself and across his administration was 
that the markets would eventually correct the problem. Pinera had earned a 
PhD in economics from Harvard University and spent years teaching economics 
alongside the infamous “Chicago boys” of Chile. Pinera appointed economist 
Felipe Larrain as finance minister. Larrain had also earned a PhD from Harvard 
and had edited a book arguing that capital controls were not very successful and 
could also be dangerous in the Latin American context (Larrain 2000). De Grego-
rio stayed on for a short while as the head of the Central Bank. He had earned his 
PhD from MIT and had worked at the IMF from 1990 to 1994 before returning 
to academia and, later, government service in Chile. De Gregorio had in the past 
also written studies that were fairly critical of capital controls but had become 
more balanced in recent times. But knowing that he did not have the votes for 
regulation in the Central Bank and that controls would be vetoed by Larrain, De 
Gregorio was more accommodating to the new party in power.
Many former central bankers and Finance Ministry economists from the 
opposition were incensed by the outright rejection of controls and repeatedly 
voiced concern that the full range of options was not being considered. Roberto 
Zahler, the former president of the Central Bank, argued that the government 
should consider capital controls as one way to halt appreciation and gain com-
petitiveness. He accused the government of refusing to consider capital controls 
for ideological reasons (Schwerter 2011).
south africa: liberalize More!
South Africa was among the hardest hit by the rapid financial flows during 2009–
2012. Like the three other nations, South Africa had a nationwide debate about 
how to respond to the inflows. In the end, the National Treasury and South Africa 
Reserve Bank (SARB) overrode other ministries and the labor contingent of the 
African National Congress (ANC) and chose to accumulate foreign reserves and 
liberalize the outflows of capital rather than imposing a tax on inflows.
Further liberalizing may seem very counterintuitive. Yet in the early years of 
the ANC South Africa had gone through a period of significant outflows controls 
to maintain a dual exchange rate regime and prevent capital flight, a regime that, 
according to the SARB, had had the desired effect (Farrell 2001). In contexts like 
this, when nations still have structural capital and exchange controls in place, 
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liberalizing outflows may reduce the net inflows and thus relieve pressure on 
the exchange rate. In addition, and as Haggard and Maxfield (1996) have noted, 
sometimes nations will liberalize capital flows during times of volatility if they 
believe further liberalization will send a positive signal to markets. This is exactly 
what the South African exporters argued for.
In many ways, the South African case conformed most closely to what the 
theory predicts. Through institutions, interest groups, and ideas, South African 
interests that were either most closely tied to or most supportive of cross-border 
finance gained power over the interest groups that wanted to intervene.
South Africa has the SARB, a central bank that is independent and that lacks 
the oversight with respect to exchange rate policy that the finance ministries in 
Brazil and South Korea enjoyed. In South Africa, the finance minister and the 
SARB president saw eye to eye on which measures to take.
In its 2010 and 2011 Article IV reports, the IMF actually weighed in, sug-
gesting that South Africa consider imposing a tax or something equivalent. It 
pointed out that doing this might reduce the volatility of the exchange rate. In 
these two Article IV reports for South Africa, the IMF urged South Africa to 
continue FX accumulations during the capital flow surge. The IMF did note that 
the tax might be an option to increase the South African FX reserves but also 
warned that history had shown that it could easily be circumvented (Isa 2010b). 
The IMF staff opinion on using controls was that they would probably raise gov-
ernment financing costs and that, absent wage restraint, it was unlikely that this 
would improve competitiveness. In 2011, however, IMF staff suggested caution 
in further liberalizing the outflows from resident nonbank financial institutions 
(South Africa had previously suffered capital flight) (IMF 2010d, 2011d).
As the rand began to appreciate, some exporters and many trade union-
ists began to loudly complain about the exchange rate effect on exports and 
 employment—unemployment had reached 25 percent. In the run up to a much 
anticipated ANC policy conference, some ministers and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) called for a tax on capital inflows to stem the 
rise of the rand and to maintain jobs and exports. Seeraj Mohamed was a leading 
COSATU economist. Mohammed had received his PhD in economics from the 
University of Masschusetts, Amherst, a department where capital controls were 
seen as an important part of a Marxist-Keynesian approach to stability and gen-
eration of employment. Indeed, Mohammed had cowritten an article on capital 
flight and capital controls (Mohammed and Finnoff 2006). The debate caused 
a stir in the global press, and the rand began to slightly decline as news spread.
The banking community strongly supported SARB and the Finance Ministry. 
Some banks cautioned that an inflows tax might spook investors. John Cairns, 
head of Rand Merchant Bank in Johannesburg, is reported as saying that an 
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 inflows tax in South Africa “is unlikely to be adopted in the near term due to the 
complexities involved in calculating a rate that will not induce a massive outflow 
of funds” (in Business Day 2010). Another investor noted, “It would likely be 
negative in terms of foreign investor sentiment, and whether it would have a 
meaningful impact on the rand is debatable” (Isa 2010a).
Exporters were very concerned about the rand, but they were more concerned 
about what the tax would do to market perceptions; therefore their ideas about 
the markets trumped their immediate material realities. Neren Rau, chief execu-
tive officer of the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was wary 
of the policy because it would appear to be a halt or reversal of the gradual pro-
cess of liberalization in South Africa. He claimed, “People who have an intention 
to invest on a sound basis in SA would be discouraged by the tax. It would be 
difficult to calculate the right rate and it would probably have to change on a fre-
quent basis” (in Isa 2010a). Interestingly, defensive measures taken by exporters 
were seen by some as accentuating the problem. Jean-François Mercier, Citigroup 
economist, said that exporters appeared to be sitting on large amounts of FX in 
hopes that the rand would weaken. “If it doesn’t weaken they could throw in the 
towel and suddenly convert them, pushing the rand stronger” (in Isa 2010a).
Immediately, it began to be reported that the SARB and the National Treasury 
were “dead set against such a tax idea around inflow restrictions and preferred 
direct reserve accumulation and other methods” (Times Live 2010a). Lesetja 
 Kganyago, a deputy governor of SARB, quickly dampened the debate in a speech 
in which he characterized a tax on inflows as “bad economics.” “Kganyago made 
the point that such a tax could push up yields (because it affects the cost of 
capital) and that high yields were the very reason foreign speculators were park-
ing money in South African assets” (Times Live 2010b). Kganyago has earned 
degrees from the University of London as well as Harvard University and Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand. He also had training from the IMF Institute, the 
World Bank Institute and JP Morgan. Kganyago’s comments were often echoed 
by Pravin Gordhan, the South African minister of finance at the time. Gord-
ham said that South Africa would ease the effects of capital inflows by increas-
ing reserves and increasing the limit on how much capital residents could move 
outside the country. Because it was a small economy, Gordhan said, South Africa 
could not successfully offset large global swings in capital flows.
summary and conclusion
Political factors integrated to form the preferences that led the four states to use 
different instruments to address very similar challenges. In the wake of the 2008 
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financial crisis, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, and South Korea each experienced 
a surge in capital inflows that led to currency appreciation and concerns about 
asset bubbles. The memory of the bursting of similar bubbles in previous crises 
loomed large for governments and for domestic actors in these countries, such 
that heated debates ensued regarding which instruments should be used to stem 
the surge in capital inflows. Two countries, Brazil and South Korea, deployed 
both traditional and innovative capital account regulations. Chile made slight 
interventions in its currency market. And South Africa actually accelerated the 
liberalization of its capital account.
Table 5.3 outlines the prevailing factors that led Brazil and South Korea to 
regulate and that led Chile and South Africa to not do so. Both Brazil and South 
Korea had strong political parties backed by key interest groups or a public 
that had experienced grave financial crises that had been costly in economic 
Table 5.3 Domestic politics of capital controls: Prevailing factors
braZil souTH Korea
Institutions Central Bank subordinate to Finance 
Ministry
Central Bank subordinate to Finance 
Ministry
Development Bank allocates credit 
to exporters
No trade treaty Carve out in trade treaty
Power interests Exporters concerned about ex-
change rate
Exporters concerned about exchange 
rate
Governing political party commit-
ment
Governing political party commitment
Elections looming Elections looming




Minskian developmentalism New welfare economics/pragmatism
New welfare economics/pragmatism
cHile souTH aFrica
Institutions Central Bank vote Central Bank–Finance Ministry 
 alliance
Restrictive trade treaty
Power interests Weak noncommodity exporters Weak noncommodity exporters
Conservative party and 
 appointments
Weak unions
Ideas New classical/Keynesian New classical/Keynesian
Conservative technocrats
Note: NGO, nongovernmental organization.
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and political terms. Technocrats in each country reframed the need to regulate 
capital flows in the rationale of the new economics of capital controls (outlined 
in the chapter 3). Both countries had institutional arrangements that made 
the central banks somewhat subordinate to the finance ministries, where these 
technocrats were employed and devised policy. Finally, when the controls did 
not result in disaster, Brazil and South Korea were (eventually) not shunned 
by Western countries and the international financial institutions, as they had 
been in the past. Table 5.4 maps the extent to which different actors in each 
nation either supported (top panel) or were against (bottom panel) regulating 
capital flows.
The theories outlined earlier explaining why countries deregulated their 
capital accounts also go a long way in showing how some countries did the op-
posite in the twenty-first century. In Brazil and South Korea, both the govern-
ing parties and their finance ministries wanted to regulate capital flows. In the 
case of Brazil, this was due to interest-group pressure by exporters concerned 
about the exchange rate and due to political representation in that the govern-
ing Workers’ Party that wanted flexibility in monetary policy to spark growth 
and employment. In Brazil, the prevailing ideas held in the Finance Ministry 
were Minskian developmentalism and the new welfare economics of capital 
controls. Barbosa’s team held Minskian developmentalist views of the issue 
and translated these views into the language of the new welfare economics to 
gain their acceptance by the Central Bank. Brazilian authorities were concerned 
about appreciation, asset bubbles, monetary autonomy, and potential Dutch 
disease. In South Korea, the prevailing ideas were the new welfare economics 
of capital controls and new thinking on macroprudential policy, as advocated 
by Hyun Song Shin.
Chile and South Africa were different. In Chile, the Finance Ministry and Cen-
tral Bank were not supportive of regulating capital flows, and they had the final 
say. Moreover, the political clout of concerned exporters was weak relative to 
other voices in the economy. In South Africa, the SARB had the high authority 
and the Finance Ministry and SARB both saw controls as heterodox and risky. 
In South Africa, such ideas were supported by the export industry, which was 
dependent on foreign finance to support its trade.
In a study of exchange rate politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan, 
Henning (1994) stipulates that the degree to which interest-group preferences 
are translated into policy is a function of the nature of the institutions that gov-
ern the exchange rate and the extent to which the private sector is united with 
the banking sector in the need to manage the exchange rate. Both Brazil and 
South Korea had laws that granted the finance ministries significant leeway with 
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treaty commitments that hindered its ability to exercise its laws, and South Korea 
explicitly and successfully got an exception written into the KORUS so that it 
could use its exchange rate law.
In Brazil, the traditional alliance between the private sector and banking broke 
down for two reasons. First, private-sector exporters wanted action to control the 
exchange rate so their products would remain competitive and thus were gener-
ally inclined to support policy action. Given that the channel causing exchange 
rate appreciation was through international financial flows intermediated by 
banks, it was the banks that would have to pay the price in terms of regulatory 
costs—making the banking sector less inclined to ally with the private export 
sector. Brazilian manufacturing exporters were especially keen to split from the 
private banking sector because they rely less on private-sector banks. Brazilian 
banks received a significant amount of subsidized credit through the government 
development bank and through requirements for targeted lending by private fi-
nancial institutions. The second reason there was a split between international 
finance and private exporters was that international credit presented currency 
mismatches that could accentuate balance-sheet pressures in the event of a sud-
den stop. The memory of such events in 2008 and during earlier crises in the 
1990s led to a more pragmatic approach in the finance ministries and central 
banks in both Brazil and South Korea and led them to be more responsive to 
private-sector concerns.
Perhaps more interestingly, South Korea took action despite a center-right 
party being in power and despite the measures having little support from ex-
porters or domestic and international financial actors. South Korean financial 
authorities were driven by a sense of pragmatism given their experience with 
the East Asian financial crisis in the 1990s and the global financial crisis in 
2008. Moreover, their chief advisor was Hyun Song Shin, one of the leading 
economists in the new welfare economics of regulating capital flows. These 
pragmatic ideas could be channeled into policy action because of the special 
law that allowed financial authorities to act at their discretion during times of 
turmoil.
Brazil and South Korea also had the policy space to take these actions under 
their international commitments. Moreover, nations such as the United States 
and institutions such as the IMF did not publicly condemn Brazil or South 
Korea when they took the actions they did. As we will see in chapter 8, Brazil did 
not make major commitments on trade in financial services at the WTO and 
did not ratify any bilateral investment treaties that would make its measures 
actionable. South Korea had exceptions under the OECD to take the measures 
it did and also made sure it had exceptions under its trade agreement with the 
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United States. Although the IMF was initially critical of the measures taken in 
both countries, it began to change its tune as IMF thinking about managing 
capital flows evolved after the crisis. In the next three chapters, I outline how 





The New International Monetary Fund  
View of the Capital Account
As we have seen, the orthodox thinking about capital controls in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and global monetary system during the Bretton 
Woods era (Keynes 1944) had changed in theory and practice by the 1970s, the 
shift going so far that there was an attempt to change the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment to mandate the deregulation of cross-border finance. Now the pendulum 
has swung back once again, although not as far as in 1944. With much fanfare, 
after a two-year process the IMF embraced a 2012 new institutional view that 
endorses the reregulation of cross-border finance under certain circumstances. 
Although the IMF remains wedded to eventual global capital account liberaliza-
tion, it now acknowledges that the case for the free movement of capital rests on 
a much weaker intellectual foundation than does the case for free trade.
To be sure, Board members from industrialized country, many emerging-mar-
ket and developing countries (EMDs), and many outside experts were not thrilled 
with the final outcome—although for very different reasons. One senior official 
interviewed for this book reluctantly remarked that, thus, “it must be pretty good.”
The IMF staff was intent on making some official room for the use of cross-
border financial regulations. Many EMDs, particularly the BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), were not happy that there was 
an official process on this matter. They were concerned that it might lead to 
a narrowing of their ability to use capital account regulations under the IMF 
Articles of Agreement. So, BRICS formed a coalition that sought to defend such 
policy space and to put some of the burden of regulating capital flows on to the 
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industrialized countries. The industrialized countries were not fully supportive 
of a process toward an institutional view either and, thus, sought to maintain 
an emphasis on the benefits of capital account liberalization and to ensure that 
the process didn’t get out of hand—especially in the form of endorsing capital 
controls for undervalued exchange rates in China and beyond.
There was something in the institutional view for all these perspectives. The 
IMF is now officially charged with making recommendations regarding the 
management of capital flows under its surveillance functions. As of 2013, staff 
members are required to recommend caution concerning capital account lib-
eralization and to recommend capital flow management measures (CFMs), the 
new IMF term for capital account regulations, under certain circumstances. The 
EMDs now have an official blessing, in some cases, for their use of capital account 
regulations. And the final view does not draw a clear line between controls for 
exchange rate management and cross-border financial regulations for ensuring 
financial stability. The industrialized countries were able to maintain an empha-
sis on the benefits of capital flows in general and capital account liberalization, 
in particular, and were able to temper calls for their concerted collaboration with 
EMDs on CFMs.
All three parties had their misgivings as well. IMF staff members were gener-
ally pleased with the outcome but were concerned that the political process led 
the final language in the institutional view to be murky in spots, which will make 
it hard for the IMF to give clear advice. BRICS were concerned that the final 
document did not emphasize fully the role of source countries in generating 
spillovers and the role that source countries should play in mitigating such spill-
overs. Industrialized countries also very reluctantly endorsed a last-minute push 
to delete implications that CFMs should be used only as a last resort.
In this chapter, I analyze what has changed at the IMF with respect to man-
aging capital flows and how those changes came about from the perspective of 
political economy. At first glance, we might think that the institutional view 
would reveal the preferences of industrialized countries—assumed to be for 
unbridled capital account liberalization—given the structure of the voting 
power in the IMF and the way that the deliberations were structured within 
the IMF. IMF voting power reinforces the power of industrialized countries in 
the international monetary system. The IMF staff coordinated the process and 
set the agenda; and traditionally, IMF staff members had largely been seen as 
reinforcing the views of industrialized countries when it came to capital flows 
and other matters (Thacker 1999; Abdelal 2007; Copelovitch 2010; Chweiroth 
2010a; Moschella 2011).
In fact, however, the final institutional view incorporates a much more middle 
ground. It looks the way it does because of new ideas among key IMF staff and 
126      cHaPTer 6
because the staff that was able to set the agenda for the view. The final document 
also reflects a partial acceptance of cross-border financial regulation by some 
industrialized countries. Significantly, BRICSs punched far above their voting 
weight throughout the deliberations as well. There are three reasons for this: 
(1) EMDs, especially BRICS, formed a coalition that often had a unified voice 
at the IMF Executive Board; (2) EMDs used extra-forum leverage by exploiting 
networks within the G20 to wedge emerging market views into the discourse at 
the IMF; and (3) given that some IMF staff members were pushing a view that 
overlapped significantly with the BRICS positions, the BRICS countries used in-
traforum leverage by wedging these IMF staff views into the discussion to com-
bat the opposition by the industrialized countries to the BRICS positions.
In this chapter, I first pinpoint the changes that have occurred in the new 
institutional view of 2012 compared to a 2005 Independent Evaluation Office 
(IEO) report on the IMF view of capital account liberalization. I then analyze 
the political economy of how these changes occurred: the influence of the IMF 
as an institution and the ideas of the IMF staff, the positions of the industrialized 
countries at Executive Board meetings, and how BRICS engaged in coalitions 
that leveraged power from both within and outside the IMF to punch above their 
voting weight.
The international Monetary Fund and the 
capital account: What Has changed?
Following the Asian financial crisis, the IMF took a more gradual approach to 
capital account liberalization and even supported the use of capital controls in 
some situations. After the global financial crisis, the IMF expanded and officially 
clarified that position with an institutional view on liberalization and regulation, 
and then went beyond merely supporting cross-border financial regulations to 
recommending them. To examine the extent to which the IMF has changed its 
view on the capital account since the global financial crisis carefully, I examine 
a 2005 IMF report on the official IMF view as a basis for comparison and then 
juxtapose those findings with an analysis of the 2012 IMF institutional view.
In 2005, the IMF IEO conducted an assessment to evaluate and synthesize the 
IMF approach to capital account liberalization from the Asian financial crisis to 
2004. The IEO concluded that the IMF position had begun to evolve after the 
Asian financial crisis. In contrast to the 1990s, the IMF policy stance on capital 
account liberalization during this period still saw capital account liberalization as 
a key goal; however, the IMF also now recommended that the liberalization of the 
capital account be gradual and sequenced. In addition, the IMF recognized that 
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temporary capital controls could be a part of the transition to eventual capital 
account liberalization (IMF 2005).
After the global financial crisis struck in 2008, the IMF underwent a formal 
process that resulted in an official clarification of its stance on capital account 
regulation. In addition to the staff position note (discussed in earlier chapters) 
that found that nations that deployed controls were among the least hard hit 
during the crisis and recommended, therefore, that controls be part of the tool-
kit, the IMF reiterated its support for the use of capital account regulation in 
its “Global Financial Stability Report” and in its World Economic Outlook (IMF 
2010a, 2010d; Grabel 2011). Those reports discussed the need for regulating fi-
nancial inflows; during the global financial crisis, the IMF also recommended, 
or at least sanctioned, controls on outflows in Iceland, Latvia, and the Ukraine 
(Grabel 2011; IMF 2012a).
The impetus and dynamics that led to the new institutional view are dis-
cussed in more detail later in this chapter. In a nutshell, the IMF started a 
process to officially evaluate its view on the capital account in 2011, which 
culminated in an official document that represented the official IMF view on 
the capital account that would be applied to the IMF surveillance activities and 
country programs. The key elements of the final document, “The Liberaliza-
tion and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View” (IMF 2012b) 
are outlined in box 6.1.
Box 6.1: Elements of the International Monetary Fund 
Institutional View of Managing Capital Flows
Capital Account Liberalization
•  Liberalization should be a goal, but the appropriate level of liberalization 
depends on institutional thresholds and country-specific circumstances.
•  Nations should be cautious and sequenced when liberalizing the capital ac-
count, first liberalize FDI, then longer-term portfolios, and then short-term 
flows.
•  Under certain circumstances capital controls (now referred to as CFMs) 
need to be part of the process of liberalization.
Managing Capital Inflows
•  Nations should respond to inflow surges with appropriate macroeconomic 
policies such as:
  Allowing the exchange rate to appreciate
  Accumulating reserves
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  Tightening fiscal policy
  Managing interest rates
•  Nations should use CFMs if:
  The exchange rate is not undervalued
  Reserves are at optimal levels or too costly to accumulate further
  The economy is overheating and there is little scope for fiscal tightening
  CFMs can buy time for the first three
  Inflow surges raise systemic risk
•  Nations should give precedence to CFMs that do not discriminate on the 
basis of residency.
Capital Flow Management Measures on Capital Outflows
•  After a country has substantially liberalized its capital account, CFMs on 
capital outflows can be considered:
  In crisis or near-crisis conditions
  To provide breathing space while more fundamental policy adjustments 
are implemented
•  Nations should give precedence to measures that do not discriminate on the 
basis of residency.
•  CFMs should be temporary and should be lifted when the conditions for 
their removal have been met.
Multilateral Aspects of Managing Capital Flows
•  Source countries (where capital flows originate) and nations deploying 
CFMs should be conscious of the multilateral aspects of their policies.
•  Nations should strive for reciprocity when macroprudential policies are 
being deployed.
•  The design of policies should “minimize the scope for regulatory arbitrage.”
•  The IMF recognizes that its advice on CFMs may be at odds with interna-
tional trade and investment commitments of IMF members.
Sources: Based on IMF (2011a, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).
In the institutional view, the IMF reiterates its support of capital account lib-
eralization as a long-run goal but slightly qualifies that support. The IMF now 
states that capital account liberalization is optimal only after a nation has reached 
a certain threshold of financial and economic development and that liberaliza-
tion should be sequenced, gradual, and not the same for all countries at all times. 
Indeed, it offers a sequenced, stepwise process for the liberalization of capital 
flows for its members. The IMF also has new terminology for capital account 
regulations—CFMs. In the IMF view, CFMs can be part of liberalization and 
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sequencing. The guidelines on inflows recommend that countries deploy CFMs 
after such measures as building up reserves, letting currencies appreciate, and 
cutting budget deficits. The IMF also recommends that controls not be discrimi-
natory among residents. The guidelines for the use of controls on capital out-
flows suggest that, by and large, they should not be used but can be considered in 
crisis or near-crisis conditions (IMF 2012b).
Table 6.1 compares the new institutional view with the 2005 IMF IEO assess-
ment in terms of the kinds of measures related to capital flows. As we can see, 
in 2012 the IMF remained wedded to the eventual liberalization of the capital 
account of a country but now recognized that the case for free transfers of in-
vestments rests on much weaker ground than does the case for free trade. The 
IMF now recognized (as discussed in chapter 3) that nations need to cross a 
certain institutional threshold before liberalization. What is more, the IMF now 
acknowledged that there are risks as well as benefits to cross-border financial 
flows; capital flows are particularly prone to sharp inflow surges followed by sud-
den stops that can cause a great deal of financial instability.
What are new are the specific reference to surges and sudden stops and, more 
important, that the rationale is often framed in the language of the new welfare 
economics (see chapter 3). The new IMF view reframed capital controls as CFMs, 
which were recommended on inflows in the case of surges after the institution 
of other macroeconomic policies such as interest rate and fiscal policy manage-
ment, the accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) reserves, and macropruden-
tial financial regulations. The IMF also sanctioned the deployment of CFMs on 
outflows of capital in the event of a crisis. In addition, the IMF noted that new 
Table 6.1 International Monetary Fund policies on regulating cross-border 
 finance, 2005 and 2012
Measure ieo, 2005 insTiTuTional VieW, 2012
Capital account liberalization Fully support Fully support
Capital controls on inflows Partially support Partially support
Rationale Impossible trinity, transition Impossible trinity, transition
Financial stability
Nomenclature Capital controls Capital flow management 
measures
Capital controls on outflows Partially support Partially support
Source countries Not mentioned Partially support
Trade exceptions Partially support Fully support
Legitimacy General behavior Official board view
Sources: IMF (2005, 2012b).
Note: IEO, Independent Evaluation Office.
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IMF advice could clash with the trade and investment treaty commitments of 
its members in and recommended establishing safeguards granting nations the 
right to regulate using CFMs without being in conflict with trade commitments. 
Finally, and in stark contrast with the IEO report, the IMF noted that industrial-
ized countries may need to regulate the outflow of capital in concert with EMD 
regulation of inflows. The most significant change is that the 2005 IEO report 
witnesses and summarizes the general behavior of the IMF but the institutional 
view is an official Board-endorsed view that staff must incorporate into sur-
veillance activities. Indeed, in 2013 the IMF issued a staff guidance note that 
provided guidelines regarding how IMF staff should discuss capital flows during 
surveillance activities (IMF, 2013b).
Surveillance activity at the IMF is most expressed through Article IV con-
sultations. To write an Article IV report, IMF staff members visit a country, 
conduct an assessment of the economy, and make a series of recommendations. 
In July 2012, the Executive Board adopted a new decision that allowed staff 
members to discuss with its member states their capital account policies and 
provide recommendations. The new institutional view officially guides staff in 
that task. As a former senior counsel at the IMF states with respect to the new 
guidelines, “In surveillance consultations, any recommendations drawn from 
this framework would constitute policy advice, which is not obligation but 
still an essential part of the IMF’s oversight role in the context of surveillance 
discussions and its ongoing relationship with members” (Siegel 2013, 73). Al-
though surveillance is not mandatory, it has been shown to be highly influential 
in states where the IMF has a country program. Moreover, surveillance reports 
can influence other actors in global markets, such as credit-rating agencies, that 
have impact on countries. Finally, it is also possible that surveillance could lead 
to socialization and learning effects in countries (Lombardi and Woods 2008; 
Chwieroth 2010a).
To review, the new IMF institutional view is significantly different than its 
previous view in that it is now official policy, the economic rationale for regulat-
ing capital has expanded to maintaining financial stability, the nomenclature on 
capital controls has shifted to CFMs, and the IMF notes the needs to regulate 
capital on both ends. All this is significantly different from the view in the 2005 
IEO report; also the new view goes into much greater detail about the nature of 
capital account liberalization and the specific conditions for the use of CFMs. 
Although incremental, the substantive changes break significant ground. In par-
ticular, the IMF view has significantly broadened with respect to the multilateral 
aspects of regulating financial flows—recognizing the role of source-country 
spillovers and the lack of consistency between the guidelines and trade and in-
vestment treaties.
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The Power of the international Monetary Fund: 
be careful What You Wish For
After reading chapter 2, we might have expected that the structure of the IMF 
as an institution would predetermine that the IMF institutional view would be 
a blueprint for capital account liberalization. After all, the IMF voting structure 
is weighted toward the industrialized countries, and the industrialized countries 
initially did not support the idea of formulating an institutional view in fear 
that it might delegitimize capital account liberalization and legitimize capital 
controls. Moreover, the management and coordination of the process was put in 
the hands of IMF staff, which had become a leading proponent of capital account 
liberation at the turn of the century. But, surprisingly, that the IMF staff had 
significantly changed the way it thought about the capital account. This fact, and 
the crafty efforts of EMDs, caught industrialized countries a bit off guard and led 
to a more even set of rules on the capital account.
The origins of the institutional view come from both outside and within 
the IMF. In response to EMD pressure, the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit documents 
“called on the FSB, IMF and BIS to do further work on macro-prudential policy 
frameworks, including tools to mitigate the impact of excessive capital flows” 
(Montpetit et al. 2012). Later in 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy assumed 
the role of host and head of the G20 for 2010–2011, a period of excessive capital 
market volatility (see chapter 4). Sarkozy saw the myriad uses of capital controls 
and called for a global code of conduct, setting the IMF the task of proposing a 
set of guidelines for reform:
A code of good conduct, strong guidelines and a common framework 
governing the possibility of implementing capital controls where nec-
essary must define the conditions under which restrictions on capital 
movements are legitimate, effective and appropriate to a given situation. 
If we agree on these rules, ladies and gentlemen, it will be a major evo-
lution in the doctrine of the IMF, to the benefit of the emerging coun-
tries, which suffer from excessive volatility of capital movements. Is it 
reasonable, today, given the increasing impact of capital movements, 
that the IMF can issue recommendations to a country only as concerns 
its current account balance of payments and not concerning its capital 
account? I would like someone to explain to me why a recommendation 
about one is legitimate and a recommendation concerning the other 
is illegitimate. Expanding the supervision of the IMF to include the-
ses aspects strikes me as crucial. In the longer term, France—and I’m 
saying this now—is favorable to a modification of the IMF’s Articles 
of Agreement to broaden its supervision mandate. Yet if we decide on 
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more  coordination, more rules and more supervision, we then need to 
decide which organization is in charge of enforcing such rules and con-
ducting such supervision. For France, it’s clear. It’s the IMF. (quoted in 
Batista 2012a, 99)
Evocative of the 1972 call by the United States and C20 for an IMF code of con-
duct (discussed in chapter 2) that might bind nations to appropriate (versus in-
appropriate) uses of capital controls, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the 
IMF embarked on creating a new code of conduct for the use of capital controls.
People working at the IMF had already been thinking along the same lines. 
In the wake of the crisis, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, IMF director, assembled key 
staff members and inspired them to rethink many of the core ideas of the IMF. 
Strauss-Kahn wanted the IMF to become a major player in post-crisis activities, 
but to do so it needed fresh thinking and new ideas. What is more, as in the case 
of the G20, EMDs had been asking the IMF whether their use of capital account 
regulations in response to the crisis was considered okay. Strauss-Kahn encour-
aged Olivier Blanchard, IMF research director, to foster new thinking in research. 
This new atmosphere permeated the IMF, prompting Jonathan Ostry and other 
economists to take steps they wouldn’t have thought of in previous years. Ostry 
and colleagues decided to conduct an analysis examining how well nations with 
capital controls on inflows had done during the crisis (resulting in Ostry et al. 
2010). He found that nations that had controls had fared better during the crisis 
than those without. To provide cover for this controversial view, Strauss-Kahn 
elevated what was to be a seminar presentation of the paper to a full IMF sym-
posium on the study. The paper sparked significant controversy within the IMF, 
especially within the Capital Markets Division. Nevertheless, it was approved as 
an example of this new thinking by the managing director and inspired further 
work on capital flows.
The atmosphere of new thinking also met with the practical, on-the-ground 
fact that many IMF members, largely EMDs, were asking whether it was permis-
sible in the eyes of the IMF for them put capital account regulations in place in 
the wake of the crisis. More than one account notes that Stanley Fischer, governor 
of the Bank of Israel at the time (and formerly deputy managing director of the 
IMF during the turbulent 1990s), expressed concern in late 2009 that he didn’t 
know how else to handle the massive surge in inflows that was starting. Moreover, 
an internal and early post-crisis assessment discovered that IMF country teams 
were giving different and inconsistent advice to member countries on this matter. 
Thus the IMF Strategy, Policy and Review Department started to think that the 
IMF needed to speak in a uniform voice through its Article IV surveillance activi-
ties on this matter. This was communicated across the IMF, and the managing 
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director went to the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), 
which in 2011 had assigned the IMF the task of developing an official institu-
tional view on capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows 
that would unify IMF surveillance on the issue.
Thus, the impetus for the rethinking of IMF policy came from both the 
outside (the G20) and the inside (member requests and staff analysis). Both 
were prompted by EMD inquiries. To some extent, however, the very fact that 
the G20 and the IMFC delegated the discussion and the official reevaluation 
of the management of capital flows to the IMF ensured that EMDs would not 
get carried away. The French had long looked to the IMF to set boundaries on 
capital account liberalization and capital controls (Abdelal 2007). Sarkozy had 
been looking to regulate cross-border finance starting in 2004 when he was the 
French minister of economy. Later, in 2008, Sarkozy called for a Bretton Woods 
II that would revamp the entire international monetary system in the wake of 
the crisis (Helleiner and Pagliari 2009). Indeed, some sources I interviewed spec-
ulated that Sarkozy saw the rapid proliferation of capital account regulations in 
2009–2010 as needing to be contained within specified boundaries. Given that 
the industrialized nations control the voting power at the IMF, Sarkozy power-
fully circumscribed the range of debate in this decision by placing the effort in 
the IMF.
Under this dual direction, the IMF staff conducted research and wrote staff-
level background papers that were then compiled into and approved as official 
papers for Executive Board discussion at numerous board meetings from 2011 to 
2012. The Board discussed and debated each of these papers, often sending them 
back for revision based on those debates, and then eventually endorsed them of-
ficially. The Executive Board formally endorsed a set of guidelines on inflows in 
April 2011; guidelines on capital account regulations and controls on outflows 
were drawn up in March 2012 and discussed at the Executive Board in April 
2012. The official IMF papers to this end were synthesized into a final document 
representing the full institutional view of the IMF in October 2012 and the full 
package was endorsed by the Executive Board in December 2012.
The IMF staff steered the process. An interdivision group drafted the back-
ground research papers and the board papers. The three divisions involved were 
the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, the Strategy, Policy and Review 
Department, and the Research Department, all with input from the Legal De-
partment. The Monetary and Capital Markets Department was the most wedded 
to capital account liberalization, and the Research Department was most wedded 
to establishing a new role for capital account regulations. Strategy, Policy, and 
Review played a coordinating role and balanced these disparate views into the 
papers presented to the Board for discussion and debate.
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This structure dictated that the industrialized nations and EMDs alike had to 
react to staff ideas rather than setting their own agendas, which would be sub-
ject to internal reaction. Table 6.2 presents the results of a textual analysis of the 
background research papers, papers submitted to the Board, EMD critiques or 
alternative proposals to the Board papers, and the final institutional view. This 
analysis shows that the Research Department was quite supportive of the se-
quenced liberalization of the capital account and the use of CFMs. The initial 
research papers characterized CFMs on inflows as a tool to manage the process 
of macroeconomic adjustment, although only after other adjustments had been 
made. Perhaps most significantly, the Research Department also endorsed CFMs 
when there was a buildup of financial fragility, saying that there was “no unam-
biguous welfare ranking of policy instruments” (Ostry et al. 2011, 4).
The Board paper on inflows, however, downplayed the use of CFMs in the 
case of financial fragility and emphasized that CFMs on inflows should be used 
only after the exchange rate had appreciated, the interest rate had been adjusted, 
and interventions in the FX market had been made by a central bank. This was 
interpreted by most executive directors as endorsing the use of CFMs only as a 
last resort and became perhaps the most contentious issue in the deliberations. 
Indeed, there was an outcry on this issue from BRICS capitals and from nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) across the globe as well (see chapter 7).
The Research Department had been convinced of many of the new arguments 
and rationales for regulating cross-border finance. Thus, to the surprise of other 
Table 6.2 Political economy of the International Monetary Fund institutional 
view on regulating capital flows
Measure sTaFF PaPers eMds board draFTs Final iMF VieW
Capital account 
liberalization
N/A. Not supportive Fully supportive Partially 
 supportive
Regulating inflows
Sequencing Part of toolkit Part of toolkit Last resort Part of toolkit
Temporary/ 
permanent
Temporary Permanent Temporary Temporary
Residency-based Supportive Supportive Not supportive Partially sup-
portive








Fully supportive Fully supportive Partially supportive Fully Supportive
Notes: EMDs, emerging-market and developing countries; IMF, International Monetary Fund; N/A, not applicable.
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staff departments and the executive directors from the industrialized countries, 
the research papers, especially, and many of the Board papers were making strong 
cases for CFMs on inflows and outflows, even suggesting that source countries 
regulate capital flows as well!
The IMF was charged with redefining its cognitive map, which had long held 
capital account liberalization as a core principal (Moschella 2012a). A number of 
personnel factors explain how there was such a change in position among staff 
members from the one held in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the econo-
mists in the Research and other departments who had done empirical research 
on the impacts of capital account liberalization had risen to more senior posi-
tions by the time of the global financial crisis. In addition, Research was headed 
by Olivier Blanchard, an MIT economist known to be pragmatic but who was 
also at the center of and sensitive to new developments in theory. Blanchard was 
very close to Strauss-Kahn and was the first to embrace the charge by Strauss-
Kahn to infuse new thinking into IMF operations. What is more, the IMF was 
seeking to show more of a human face, in general, because its reputation had 
been severely tarnished in past crises—and particularly with respect to the issue 
at hand (Grabel 2011).
All three departments involved in the Board papers, although with varying 
degrees of conviction, had accepted the empirical literature on capital account 
liberalization, growth, and crises. Indeed, many economists in the IMF Research 
Department had contributed to that literature. Moreover, a significant turnover 
had occurred at the IMF since the 1990s, and many big-bang liberalizers had left, 
especially those who had been in leadership positions. Many staff members used 
the mandate from Strauss-Kahn and the G20, new economic ideas, and the flex-
ibility of the IMF Articles to reinterpret, or incrementalize, its thinking on capi-
tal controls (Moschella 2012a). Current and former staff members conducted 
some of the more rigorous econometric analyses showing that capital controls 
had helped stabilize EMDs in the run-up to the global financial crisis and had 
helped mitigate the worst of its aftermath (Magud Reinhart, and Rogoff 2011; 
Ostry et al. 2010; Chwieroth 2012). So, as a practical matter, many staff members 
saw CFMs as a part of the toolkit, although certainly not part of a first response. 
Monetary and Capital Markets Department staff members and some in Strategy 
Policy Review continued to see capital account regulations as fundamentally dis-
tortionary but necessary in extreme situations.
What is most remarkable is that the Research Department began to articulate 
the view that capital account regulations are Pigouvian ways to correct for mar-
ket failure. In other words, Research staff began to articulate that capital account 
regulations were not distortionary but could instead make markets work better. 
This view was not held by Monetary and Capital Markets nor by many in Strategy 
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Policy Review. This explains, in part, why Research staff had strong convictions 
about regulating cross-border finance.
Key staff in Research were influenced by and collaborated with economists 
who had developed a new welfare economics of capital controls. As discussed 
chapter 3, Anton Korinek, Olivier Jeanne, and others developed a new way of 
thinking about capital flows and capital controls (Jeanne, Subramanian, and Wil-
liamson 2012; Korinek 2011). According to this research, externalities are gener-
ated by capital flows because individual investors and borrowers do not know (or 
ignore) the future effects of their financial decisions on the financial stability of a 
particular nation. A better analogy than protectionism is the case of an individual 
firm that does not restrict its contribution to urban air pollution. In the case of 
pollution, the polluting firm can accentuate the environmental harm done by 
its activity; in the case of capital flows, a foreign investor might tip a nation into 
financial difficulties and even a financial crisis. This is a classic market-failure 
argument and calls for a Pigouvian tax that will correct for the market failure and 
make markets work more efficiently.
Ostry in many ways was a norm entrepreneur inspired by Strauss-Kahn’s 
charge to incorporate new thinking. And, if understood well, the economics was 
a very powerful set of ideas that fit right in with the existing theoretical appara-
tus adopted by IMF economists such as Ostry and his group. Indeed, the theory 
of Korinek and others is a major breakthrough and innovation in economics as 
a whole. Because this major breakthrough was so adaptable—in that it was in 
a welfare economics framework and articulated in clear neoclassical terms—it 
was quickly adopted by the profession and diffused throughout the IMF. Let us 
contrast this with the breakthrough on this issue from the more Minskian tradi-
tion (see chapter 4) that had happened a few years beforehand and that had a 
similar theoretical rationale and similar policy recommendations. Theories from 
this tradition, which do not have elaborate modeling and didn’t fit in a general 
equilibrium framework, did not get any traction at the IMF at all. The new wel-
fare economics added a new rationale for capital account regulation—financial 
stability. The earlier rationale at the IMF rested on the use of cross-border finan-
cial regulation as a bridge to capital account liberalization or to work within the 
parameters of the impossible trinity. This view still sees cross-border financial 
regulations as distortionary, although necessary in the short term. But from the 
perspective of the new welfare economics of capital controls, such measures fix 
markets, not distort them. Ostry’s papers began citing Korinek and Jeanne’s work 
as early as 2010, when Korinek’s work was still in the form of working papers. 
Korinek was then invited to serve as a visitor at the IMF, and Ostry, Korinek, and 
others wrote a key paper that articulated that, under certain conditions, it would 
also be prudent for source countries to regulate the outflow of capital during 
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inflow surges to EMDs. Again, this was a neoclassical and formal articulation of 
the notion that capital needed to be regulated at both ends, as Keynes and White 
had noted long before. This idea made it through into the Board papers and was 
strongly supported by EMDs. Many industrialized countries, in contrast, were 
very taken back and significantly watered down the final language on this matter.
Indeed, there is some evidence that, even before the direction to formulate an 
institutional view, the IMF had begun using the term CFM and advising coun-
tries to use CFMs because research and Board papers on these topics began to 
appear. As shown in table 6.3, the IMF began recommending or endorsing CFMs 
after the Lehman crash in 2008. The 2005 IEO report analyzes IMF advice on 
capital account regulations from 1990 to 2004 and serves as a guide and the base-
line for the analysis in this table. The IEO labels the IMF “not supportive” if the 
IMF either recommended that the nation not put capital account regulations 
in place or recommended that a nation dismantle its current regulations. It la-
bels the IMF “partially supportive” when it either partially supported regulations 
implemented by a nation or recommended that a nation put in place regulations 
but with some hesitation. The label “fully supportive’ is applied when the IMF 
either praised a nation for implementing cross-border financial regulations or 
suggested that a nation deploy such regulation without any hesitation.
Table 6.3 presents an illustration of findings from another econometric analy-
sis performed for this book that examines IMF advice on capital flows before and 
after the global financial crisis for eight countries. These eight countries were 
among the largest precrisis and post-crisis recipients of capital flows. Although 
there was a significant sudden stop in 2008 and 2009, the IMF either did not rec-
ommend regulations or urged nations not to put in place regulations on capital 
flows. The starkest changes occur after the crisis. Although in 2008 and 2009, the 
IMF was still not very supportive of attempts to regulate capital flows, begin-
ning in 2010 there was a significant change. During the post-Lehman surge in 
capital inflows, the IMF either actively endorsed the use of capital account regu-
lation or, in some cases, actively recommended that nations deploy regulations. 
Indeed, numerous times the IMF recommended that Colombia and Mexico put 
capital account regulations in place, although these nations refrained from doing 
so. Interestingly, when South Korea and Brazil started to implement the third-
generation capital controls, the IMF was initially not supportive or only partially 
supportive. Later, for both these countries the IMF eventually became fully sup-
portive of regulation.
Table 6.3 is illustrative of the broader findings of another econometric analy-
sis. With Yuan Tian and other graduate students at Boston University, I coded Ar-
ticle IV reports from 1999 to 2013 for all significant emerging markets. We found 
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in the post-crisis period and that the IMF was more likely to support the use of 
CFMs after the crisis as well (Gallagher and Tian 2014).
In summary, the IMF, surprisingly, became the source and supporter of new 
thinking about regulation of capital flows; capital account regulations were now 
characterized as necessary and important parts of the financial stability toolkit. 
This was largely due to a spirit of fresh thinking within the IMF and a few key 
researchers who matched that spirit with pioneer thinking in the economics pro-
fession. An inter-IMF process incorporated many of these ideas into final Board 
papers. The starting point of Executive Board discussion was, thus, much more 
enthusiastic about regulating capital than we would expect from the thinking of 
the IMF staff in general and, especially, from an organization in which power was 
held by nations that were not supportive of capital controls.
industrialized countries: From  
en Garde to off Guard
Industrialized countries were not very supportive of either the entire project or 
of specific proposals by the IMF staff. The task given to the IMF staff to ar-
ticulate a new institutional view for debate by the Executive Board set the goals 
for the discussion of the issue of the capital account at the IMF. Industrialized 
countries—chiefly the United States, the European Union, and, to a lesser extent, 
Japan—thus were put in a position of reacting to the agenda rather than setting 
or controlling it.
As we saw in chapter 2, the US executive director to the IMF, the US Treasury 
Department, and the private financial sector were not the originators of the pro-
cess in the 1990s to change the IMF Articles of Agreement. The US Congress and 
NGOs, however, were opposed to changing the Articles (Abdelal 2007). Thus, the 
United States was far from a monolith on this subject. In the process for formu-
lating the institutional view, the roles were different. The US executive director’s 
office was originally opposed to a process of formulating an institutional view, 
and the private sector was much more engaged this time. The US Congress was 
not involved in the process at all, and most NGOs were not attuned to the delib-
erations either.
Indeed, the United States was not very supportive of the proposal to engage in 
the process of an institutional view from the very beginning. The crisis in Europe 
and global efforts toward a recovery were at the top of the US agenda. Discussions 
about a policy change on capital account liberalization were considered a distrac-
tion. Moreover, given the mood at the time, the United States was concerned that 
the process would get out of hand and achieve a momentum that could lead to a 
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full endorsement of capital controls the world over. That said, the United States 
did not attempt to shut down the deliberations for two reasons. First, the United 
States had long called for a cleaner differentiation between capital controls used 
to manage exchange rates and cross-border financial regulations used to enable 
financial stability (see chapter 2). The US Treasury and many in the Congress 
were very concerned about the Chinese exchange rate policies. Even so, many 
of the economists in the US Treasury at the time were aware of and quietly endorsed 
the new economics of capital controls and the econometric evidence supporting 
the use of regulations. Second, the United States also recognized that the IMF had 
been giving inconsistent advice on these matters through its Article IV reports.
The European Union was not happy with the process either. The European 
Union had outlawed the use of capital controls in its founding treaties and did 
not want situations to arise where the IMF would recommend that nations vio-
late those core commitments. The United States and the European Union, then, 
stood as a bloc during the deliberations on the new institutional view. Their 
priorities were to stress the benefits of capital flows and capital account liberal-
ization, and to be sure that capital controls were not endorsed for exchange rate 
manipulation. Both parties were much more engaged, however, in internal crisis 
management, especially the European Union; the United States was also more 
concerned with the Dodd-Frank regulations (the US financial regulatory reform 
bill after the crisis) and with securing market access for financial firms in pending 
trade negotiations.
Although the private sector had largely ignored the IMF in favor of strong 
international standards in the trade and investment regime (see chapter 7), some 
key actors did engage in the process of articulating the new institutional view. 
For example, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) represents the interests 
of the world’s largest commercial banks and investment funds. In the 1990s, the 
IIF had not been involved in the move to change the IMF Articles (Abdelal 2007; 
Chwieroth 2010a); this time, however, the IIF did engage in the process of creat-
ing a new IMF institutional view.
The IIF launched a series of meetings on Principles for Stable Capital Flows 
and Fair Debt Restructuring in 2004. The IIF position was that capital account 
liberalization is an efficient way for nations to attract savings that can be de-
ployed for economic growth. In addition, countries should implement appropri-
ate economic policies to avoid macro-imbalances, such as large and persistent 
budget or current account deficits and high inflation. These policy measures 
would help to sustain stable capital inflows. The IIF was active in promoting this 
policymakers and the general public. Given its proximity to IMF headquarters, 
the IIF engaged in discussions with the IMF on a variety of issues of mutual inter-
est, including fostering stable capital flows as related to the deliberations for the 
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new institutional view. In an interview, Hung Tran, executive managing director 
at the IIF in 2013, said that “at this point we agree with the IMF’s eclectic ap-
proach. The IIF sees capital account liberalization as a smart policy, but one that 
may need to be properly sequenced. We agree with the IMF that measures can 
be taken to regulate capital inflows after sound macroeconomic policies, macro-
prudential measures, and a hierarchy of other steps have been exhausted as long 
as they are a last resort and temporary. Importantly, these capital flow measures 
should not be viewed as substitute for appropriate macroeconomic policies or 
necessary reforms.”
Abdelal (2007) notes that in the 1990s members of the US Congress, such as 
Representatives Maxine Waters (D-California) and Barney Frank (D- Massachu-
setts), under pressure from NGOs, had became involved in the effort to change 
the Articles of Agreement. This time, both actors had moved on to other issues 
and were not aware of the deliberations at the IMF. Waters and, especially, Frank 
were immersed in the Dodd-Frank bill, and when I spoke to them about the IMF 
institutional view, it was the first that either office had heard of it. Representa-
tive Frank had shifted as early as 2003 to critiquing US trade policy for putting 
strong international standards on to capital account management through trade 
and investment deals (see chapter 8). Indeed, when Frank’s office learned of the 
IMF deliberations, it used the IMF institutional review to try to wedge space 
for capital controls into US trade and investment treaties. Perhaps this lack of 
attention to these issues at the IMF was due to these distractions and to the fact 
that this time very few NGOs campaigned on the IMF new institutional view 
process. Only the Bretton Woods Project, a UK-based NGO, launched an official 
campaign on the institutional view. Other groups based in the United States had 
shifted their focus to Dodd-Frank and to the G20.
countervailing Monetary Power:  
brazil, russia, india, china, and  
south africa Punch above Their Weight
In many ways, EMDs put the reregulation of cross-border capital back on the 
international agenda. EMDs had put in place many regulations at home and had 
pushed the G20 to take on these issues as well. Moreover, EMDs had been quietly 
seeking assurances from the IMF that their reregulation efforts would be blessed, 
or at least ignored, by the IMF. Nevertheless, the IMF voting structure and a 
general level of mistrust of IMF staff led some EMD executive directors—led by 
a coalition of the BRICS—to be wary of the entire process. EMDs enjoyed the 
policy space in the Articles to engage with the capital account on their own terms 
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and did not want to lose that policy space during this process. EMDs largely 
had three key positions: (1) to ensure that capital account liberalization was not 
enshrined in the document, (2) to preserve their ability to regulate capital flows 
under the Articles, and (3) to put more of the burden of regulation on industrial-
ized countries so that there could be cooperation on capital flows at both ends.
The final institutional view noted that capital account liberalization should be 
country-specific and should be sequenced. It also noted that CFMs were appro-
priate for financial stability and to buy time for macroeconomic adjustment—
thus taking away most of the insinuations of controls being used as a last resort 
in earlier board drafts. The language on the role of source countries, however, 
was limited to stating that source countries should take into account the nega-
tive impacts of their policies on EMDs, not that they should actually cooperate 
on regulation at both ends. I outline next the EMD critique of early board drafts 
and discuss how EMDs were able to punch above their voting weight to make 
significant changes in the final version of the IMF institutional view.
Critique of Capital Account Liberalization and the  
Use of Capital Flow Management Measures as a Last Resort
The biggest concerns to EMDs during the deliberations were that the IMF still re-
tained the implications that capital account liberalization was a goal, that CFMs 
should be used as a last resort, and that source countries were not held respon-
sible for the negative spillovers they caused in terms of capital flows.
EMDs were particularly concerned that the IMF continued to advocate the 
eventual liberalization of the capital account despite the fact that the current lit-
erature overwhelmingly found no strong correlation among capital account lib-
eralization, growth, and financial stability—especially in EMDs. Olivier Jeanne 
and Arvind Subramanian, former IMF economists, conducted a meta-regression 
on the literature and conclude that “the international community should not 
seek to promote totally free trade in assets—even over the long run—because (as 
we show in this book) free capital mobility seems to have little benefit in terms of 
long-run growth and because there is a good case to be made for prudential and 
non-distortive capital controls” (Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson 2012, 5).
The IMF view of managing inflows of capital was also seen as limited. It stresses 
that priority should be given to letting the exchange rate appreciate, accumulat-
ing reserves, and tightening fiscal policy to reduce the amount of capital flowing 
into an emerging market; CFMs should be used as a complement to or after such 
efforts. Recall that there is no substantive economic basis for this claim. The new 
research in economic theory (see chapter 4) shows that implementing capital 
controls can be the optimal policy for internalizing the externalities  associated 
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with risky capital flows (Korinek 2011). In addition, econometric analyses by 
the IMF, National Institute of Economic Research (NBER), and others have all 
shown that capital account regulations have been effective in meeting many of 
their stated goals. Indeed, research by the IMF itself shows that nations that de-
ployed controls were among the least hard hit by the global financial crisis; these 
studies do not differentiate the sequence of use for the different measures, nor do 
they distinguish whether such measures were market-based and temporary (see 
Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff 2011; Ostry et al. 2010).
Some EMDs and economists see regulating capital flows as an alternative to 
reserve accumulation—rather than seeing CFMs on inflows as an option after 
reserves have been accumulated, as the IMF Board papers suggest. Accumulat-
ing reserves can be costly to EMDs in terms of the opportunity cost of invest-
ment and sterilization, and some central banks may not always have the capacity 
to sterilize flows without adverse effects (Gallagher and Shrestha 2012; Rodrik 
2008; Aizenman 2010). Daniela Gabor (2012) also argues that reserve accumula-
tion creates a demand for such activity and thus could actually increase inflows. 
Moreover, the accumulation of reserves by EMDs also resulted in global costs 
in the form of global imbalances that played a role in the global financial crisis 
(Eichengreen 2007).
Tightening fiscal policy also may not be ethical, optimal, or possible in the 
short term, and capital account regulations can buy time to make such an adjust-
ment. First, it has been argued that it is undemocratic for fiscal policy to be man-
aged for the benefit of global investors over local needs (Batista, 2010a). Second, 
and more pragmatically, adjustments to fiscal policy are often long drawn-out 
processes that require legislation. The fiscal balance cannot be changed over-
night, but a central bank or finance ministry can put in capital account regula-
tions overnight to either buy time for (or put up with) a slow-moving fiscal cycle.
Finally, it is not always clear that a nation should wait for the exchange rate to 
float to a certain level before using capital account regulation. As Gabor (2012) 
points out, exchange rate over- or undervaluation is fairly difficult to adequately 
measure, especially ex ante. In addition, if nations continually intervene in FX 
markets, investors will price that in and the interventions will not have the de-
sired effect. Also, it should be recognized that some nations see a need for a com-
petitive exchange rate as part of an export-led development strategy (Rapetti, 
Razmi, and Skott 2012; Rodrik 2008). EMDs wanted to preserve the right to use 
capital account regulation for financial stability and to manage the exchange rate 
to mobilize resources—coming at the issue from both the new welfare and the 
Minskian developmentalist angles.
The stressing by the IMF that such measures be temporary and not discrimi-
natory was also a source of major contention. For regulations to be part of a 
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countercyclical macroeconomic policy, EMDs argued, nations have to have per-
manent authority to use measures as inflows and outflows occur. And by their 
very nature, most capital account regulations are discriminatory between resi-
dents and nonresidents. The IMF recommendations, thus, contradict the IMF 
staff ’s own findings about the kinds of measures that work. In econometric anal-
yses that show a significant impact of capital controls on limiting exchange rate 
volatility, changing the composition of inflows, and allowing monetary policy to 
be more autonomous, there is no such hierarchy of when a nation used controls, 
what form they took, and how long they lasted.
On the management of outflows, EMDS pointed out that the IMF ignored 
its own research showing that measures on capital outflows could be useful in 
preventing excessive inflows of capital. In addition, many countries in transition 
to more openness or in the process of development may need to deploy measures 
to curtail outflows to steer credit toward productive development (Epstein 2012; 
Lewis 1954; Ocampo 2012). Instead, the IMF sanctioned measures on outflows 
only in the middle of a financial crisis. But a focus on outflows is particularly 
important for the poorest countries. The least developed countries often do 
not experience massive inflow surges, but they do experience massive outflows 
(UNCTAD 2012a).
The IMF concern about the spillover effects of the prudential use of capital 
controls is also unfounded. Korinek (2013) has shown that regulating capital 
flows in an efficient manner may cause increases or decreases of capital in neigh-
boring countries that may not necessarily be negative spillovers, in the economic 
sense. By design, an optimal tax on inflows lowers demand for inflows, and thus, 
interest rates may drop and cause more inflows in neighboring countries. This 
is the invisible hand at work. The inflows to neighboring countries may not be 
negative—whether they are really depends on the stock and composition of the 
investments of any neighboring country, the depth of its capital markets, its cur-
rent account balance, and its level of regulation. And, even if a nation chooses not 
to put regulations in place, the cost of a negative spillover may be far outweighed 
by the benefit of not being the recipient of contagion in the form of crisis.
The EMDs said the IMF was right to point out that source country policies 
“have likely affected the volume and volatility of capital flows to both advanced 
and emerging market economies”(IMF 2012c, 22). Nevertheless, too much of the 
burden was being placed on EMDs and not on the source countries. The BRICS 
argued that the IMF new institutional view lacked the same levels of specificity 
about and scrutiny of source-country policies as there was for EMDs. Whereas 
the new view scrutinized the exact types of capital account regulations in EMDs, 
it did not examine to an equal extent which types of monetary and regulatory 
policy trigger the most risky capital flows from developed to developing countries.
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The IMF suggested that its new institutional view could help guide future 
trade treaties and that the IMF could serve as a forum for such discussions. In-
deed, it is important that the IMF recognized that many nations lack the policy 
space to implement new policy advice from the IMF; however, given that the IMF 
view is overly narrow, EMDs saw it as imperative that future safeguards for trade 
and investment treaties not simply defer to the IMF on capital account regula-
tions. Although the IMF has legal authority on current transactions, this new 
view did not grant the IMF authority over the capital account.
Crafting Coalitions
Many significant EMDs saw unprecedented growth in the period between the 
Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis. This newfound economic 
power balanced the global discussion on regulating cross-border finance. BRICS 
and other nations are now part of the G20, have (a little) more voting power 
at the IMF and World Bank, and generally have asserted more sway given their 
market power and dynamism (Chweiroth 2012). In contrast to the late 1990s, 
when the BRICS were 9 percent of global GDP and all but China had an IMF 
country program, by 2012 the BRICS were 34 percent of world GDP and none 
had an IMF program.
Many of these nations deploy capital account regulations and see them as 
part of preserving autonomy for domestic objectives. Some of these countries, 
to varying degrees could be classified as neodevelopmental states or, at least, a 
hybrid version of developmental states and neoliberal approaches that to some 
degree are trying to reembed markets (Ban 2013a; Gallagher 2012). As pointed 
out in chapter 5, these nations (especially Brazil) house many important interest 
groups that saw the threat of export decline due to exchange rate appreciation 
and supported national efforts on capital controls after the global financial crisis.
The key EMD executive directors who had formed a coalition at the IMF 
and addressed the institutional view were from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa, with the Brazilian director as leader and spokesperson at the Ex-
ecutive Board meetings. This BRICS coalition had already formed in efforts to 
reform IMF voting quotas and was ready-made to collaborate on the capital 
account issues. Brazil already had an open capital account but had a long and 
uneasy relationship with the IMF and, exactly at that time, was experimenting 
with the many capital account regulations (see chapter 5). Brazil wanted to make 
sure that it would be able to maintain the policy space to deploy such regula-
tions. India, China, South Africa, and Russia, in contrast, were in various stages 
of gradual capital account liberalization and were using capital controls as part 
of their regulatory strategy. These nations did not want the IMF to send signals to 
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markets that their approaches were somehow wrong. The coalition had worked 
together in 2008 to improve the IMF quota system (Woods 2010). Although this 
group still lacked significant voting power, its collective voting power was highly 
symbolic—at 16.75 percent of the vote at the IMF Executive Board, the coalition 
had just as much voting power as the United States.
Collectively, this group of EMDs was highly concerned with the effort to create 
guidelines for capital account liberalization and capital controls. Sarkozy’s origi-
nal speech mentioned the effort as ending in an amendment to the IMF Articles of 
Agreement, and that sent shivers throughout the developing world. Even without 
an amendment, the guidelines were seen as narrowing the flexibility under the 
Articles given that the institutional view would be firmly incorporated into sur-
veillance and Article IV operations at the IMF. Some openly criticized the vote of 
endorsement on the inflows framework, arguing that it was a vote of the weighted 
majority in that the industrialized countries that were the source of the capital 
outflows had voted to restrict the ability of EMD recipients of the subsequent 
inflows to act on them. No EMDs voted for the measure (Batista 2012a).
Indeed, led by Brazil, EMDs expressed real concern about the entire project at 
an April 2012 meeting of the Executive Board.
We have warned that the Board was embarking on a slippery slope that 
“possible frameworks,” “guidelines” and “tentative proposals” would 
eventually creep into Fund surveillance and gradually become bind-
ing constraints for membership. We reaffirm our opposition to any at-
tempt to establish “rules of the road” that, directly or indirectly, at this 
time or in the future, constrain country authorities’ discretion to adopt 
policies that they consider appropriate to their national economic and 
financial circumstances, as guaranteed by Article VI of the Articles of 
Agreement. This Article establishes that “members may exercise such 
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.” 
(Batista 2012b, 2)
China, India, South Africa, and the G24 all made similar statements about the 
new IMF institutional view (Seria 2011). BRICS and other EMDs informally at-
tempted to act as a bloc during the development of the institutional view. The 
BRICS executive directors and others met regularly to coordinate their positions 
and tactics throughout the process, often with the executive director of the G24. 
One of their strategies was to slow down the process. EMDs came to the Execu-
tive Board meetings with detailed critiques of the draft Board papers and col-
lectively insist that no vote be taken on the Board papers until their changes were 
incorporated. The group also attempted to stall the process by insisting that other 
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pressing matters (e.g., the European crisis) be discussed at Board meetings rather 
than the latest version of the institutional view.
Extra-Forum Leverage: G20 “Coherent Conclusions” 
and Communiqués
Some of the views of the EMDs were expressed in writing and orally at the Ex-
ecutive Board meetings. In addition, BRICS craftily traded across regimes by le-
veraging their position within the IMF with actions taken in other international 
regimes where the countries had more equal power at the table—particularly at 
the G20 and the G24. Indeed, by comparing G7, G20, and G24 communiqués 
and politics, we can see the revealed preferences of industrialized nations (in 
the G7), of the EMDs (G24), and of a subgroup of EMDs and industrialized 
countries (G20).
The 2011 G20 meeting was held in Cannes, France, during an acute period of 
the eurozone crisis that captured the attention of most negotiators. In addition, 
a working group was formed to take the capital flows issue to the highest level. 
Headed by Germany and Brazil, the group forged the “G20 Coherent Conclusions 
for the Management of Capital Flows Drawing on Country Experiences” (G20 
Information Centre 2011b). The document was endorsed by the G20 finance 
ministers and central bank governors in October and then endorsed by the G20 
leaders themselves in Cannes. The effort was spearheaded by Brazil (and many 
of the same people in the G20 working group were also part of the Brazilian IMF 
effort, as was the case with other BRICS as well) and accepted by Germany. At the 
Cannes meetings, Germany was seeking EMD support to build a firewall around 
the eurozone to prevent further crises there through contributions by EMDs to 
the European Central Bank or some other mechanism. This environment gave 
EMDs significant negotiating power.
The IMF Executive Board had just examined and voted on a set of guidelines 
on regulating capital inflows that many of the BRICS countries disliked. The G20 
conclusions were an attempt to get a high-level endorsement of an alternative 
view so that this view could be wedged back into the IMF process. In contrast 
to the IMF guidelines, the G20 conclusions say, “there is no ‘one-size fits all’ ap-
proach or rigid definition of conditions for the use of capital flow management 
measures” and that such measures should not be solely seen as a last resort (G20 
Information Centre 2011b), as the Executive Board papers had stressed. Instead, 
the G20 conclusions call on nations to develop their own country-specific ap-
proach to managing capital flows. This document was repeatedly used as a refer-
ence point to contrast with Board papers in Executive Board sessions thereafter.
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BRICS also worked hard to insist that official G20 communiqués included 
language on the need to regulate capital flows—thus exhibiting a global con-
sensus that could be leveraged in discussions at the IMF. My interviews with 
key BRICS players confirmed this; in addition, EMD preferences are revealed by 
comparing G7 and G20 communiqués before and after the crisis. Often G7 com-
muniqués occurred shortly before G20 meetings. The G7 communiqués tended 
to stress the need for flexible exchange rates and the free flow of capital; in con-
trast, the G20 communiqués between 2009 and 2012 stressed the volatile capital 
flows to EMDs and the need to regulate them.
Nearly every G7 communiqué from 2005 to 2012 has language that is identical 
to or a variant of the following:
We reaffirmed that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamen-
tals. Excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates are 
undesirable for economic growth. We continue to monitor exchange 
markets closely and cooperate as appropriate. In this context, we empha-
size that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major coun-
tries or economic areas that lack such flexibility to promote smooth and 
widespread adjustments in the international financial system, based on 
market mechanisms. (G7/8 Finance Ministers Meetings 2005)
In contrast, G20 communiqués, especially after 2009, have language such as this:
We underscore the importance of rigorous surveillance on exchange rate 
policies and support a more ample coverage of surveillance activities, 
where relevant, including global liquidity, capital flows, capital  account 
measures, reserve and fiscal, monetary and financial sector policies that 
could have an impact on external stability (G20 Information Centre 2012).
As Brazilian Finance Minister Guida Mantega said at a 2011 G20 meeting, “We 
oppose any guidelines, frameworks or ‘codes of conduct’ that attempt to con-
strain, directly or indirectly, policy responses of countries facing surges in volatile 
capital inflows.” Mantega added that capital controls were “self-defence” mea-
sures: “Ironically, some of the countries that are responsible for the deepest crisis 
since the Great Depression, and have yet to solve their own problems, are eager to 
prescribe codes of conduct to the rest of the world, including to countries that are 
overburdened by the spillover effects of the policies adopted by them”(in Reddy 
2011). My interviews with G20 representatives confirm that the different language 
in the G20 communiqués compared to the G-7 communiqués was included on 
the insistence of nations such as South Korea, Brazil, India, and Argentina.
The G24 (formally the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on In-
ternational Monetary Affairs and Development) was established in 1971 (G24 
2011a). The group coordinates EMD positions on international monetary and 
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development issues, particularly at the IMF and G20. Indeed, the G24 often had 
a seat at the IMF Executive Board meetings on the institutional view. Moreover, 
the G24 served as a host and provided technical support for the many EMD 
coalitions examining the institutional view. It also acted as a conduit between 
EMDs and IMF staff during deliberations.
In addition to having a representative at the IMF annual and spring meetings, 
the G24 convenes the finance ministers from its membership and delivers its 
own communiqués to the press and the world. Here is where we find the starkest 
statements in favor of the need to regulate volatile capital flows and critical of 
the IMF process. A group of many key EMDs in the World Bank and IMF pub-
lished a communiqué in the wake of the 2011 meetings echoing the views it had 
expressed in communiqués since the crisis:
Ministers stressed that the IMF must adopt an open-minded and even-
handed approach to the management of capital flows and take into ac-
count policies in capital-originating countries, especially systemically 
important financial centers, as well as specific circumstances of capital-
receiving countries. Ministers did not agree with the proposed frame-
work for staff advice to member countries on managing capital flows 
and its inclusion in Fund surveillance. Policymakers of countries facing 
large and volatile capital flows must have the flexibility and discretion 
to adopt policies that they consider appropriate and effective to mitigate 
risks through macroeconomic policies, prudential measures and capital 
controls, as stipulated in the Articles of Agreement. (G24 2011b, 55)
This was all part of a strategy to acquire cover at the IMF forum, where EMDs 
had less bargaining power.
Intraforum Leverage: Strategic Use of  
International Monetary Fund Staff Positions
Another channel that the EMDs used to exercise countervailing power and 
punch above their weight within the IMF was the use of IMF staff papers and 
opinion to wedge EMD positions into the discussions. As we have seen, on many 
of the issues that the EMDs contested, the IMF staff had views similar to those 
of the EMDs. EMD executive directors and staff repeatedly cited this consistency 
in their critiques of many of the Board papers and arguments made by indus-
trialized nations. Given that the IMF staff has long been a trusted supporter of 
industrialized-country positions on capital flows (Chwieroth 2010a; Abdelal 
2007), this was yet another way for EMDs to punch above their voting weight.
Note that, on the issue of capital account liberalization, there were no new 
public staff papers written and published in the midst of the reevaluation. The 
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initial draft of the paper that dealt with managing outflows and capital account 
liberalization did include an analysis of the literature on capital account liberal-
ization, but that analysis was different from analyses in many previous staff pa-
pers. Whereas earlier analyses of the literature had argued that there was no clear 
relationship between capital account liberalization and growth, these new papers 
argued that such a relationship might exist. And indeed, in the middle of the 
reevaluation Olivier Jeanne and Arvind Subramanian, two former senior IMF 
staff (along with John Williamson), published a report at the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics (Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson 2012) that 
not only reviewed the literature and drew different conclusions from the initial 
draft but also performed a meta-regression analysis of all the former economet-
ric studies and found no clear positive relationship between capital account lib-
eralization and growth. EMDs, wary of discussion in the 1990s about codifying 
the need to liberalize all capital flows, were vehemently against the language in 
the drafts that hinted that such a route was the optimal one.
The most contentious issue outside the liberalization of capital flows was the 
extent to which nations should regulate capital inflows. In addition to the Febru-
ary 2010 staff position note (Ostry et al. 2010), the IMF staff published a detailed 
analysis of the conditions under which nations should deploy capital account 
regulations (Ostry et al. 2011) that stood in stark contrast to the initial and final 
Board drafts on the issue. This paper was used by EMDs and outside experts to 
highlight the extent to which industrialized-country interests were overriding 
IMF analyses.
Two issues stood out. First, the staff papers were not so strident about whether 
nations should regulate cross-border finance in a discriminatory manner on the 
basis of residency. Second, the staff papers did not say that regulations should be 
solely price-based regulations.
The issue that was the most contentious, however, was whether capital con-
trols should be used only as a last resort or alongside other measures. Early papers 
(Ostry et al. 2011) and the Board drafts indicated that regulations on the inflow 
of capital should occur only as a last resort after the exchange rate had appreci-
ated, FX had been accumulated, fiscal policy was tightened, and macroprudential 
measures had been put in place. Those drafts also said that, after such a sequence 
of events, regulations should not discriminate on the basis of residency and that 
they should be price-based. The staff background papers, however, were more nu-
anced, and EMDs called attention to wording such as “there is no unambiguous 
welfare ranking of policy instruments (though non-discriminatory prudential 
measures are always appropriate), and a pragmatic approach taking account of 
the economy’s most pertinent risks and distortions needs to be adopted” (Ostry 
et al. 2011, 5). EMDs also singled out staff papers that noted that sometimes 
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capital account regulations may need to discriminate on the basis of residency 
and that price-based capital controls may not be as effective in the face of uncer-
tainty; according to these papers, under such circumstances quantity-based con-
trols may be appropriate: “when the authorities face information asymmetries 
and uncertainty about the private sector’s response, it can be difficult to calibrate 
price-based measures appropriately” (Ostry et al. 2011, 27).
BRICS were quick to highlight these differences in Executive Board meetings, 
through the G24, and elsewhere, as were outside experts. When EMDs invited 
the independent task force to brief the full Executive Board, Olivier Blanchard 
and Rex Ghosh were asked to provide commentary. Both agreed publicly that 
capital account regulations should not be used only as a last resort. An internal 
IMF debate ensued, and the final institutional view has no mention of the term 
last resort. The final language notes that CFMs should not be a substitute for 
macroeconomic adjustment but endorses their use to buy time in the process 
of adjustment. This final battle represents a loss of sorts for the industrialized 
countries that wanted a clear delineation between capital controls for exchange 
rate management and cross-border financial regulation for financial stability.
Another key issue where the EMDs and staff saw eye to eye at one level was on 
the need to regulate capital flows at both ends (see chapter 2). IMF staff, along 
with Anton Korinek (see chapter 4), published a technical paper outlining that 
in some circumstances source countries should regulate capital flows to EMDs 
(Ostry, Ghosh, and Korinek 2012). This was repeated as a core component of 
EMD demands at the Executive Board. Interestingly, after the IMF staff published 
its very technical paper, Olivier Blanchard, the IMF research director, and Jona-
than Ostry, the deputy director, published a popular version of the article that 
clearly echoed much of what the EMDs had been arguing for and was evocative 
of the 1944 arguments made by Keynes (see chapter 2):
In thinking through the circumstances in which capital controls may 
be appropriate, a multilateral perspective is essential. Indeed this was 
a key tenet of the IMF’s founding fathers, Keynes and White. Keynes 
considered that managing capital flows would be much more difficult 
by unilateral actions than if movements of capital could “be controlled 
at both ends” of the transaction. White concluded that capital controls 
would be ineffective unless there was cooperation across countries in 
their implementation.
The perspective of Keynes and White is very much alive today. The 
G20 for example in its Coherent Conclusions on capital flow manage-
ment last year urged that national policies to deal with capital flow vola-
tility take account of potential cross-border spillovers. Many emerging 
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market countries worry that policies in source countries are increasing 
the challenges of managing capital inflow cycles for them, underscoring 
the potential gains from cooperation. (Blanchard and Ostry 2013)
Finally, the last issue on which there was consensus between EMDs and IMF staff 
was the need for the trading system to make room for the use of CFMs. This is 
the subject of chapter 7. Here we need only note that, since the early 2000s, the 
United States had reformulated capital account liberalization as the liberalization 
of trade in financial services and inserted into its trade and investment treaties 
the requirement that signatories deregulate cross-border finance. The IMF staff, 
EMDs, and outside experts saw that this led to an inconsistency between the new 
thinking on capital account regulations and existing trade and investment com-
mitments. As a key IMF staff document notes:
There are about 2,500 BITs, as well as bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments that provide legal protection for foreign investments. These 
agreements usually liberalize inward investments and provide for the 
free repatriation of that investment. They typically include “most- 
favored nation” clauses. Most BITs and FTAs either provide tempo-
rary safeguards on capital inflows and outflows to prevent or mitigate 
financial crises, or defer that matter to the host country’s legislation. 
However, BITs and FTAs to which the United States is a party (with 
the  exception of NAFTA) do not permit restrictions on either capital 
inflows or outflows. (Ostry et al. 2011, 20)
This was echoed by EMDs, but the final Board draft had relatively weak language 
on the matter. The final institutional view, however, states that these agreements 
in many cases do not provide appropriate safeguards or proper sequencing of 
liberalization, and could thus benefit from reform to include these protections 
(IMF 2012a, 8).
In the week proceeding the final vote in fall 2012, new and former BRICS ex-
ecutive directors convened numerous times to get to know each other and devise 
a collective plan to either continue to block or to collectively vote against the 
institutional view. One of the executive directors in the coalition claimed that 
it would be impossible to get approval from his national capital on such short 
notice and thus noted that he would remain neutral during the vote the next day. 
Although the rest of the BRICS made statements critical of the final institutional 
view during that last Executive Board meeting, their lack of a unified no vote 
made it difficult to fully counter the insistence by the industrialized countries on 
a final vote and end to the process.
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At the very end of the process, the industrialized nations and upper IMF 
management used their power within the institution to ensure that no further 
deliberation would occur. EMDs had successfully postponed the final vote on 
the guidelines in their meeting before the Tokyo 2012 annual meetings. The IMF 
management and industrialized nations insisted, however, that the vote occur 
during the first meeting after the annual meetings. This put EMDs at a disadvan-
tage for two reasons. First, after the Tokyo meetings there were also G20 finance 
minister meetings, and the executive directors had little time to meet before the 
final vote was scheduled. Second, the first Board meeting after the Tokyo annual 
IMF meetings ushered in a new crop of executive directors, many of whom were 
unaware of the reevaluation process and had little relationship with some of the 
coalitions. Although the EMDs were able to stall the final vote on these grounds, 
they were able to do so for only one week.
The final chapter of the process occurred in April 2013 when the Board dis-
cussed the staff guidance note put together by IMF management for the staff 
to use as guidelines in Article IV reports and when putting together country 
programs. Interestingly, the staff guidance note makes some significant improve-
ments around the edges of the institutional view. The guidance note gives much 
more credence to advising IMF staff to be in tune with specific country condi-
tions. The guidance note also reemphasizes that source countries in the North 
have a real responsibility to be mindful of the spillover potential of their own 
policies. The guidance note is also looser with respect to whether a CFM should 
discriminate based on residency and should be temporary. These were all key 
tenets of the EMDs position. Many of the Western Board members felt that the 
battle was largely over and that the guidance note would merely be a summary 
of the institutional view. But, there was some leeway for interpretation, and the 
staff was able to insert some of its earlier preferences. Such moves were praised 
by the EMD coalitions at the April meetings.
In the end, in part because of interventions exercised by Brazil and other na-
tions, the IMF made clear that the institutional view would not be binding or 
entail a change to the IMF Articles of Agreement. For the time being, this coun-
tervailing power resulted in a successful defense of cooperative decentralization. 
Although the IMF may not verbally agree in Article IV reports (because of the 
new institutional view) with measures taken by each of its members, those na-
tions still have the freedom to deploy measures they see fit.
The final institutional view did reveal many of the preferences of EMDs, how-
ever, and more so than we might have expected given their lack of voting power 
at the IMF. The symbolic importance of the EMDs, creative coalition building 
among them, the use of extra-forum shopping, and the ideational alliance with 
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many IMF staff ideas allowed countervailing monetary power to be expressed at 
the IMF and enabled EMDs to punch above their voting weight and get more 
than they otherwise would have. That said, the EMDs were only half-pleased 
with the final outcome and pointed to their lack of voting power as a reason for 
the result.
summary and conclusion
The IMF institutional view on capital account liberalization and the management 
of capital flows is a step forward compared to the inconsistent and unofficial view 
of the IMF at the turn of the twentieth century. The IMF now officially recognizes 
that capital account liberalization is not always optimal for every country, that 
countries should deploy capital account regulations when under pressure from 
global markets, and that source countries should be more aware of the impact of 
their policies on capital flows across the globe. This change was a function of new 
ideas in the IMF Research and other departments, which were then bolstered to 
support similar EMD positions. EMDs were now able to react to recommenda-
tions about when they should deploy regulations as opposed to recommenda-
tions about whether regulation should be imposed at all. EMDs wedged their 
views into the process by leveraging IMF staff positions and other agreements 
originating outside he IMF, such as the G20 “Coherent Conclusions.”
In part, this chapter tells a story about how some EMDs—namely the BRICS 
coalition—used countervailing monetary power to defend cooperative decen-
tralization in regulating capital flows. Recall that cooperative decentralization 
is a financial regime in which there is interstate cooperation but across a diver-
gence of national regulatory approaches (see chapter 2). This stands in contrast 
to strong international standards, which are characterized by interstate coop-
eration and global regulatory convergence across national systems of regulation. 
The IMF Articles of Agreement allow for national diversity in terms of regulating 
capital flows and permit nations to cooperate to monitor and enforce such regu-
lations on a multilateral basis.
EMDs exerted their countervailing power in attempts to defend and gain back 
some of their policy space to deploy capital controls. As we have seen in chapter 
5, EMDs exerted countervailing monetary power in the form of regulating the 
structural power of global markets; this change in policy also yielded a modest 
change in economic outcome. Here and in the next chapters on the G20 and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), we see how EMDs exerted countervailing 
monetary power on the power of the industrialized states in global economic 
institutions. EMDs had even more success in changing policy at the G20.
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GOOD TALK, LITTLE ACTION
The Limits of the G20
Immediately following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, there appeared 
to be a renewed willingness to engage in global cooperation to mitigate the cri-
sis and prevent the next one. Rather than the United States and the IMF taking 
center stage as in previous crises, the G20 was elevated to a global leaders’ forum 
where world leaders from industrialized countries and emerging-market and de-
veloping countries (EMDs) came together and pledged to coordinate. Through 
the G20, a new institution was created, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was revitalized with new funding. Di-
rectly and indirectly, this newfound coordination also addressed issues related to 
cross-border finance. In some sense, the G20 became another forum for coopera-
tive decentralization. Nation-states would independently regulate their financial 
systems and devise macroeconomic policies, but with a coordinated eye on the 
global implications of these policies. How did it fare?
The most significant success with respect to cross-border capital flows at the 
G20 was in terms of discourse and official communiqués. Particularly significant 
was the negotiation of a set of “Coherent Conclusions” on the regulation of capital 
flows that was agreed on and signed by G20 finance ministers, central bank gover-
nors, and then heads of state in 2011. The same BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russian, 
India, China, and South Africa) that resided in the IMF (often staffed by the same 
negotiators) organized at the G20 on these matters. As we have seen in chapter 6, 
the coalition also was able to include language in the highest-level official commu-
niqués on the need to regulation capital flows and on the need for source countries 
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to be more cognizant of the spillover impacts of their monetary policies. Another 
major success, not so related to short-term financial flows, was the absence of a 
major move to put up tariff barriers across the world; the G20 repeatedly made 
global pleas to that effect. Yet that major step forward was followed by two steps 
backward. In the spirit of avoiding a rash of trade protectionism, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), under the auspices of 
the G20, constructed the term investment protectionism and started issuing annual 
monitoring reports seeking to identify such protectionism. In these reports the 
G20 singled out many cross-border financial regulations as protectionist despite 
the fact that the G20 “Coherent Conclusions” justified the same policies—and 
despite there being no economic reason to call such measures protectionist.
All these communiqués and reports were not paralleled by coordinated policy 
action on the regulation of global capital flows. The real promise for collaborat-
ing on both ends was the G20 coordination of financial regulatory reform. At the 
2011 G20 Summit in Cannes, France, leaders pledged to regulate the global deriv-
ative markets by putting them in clearinghouses and placing harmonized margin 
requirements on their use. This pioneering move had great promise of becom-
ing an avenue for cooperation on the regulation of cross-border finance at both 
ends. But, deep into the negotiations over the rules of the US Dodd-Frank act, 
the United States exempted important foreign exchange (FX) derivatives from 
the bill. As we have seen in chapter 4, the FX derivatives market was one of the 
key channels that allowed the crisis in 2008–2009 to become global and was the 
source of turbulence and financial amplification effects in the 2009–2012 period. 
The result was a “hypocrisy trap” (to use the term in Weaver 2008), whereby the 
G20 made great strides in making new policies and outcomes in some situations 
but completely contradicted them in others.
In this chapter, I first discuss the emergence of the G20 in the wake of the 
financial crisis. I then analyze G20 policy with respect to capital flows. Last, I 
evaluate the political economy of EMDs in the G20 and beyond.
The rise and Promise of the G20
The Bretton Woods institutions and subsequent coordination among the indus-
trialized nations were intended to provide a number of public goods to the world 
economy to prevent and mitigate financial crises. EMDs were initially shut out 
of the principal global economic-coordination bodies in the post-Bretton Woods 
period. At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the G20 was formed 
and then was elevated to prominence in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
The G20 is the most inclusive of these groups formed thus far, and it held great 
promise in the wake of the global financial crisis.
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Following the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, a group of finance 
ministers began to meet on a regular basis in an attempt to coordinate macro-
economic policies and pursue other objectives. That group became known as 
the G5 and consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and Japan. Later, Italy, Canada, and Russia were invited in, and by the end of the 
1990s, heads of state became regulars and the group became known as the G8. 
There had long been critiques of the lack of inclusiveness of these bodies, and in 
response to the Asian financial crisis and other crises in the late 1990s, the G20 
was born as a ministerial-level grouping (Bradford and Linn 2011).
According to Colin Bradford and Johannes Linn (2011), it just so happened 
that a G20 meeting was scheduled for November 8–9 in São Paolo, Brazil, in 2008. 
On the advice of Gordon Brown, then UK prime minister, it was decided to ele-
vate the G20 to a leaders’ forum and hold the meeting a week later in Washington, 
DC. The meeting was hastily assembled after the Lehman collapse and then the 
election of Barack Obama. The G20 leaders’ summit in Washington was a show 
of force by a large group of leaders in unison. The hope was to temporarily calm 
markets and put in place a larger process for reform. That larger process fell to 
the United Kingdom and Gordon Brown, who took over for the second leaders’ 
summit, which took place in London in April 2009.
The London summit was truly historic. G20 leaders came together to signal 
that global fiscal and monetary expansion was okay, and they led by example with 
over $5 trillion in fiscal stimulus packages. The IMF was also given new funds, 
and new special drawing rights were issued; $250 billion in trade finance was 
pledged to EMDs, and the Financial Stability Forum was elevated to a new global 
institution called the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (Woods 2010). Moreover, 
the G20 developed a core agenda to work on in years going forward that focused 
on macroeconomic coordination for recovery, strengthening national and global 
regulations on financial markets, and reforming the international financial insti-
tutions (Bradford and Linn 2011).
All three components of the core agenda of the G20 could be perceived to 
provide greater justification for world leaders to coordinate on the regulation 
of cross-border finance. Indeed, the actions of the G20 and the central banks of 
the industrialized members of the G20 immediately after the crisis all constitute 
attempts by the global community to allocate the five public goods outlined by 
Kindleberger (1986) as necessary for a stable international system (see chapter 2): 
maintaining relatively open markets during recessions, providing countercycli-
cal lending, policing exchange rate stability, coordinating macroeconomic policy, 
and acting as a lender of last resort. Kindleberger saw these as public goods be-
cause every nation benefits from stability regardless of whether a country pro-
vides such goods. Indeed, this allows countries to free ride on the production of 
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public goods by others. Kindleberger thought these public goods needed to be 
provided by a hegemon, the United States. Others thought these goods could be 
provided through new institutional arrangements (Keohane 1984). Remarkably, 
the G20 and its members became a forum to coordinate and communicate on all 
five of these public goods.
The G20 and the regulation of  
cross-border Finance, 2008–2013
To what extent did the G20 serve as a forum for the global coordination of the 
governance of global capital flows? There was an unprecedented elevation of is-
sues impacting global financial flows, clearly initiated by the EMDs. Whereas 
capital flows, exchange rate volatility, and spillovers were sometimes not men-
tioned in the communiqués of G7/8 meetings, such issues became the corner-
stone of G20 communiqués. What is more, Brazil and Germany brokered an 
explicit declaration on the management of capital flows that went well beyond 
the IMF institutional view on capital flow management. But these significant 
new policy statements were not matched by positive economic outcomes. On 
exchange rates, the period following the Lehman collapse became known for its 
“currency wars.” The United States defended its loose macroeconomic policy and 
took no measures to mitigate the negative spillovers associated with its policy.
When we compare EMD clout at the G20 and the IMF, it is clear that EMDs 
had more leverage at the G20; at the IMF, voting was and is skewed against them 
(at the G8, they are not present). An analysis comparing G20 and G8 commu-
niqués and subsequent interviews with key G20 negotiators reveals that EMDs 
brought capital flow volatility to the forefront of global coordination discussions 
and were even able to shape policy language in terms of communiqués, state-
ments, and declarations.
The G20 communiqué form the Seoul Summit broke ground first. As discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5, South Korea engaged in traditional and third- generation 
cross-border financial regulations throughout the post-crisis period. Indeed, in 
2010 South Korea was in the midst of implementing some of its stiffest regula-
tions. Although 2010 is characterized as a key year in the capital inflow surges to 
EMDs, the G8 communiqués did not mention the issue. In contrast, at the Seoul 
Summit, South Korea, Brazil, and other countries wanted to ensure they had the 
policy space to deploy their domestic regulations and moved to put the issue on 
the agenda. The final communiqué of the 2010 finance ministers meeting states, 
“we have agreed to prioritize the following issues on the agenda for the Seoul 
Summit: . . . Further work on macro-prudential policy frameworks, including 
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tools to help mitigate the impact of excessive capital flows” (G20 Information 
Centre 2010a). At the Seoul Summit, this was reiterated by the formulation of an 
action plan that in part resulted in the IMF institutional view; it stated, “In order 
to deal with systemic risks in the financial sector in a comprehensive manner and 
on an ongoing basis, we called on the FSB, IMF and BIS to do further work on 
macro-prudential policy frameworks, including tools to mitigate the impact of 
excessive capital flows”(G20 Information Centre 2010b).
The 2011 G7 summit also revealed little discussion of the issue, but it did note 
the following in the communiqué: “Excess volatility and disorderly movements 
in exchange rates have adverse implications for economic and financial stability” 
(G7/8 Finance Ministers Meetings 2011). At the G20 that year, capital flows were 
much more explicitly incorporated into finance ministers’ communiqué: “Today 
we agreed on a work program aimed at strengthening the functioning of the 
IMS [international monetary system], including through coherent approaches 
and measures to deal with potentially destabilizing capital flows, among which 
macroprudential measures, mindful of possible drawbacks” (G20 Information 
Centre 2011a).
As we have seen, at the 2011 G20 meetings EMDs proposed and, together with 
industrialized country leaders, presented the “G20 Coherent Conclusions for the 
Management of Capital Flows Drawing on Country Experience”(G20 Informa-
tion Centre 2011b; see chapter 6). The “Coherent Conclusions” was signed by 
finance ministers and central bank governors, and subsequently by the G20 heads 
of state. This document stands in contrast to the IMF institutional view and to 
any documents solely articulated by the G7/8:
Capital flow management measures may constitute part of a broader 
approach to protect economies from shocks. In circumstances of high 
and volatile capital flows, capital flow management measures can 
complement and be employed alongside, rather than substitute for, ap-
propriate monetary, exchange rate, foreign reserve management and 
prudential policies.
Both push and pull factors, such as global liquidity conditions, 
long-term growth prospects, and global risk perception, play a role in 
determining size and composition of capital flows. Any country that 
has the potential to affect others through its national policy decisions 
(including, in this particular context, exchange rate management poli-
cies, monetary policy in reserve currency issuing countries and regions, 
regulatory and supervisory policies, and capital flow management 
measures) should take the potential impact of such spillovers into ac-
count when weighing different policy options consistent with national 
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 macroeconomic frameworks. These policies should be the object of reg-
ular, credible and even-handed multilateral surveillance to assess both 
their individual impact and aggregate spillover effects. (G20 Informa-
tion Centre 2011b)
This effort was initiated by Brazil at the G20 and co-authored with Germany. 
Germany had sought EMD financial assistance at the 2011 meetings for Greece 
and other eurozone countries in crisis. Brazil capitalized on this to leverage the 
“Coherent Conclusions.” During this period of cross-border financial turbu-
lence, this is a milestone; an EMD had proposed and brokered a significant dec-
laration justifying the use of cross-border financial regulations and significantly 
less restraining than the IMF institutional view. As noted earlier, this document 
was used to wedge open more maneuvering room at the IMF, where EMDs had 
less voting clout.
Finally, in 2013 the BRICS led an effort to have the industrialized nations 
acknowledge and pledge to monitor the spillover impacts of their monetary 
policies. In early 2013, the US Federal Reserve had begun to signal that it would 
taper off its loose monetary policy. This created jitters in many EMD markets, 
and capital began to flee, resulting in India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, and South 
Africa seeing significant depreciations in their currencies. The 2013 G7 summit 
reaffirmed the commitments of the industrialized countries to their macroeco-
nomic policies. In contrast, the G20 finance ministers’ statement was starkly dif-
ferent: “Monetary policy should be directed towards domestic . . . and continuing 
to support economic recovery. . . . We commit to monitor and minimize the 
negative spillovers on other countries of policies implemented for domestic pur-
poses” (G20 Information Centre 2013). At the G20 meetings in Russia, BRICS 
had simultaneously negotiated the details of a reserve currency pool that would 
leverage $100–500 billion in reserves. This gave the coalition significant leverage 
at the meetings, with even the industrialized-country finance ministers wanting 
to go to the BRIC side meetings. The specter of this pool was used as intraforum 
leverage to get more concessions at the G20.
These significant changes in new policies on capital flows gained by EMDs at 
the G20 were not matched by positive economic outcomes, however. Macroeco-
nomic policy across the industrialized nations and EMDs remained uncoordi-
nated despite G20 pledges. In the absence of currency coordination, 2009–2011 
became a period of “currency war”—with the United States, Japan, and China 
debasing their currencies to some extent and many EMDs following. In the ab-
sence of macroeconomic policy coordination, many EMDs were shocked when 
the Fed announced that it would taper off its loose monetary policy in May 
2013 and were equally surprised when the Fed did not taper off those policies 
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in September 2013. These moves by the United States caused, in part, signifi-
cant exchange rate volatility and subsequent financial amplification effects across 
EMDs. During the G20 meetings from 2008 to 2013, there was a full sudden stop 
in 2009, a massive surge from 2009 to 2011, and significant capital flight in 2013, 
all causing economic disruption. But this time the United States did not shun 
EMD efforts to mitigate the harmful impacts through the use of cross-border 
financial regulations, as it had during past crises.
The Rise of Investment Protectionism?
The G20 can partially take pride in preventing the adoption of a rash of trade 
barriers in the wake of the crisis. At every G20 summit since the global financial 
crisis, the final communiqué committed to restraining member nations from 
taking protectionist measures. It is a remarkable achievement that no country 
had a “Smoot-Hawley” moment, putting major protections in place that would 
have distorted world trade and growth. The US Smoot-Hawley tariffs had been 
imposed on US imports during the Great Depression to great detriment to the 
world economy. Recall that, according to Kindleberger (1986), one of the key 
public goods is keeping markets open during recessions. As proposed at the 1944 
Bretton Woods meetings, the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT; which later became the World Trade Organization, WTO) in 
1947 as an attempt to provide this collective good. Indeed, institutional arrange-
ments at the WTO provided EMDs a mechanism to push back the United States 
when it attempted to put “Buy America” provisions into the fiscal stimulus pack-
age. From 2008 to 2011, the WTO and numerous independent assessments saw 
no significant moves toward protectionism. The WTO considered this its great-
est victory in what otherwise was a difficult period (during which it was in the 
midst of a gridlock in its longest running negotiation in its history). After 2011, 
however, both the WTO and independent analysts started to see protectionist 
measures adopted. But, although these studies show that there was an increase 
in trade measures, there was little significant impact on actual trade flows in the 
world economy (World Trade Organization [WTO] 2011; Evenett 2013; Mont-
petit et al. 2011; Drezner, 2014).
As we will see, however, the G20 then overgeneralized this observation by mis-
diagnosing the regulation of cross-border finance as “investment protectionism” 
in its further efforts to monitor trade policy in the wake of the crisis. Following 
the G20 call against the rise of “protectionism,” the OECD and UN Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) constructed the concept of invest-
ment protectionism and extended their monitoring of protectionist measures 
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to  investment policy. These efforts specifically targeted cross-border financial 
regulations, among many other policies. The term investment protectionism dates 
back to a 2008 article by the right-of-center US think tank, American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI). In an article published shortly after the crisis, Claude Barfield 
made a case that measures blocking foreign investment were just as significant 
as trade measures and called on US President Barack Obama to lead an effort 
to prevent such protectionism (Barfield 2008). This language was adopted by 
the G20 when the OECD (a longtime supporter of the deregulation of invest-
ment markets) and UNCTAD produced a joint 2009 report on investment mea-
sures in response to the G20 communiqué calling for restraints on protectionism 
(OECD-UNCTAD 2013). Between 2009 and 2012, the OECD and UNCTAD is-
sued nine reports to the G20, and they continue to do so. In addition to restric-
tions on FDI, the OECD-UNCTAD reports singled out cross-border financial 
regulations as  protectionist—including measures used in Brazil, South Africa, 
and many of the countries discussed in this book.
This move was largely missed or ignored by outside observers, but it made 
EMD governments very uneasy. Two independent groups monitoring trade pol-
icy in the wake of the crisis, Global Trade Alert and the G20 Information Centre, 
continued to use the traditional definition of protectionism as trade measures in 
their analyses.
The G20 redefinition of investment regulation as protectionist goes far be-
yond economic theory. As we have seen in chapter 3, the economic case for de-
regulating cross-border financial markets is far weaker than for trade; this has 
repeatedly been echoed by Jagdish Bhagwhati (1997), an eminent trade theorist. 
Alan Beattie, Financial Times columnist, was one of the few outside observers 
who picked up on this redefinition early. Writing in the International Economy, 
Beattie (2008) rightly argues that calling investment regulation “protectionism” 
is conceptually and theoretically weak and urges that the term investment pro-
tectionism not be used for sake of clarity. What is most inconsistent about this 
G20 approach is that G20 leaders at the highest level endorsed a set of ”Coherent 
Conclusions” justifying the very policies that G20 reports are currently singling 
out as protectionist.
Regulating Derivatives at Both Ends?
The G20 had implicitly promised to regulate capital flows at both ends, as Keynes 
and White had articulated in the run-up to the Bretton Woods conference (see 
chapter 2). To date, the G20 has failed in this effort by standing quiet as the 
United States violated the G20 agreement to harmonize margin requirements on 
derivatives across the countries in the group.
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As early as 2009, the G20 committed to regulate over-the-counter (OTC) de-
rivatives by forging rules that would require derivatives to be traded on an ex-
change or be subject to higher capital requirements. At the Cannes summit in 
2011, the G20 agreed to harmonize margin requirements on derivatives products 
as well. The US Dodd-Frank Act was among the first reforms in the industrialized 
countries to regulate derivatives in this manner. Under Dodd-Frank, the United 
States will subject derivatives to a central clearing requirement that will require 
all derivatives dealers to register with a clearinghouse and be subject to margin 
requirements. Posting margins would increase the cost of leverage and effectively 
reduce the amount of capital available when engaging in the carry trade. Central 
clearing has the potential to regulate the carry trade on both ends as well.
As noted in chapter 4, FX derivatives instruments have been an important 
part of the carry trade, and exceptions create the incentive for investors to re-
structure their carry trade positions toward the exempted parts of the market. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the daily turnover 
rate for FX transactions is now US$5.3 trillion, up from US$1.2 trillion in 2001. 
Figure 7.1 shows that the largest and fastest growing area of the FX market is FX 
derivatives in the form of foreign exchange swaps. As we have seen, FX derivative 


















FiGure 7.1. Daily foreign exchange turnover in the world economy,  
1998–2013 (Bank for International Settlements 2013).
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Requiring that US financial entities place margin requirements on FX de-
rivatives would implicitly be a form of regulating capital flows on both ends, 
as discussed by White and Keynes. The third-generation capital account regu-
lations put in place by EMDs are a form of regulating the harmful aspects of 
the FX derivatives trade on the EMD end. Because of the sheer magnitude and 
sophistication of those markets, however, they have proved difficult for EMDs 
to regulate on a sustained basis. We have seen that such regulations have some 
positive impact (see chapter 4) but not enough to fully stem financial instability. 
The Brazilian FX derivatives regulations had only a partial impact given that the 
Brazilian market is nondeliverable and largely conducted offshore. Thus, the Bra-
zilian regulations had jurisdiction only over financial entities based in Brazil that 
had one side of a particular position in the FX derivatives market. The regula-
tions created an incentive for investors to engage not with counterparties located 
in Brazil but, rather, with large investment firms in the United States and Europe. 
If the United States and Europe instituted higher margin requirements for FX 
derivatives and derivatives had to be traded openly, this would raise the cost of 
the carry trade and implicitly be a form of regulating the market on both ends.
But a blow was struck to these possibilities in November 2012 when the US 
Treasury Department exempted FX swaps and forwards from the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Nondeliverable forwards, FX options, and currency swaps are still subject 
to regulation, however (Brush 2012). Timothy Geithner, then treasury secretary, 
argued that FX swaps and forwards were not a key part of the crisis in the United 
States and were already traded in a transparent market. To the contrary, in-depth 
investigative reports have shown that these exemptions were the result of an 
intense lobbying effort by financial interests in the United States and abroad. 
Deutsche Banke, the Bank of New York Mellon Corp, UBS, Goldman Sachs, and 
other financial lobbyists entered into over 1,000 contacts with US regulators on 
these issues and attended more than one-third of the 2,100 sessions held by regu-
lators. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association paid upward of 
$3 million to lobbyists for these efforts (Brush and Schmidt 2013).
Political economy of Global  
cooperation on capital Flows
Despite some remarkable strides in constructing new policies in goals, commu-
niqués, and declarations, in the wake of the crisis the economic outcomes in 
terms of the provision of public goods were not well provided by the United 
States or the G20. As we have seen, including EMDs as part of coordinating bod-
ies yielded some significant new policy language that, indeed, allowed a loose 
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regime of cooperative decentralization. Nation-states pledged to recover from 
the crisis and put in place financial regulatory reforms to prevent future crises, 
not through strong international standards but in ways pertaining to their own 
national circumstances. They also pledged to coordinate these efforts to ensure 
they were consistent enough so as to restore financial stability to the global sys-
tem. Moreover, EMDs broadened the conversation about the global economy 
compared to the discussion and subsequent statements made in the G7/8. They 
used the G20 as an opportunity to negotiate an official declaration on the gov-
ernance of capital flows. The “Coherent Conclusions” on the management of 
capital flows sent a significant signal that EMD efforts to regulate capital flows 
were sanctioned. It also provided fodder for EMD efforts at the IMF.
There were significant economic outcomes as well. For the first time, some 
EMDs were able to obtain liquidity from outside the controversial and stigma-
tized IMF. By providing bilateral swap agreements to EMDs, the United States 
and China were able to mitigate the sudden stop that occurred immediately after 
the financial crisis. Another positive policy outcome was that EMDs were able 
to use the WTO to (partly) stem some of the protectionist measures in the US 
stimulus bill. In hindsight, however, the most significant economic outcomes 
remained elusive. Currency swings were rife throughout the period, finance was 
pro-cyclical, and financial fragility became accentuated.
Moreover, there were also significant setbacks in terms of a lack of new poli-
cies. The redefinition of investment regulations as investment protectionism was, 
until recently, largely missed by EMDs. As we have seen, reports issued to the G20 
were initiated by the OECD and UNCTAD based on a broad interpretation of 
G20 communiqué language about the need to resist protectionist acts in the wake 
of the crisis. The OECD and UNCTAD have long been advocates of investment 
liberalization in general and of capital account liberalization in particular. In fact, 
there is no economic theory that equates investment liberalization to trade liber-
alization. And, of course, branding capital account regulations as protectionism is 
inconsistent with numerous G20 communiqués and the “Coherent Conclusions.”
A second and potentially more damaging setback was the exemption of cer-
tain FX derivatives from the Dodd-Frank Act. As we have seen, the FX derivatives 
market was one of the primary channels that allowed the crisis to become global 
and that caused a surge in capital inflows in the wake of the crisis. The regulation 
of FX derivatives in developed countries, especially the United States, would sig-
nificantly to regulate capital flows at the source countries, and, with EMD regu-
lation, regulate them at both ends. The G20 still says that those sectors that are 
exempted will have to post higher capital requirements. Yet most FX derivatives 
transactions occur off balance sheet and sometimes even in offshore nondeliver-
able forward markets—areas very hard to target.
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Why did the major steps forward in inclusiveness and discourse not lead to 
subsequent gains in economic outcomes? Different combinations of power, in-
stitutions, and ideas explain both the gains and setbacks with respect to the po-
litical economy of global coordination on cross-border financial flows. Perhaps 
the best way to summarize the state of the G20 on the issue of providing public 
goods related to cross-border financial flows is that it is caught in what Catherine 
Weaver (2008) refers to as a hypocrisy trap. Weaver, in an in-depth analysis of the 
World Bank, defines a hypocrisy trap as the “persistent failure [of an institution] 
to act in accordance with its own ideals” (2008, 2) that results in “distinct and 
observable gaps or inconsistencies between the theories, goals and ‘best practices’ 
organizations claim to uphold and the actual policy agendas and instruments 
they employ” (2008, 176–77).
Power and connectedness go a long way in explaining both the inconsistent 
gains and setbacks for EMDs with respect to the coordination of capital flows. 
The relative gains in market power, financial interconnectedness, and reserve ac-
cumulation gave EMDs more bargaining power with the Fed, the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC), and at the G20. Key EMDs were able to secure liquidity lines 
outside the IMF, through the Fed and PBOC, because they were key trading or 
investment partners with the United States—their fates had become tied, and it 
was now in the interests of the United States and China to provide help. If those 
countries had also had major financial crises, it would further hurt the United 
States and China. There is also some evidence that the United States used this to 
its advantage by making EMD alignment with US positions at the G20 a condi-
tion of EMD participation in the swap lines.
At the G20, the market power of BRICS was accentuated by the nature of the 
G20 as an institution. Unlike in the IMF or in the asymmetric bilateral bargain-
ing forums at the G20, members of the BRICS coalition have an equal say. Key 
EMDs, especially BRICS, were able to consolidate this power by working in a 
coalition at the G20 and by exerting both intraforum and extra-forum leverage 
to achieve some of their objectives. As we have seen, EMDs at the G20 exerted 
intraforum leverage by forging the “Coherent Conclusions” on capital flows. In 
this case, EMDs had the upper hand because the Western members of the G20 
were actively seeking funds from EMDs to help save certain eurozone countries 
from collapse. They made the negotiation of the “Coherent Conclusions” a con-
dition of discussing EMD finance for the crisis in Europe. Exerting extra-forum 
leverage, BRICS negotiated a reserve currency pool agreement and a BRICS de-
velopment bank on the sidelines of the G20. This gave EMDs the clout to insert 
language about capital flows and the negative spillovers of Western monetary 
policies into G20 communiqués.
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Market power, the interconnectedness of financial and trade systems, 
and the broad institutional mandate of the G20 allowed for a more balanced 
North-South give and take there than in the IMF or in FTAs and BITs. For the first 
time, the industrialized countries needed the EMDs for trade, to prevent internal 
collapse, and for external finance for Europe. Because of the nature of power and 
institutional arrangements, EMDs and industrialized nations were able to agree 
on certain new policies despite the fact that they had different ideas about the na-
ture of their individual policies. On swaps and the sudden stop, EMDs, the PBOC, 
and the Fed were all on the same page—they agreed that the costs of not extending 
swap lines outweighed the benefits to all parties—thus, there was a strong policy 
outcome. The spillover effects of US monetary policy and the right to regulate 
capital flows were another matter. The United States had a different idea bout 
the costs and benefits than did EMDs. The industrialized countries, particularly 
the United States, thought that the global benefits of a loose US monetary policy 
outweighed the costs (Bernanke 2013). Some EMDs thought those costs were too 
high to bear, but EMD leverage was able to extract concessions only in terms of 
forging new policy. US power prevailed in the economic outcomes.
The EMD gains in new policy language did not fully translate into gains in 
economic outcomes because the United States still maintains primary economic 
power in the world economy. The fact that the US dollar is still the core reserve 
currency and that the US economy is still the major source of foreign trade and 
finance puts EMDs at a structurally weaker bargaining position despite the seem-
ingly even institutional distribution of power at the G20. This is accentuated by 
the power of the financial sector in the West. As we have seen with the FX deriva-
tives exemption in the Dodd-Frank Act, the US financial lobby has an enormous 
amount of resources and clout.
Moreover, the institutional structure of the central banks further solidifies the 
current power dynamics. The US Fed acted in what it saw as in its interests and 
in its mandate of maintaining stable prices and full employment in the United 
States. If the United States instituted a more rigorous and targeted fiscal stimu-
lus, the Fed believed that it could achieve both objectives—and perhaps help 
the world economy because the subsequent economic growth would trigger the 
demand for global goods. The Fed has no explicit institutional mandate to think 
about world policy. And even if the Fed did agree with EMDs on the need to 
cooperate on financial flows, it would have had a hard time explicitly doing so.
Ideas about the coordination of capital flows were not aligned either. As al-
ready mentioned, the Fed thought that if the US government had a stronger fiscal 
position, the benefits of a US recovery would outweigh the costs of the negative 
spillovers from US monetary policy. Moreover, there was a lack of constructive 
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ideas in terms of policy alternatives on the part of the EMDs. Brazil and others 
at G20 meetings criticized US monetary policy in particular, implying that the 
United States should raise interest rates or stop quantitative easing. Such talk 
was unacceptable to the United States, and for good reason. Some independent 
experts did suggest some measures that would have allowed the United States 
to cooperate more actively. Robert Pollin (2012) suggested a maximum reserve 
ratio on US commercial banks that would require them to lend. If coupled with 
tax credits to small and medium-size enterprises in the United States, US banks 
would have had a better incentive to lend for employment-based growth activi-
ties in the United States rather than to hoard cash or send it to EMDs. Others 
emphasized that margin requirements on FX and other derivatives would implic-
itly help steer investment away from areas of greatest turbulence (Griffith-Jones 
and Gallagher 2011a, 2011b). The maximum reserve ratios were proposed to the 
Fed but were not carried further. The margin requirements on FX derivatives 
could have been a cornerstone of G20 financial cooperation but fell prey to the 
US financial lobby and the lack of attention to the matter by EMD G20 mem-
bers. There are no public comments from EMDs to the rulemaking bodies of the 
Dodd-Frank Act on this matter.
What was left, then, was indeed a very different policy output than in cri-
ses past. The United States and other Western powers officially acknowledged 
through G20 communiqués and the “Coherent Conclusions” that there were 
negative spillovers from industrialized country monetary policies and that EMDs 
had the policy space to regulate cross-border finance to mitigate the harmful 
aspects of those spillovers. This is a major step forward from past crises but not 
enough to provide the key public goods necessary to prevent and mitigate finan-
cial fragility in the world economy.
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TRADING AWAY FINANCIAL STABILITY
Reconstructing Capital Account Liberalization 
as Trade and Investment Policy
Brazil and South Korea were able to reregulate cross-border finance, in part, be-
cause they were careful to carve out the policy space to do so in their trade and 
investment treaties. And, as we have seen, the United States was divided in its 
support for amending the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agree-
ment because it had moved to forge strong international standards for free capi-
tal movements in the trade and investment regime (see chapter 2).
Capital account liberalization was then resurrected and reconstructed as “trade 
in financial services” by powerful interest groups and countries still hoping to ob-
tain strong international standards for the movement of capital. As we have seen, 
some emerging-market and developing countries (EMDs) were able to maintain 
the policy space in the trade and investment arena that they had fought hard to 
protect under the IMF. The most successful saw that cross-border finance needed 
to be regulated and were able to flex their newfound economic power in institu-
tions that gave EMDs more equal say. The least successful were either not par-
ticularly convinced that capital flows needed to be regulated or were weaker states 
in institutional arrangements that favored the more powerful. In the wake of the 
global financial crisis, there was a revived effort to maintain and expand policy 
space for regulating cross-border finance at the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and in free-trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
At the multilateral level, that is, at the WTO, the project was only partially 
successful. The majority of industrialized nations, which already had open capi-
tal accounts, agreed to liberalize trade in financial services, and only a limited 
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number of EMDs followed them. What is more, the WTO has safeguards that 
may give nations the flexibility to regulate flows under some circumstances. But 
a proliferation of FTAs and BITs were enacted between industrialized countries 
and EMDs in which many EMDs agreed to restrict their ability to regulate cross-
border finance. Interestingly, many EMDs still enjoy the policy space to regulate 
capital flows under the WTO, but their FTAs and BITs leave them far less flex-
ibility to regulate cross-border finance—especially those treaties signed with the 
United States.
These differences between the WTO and FTAs/BITs are summarized in Table 8.1. 
The WTO allows nations to deploy regulations on both inflows and outflows as 
long as the nations have not committed to the liberalization of certain financial 
services. If a nation has made commitments in financial services, restrictions 
on capital flows are not permitted without being subject to claims. There are 
safeguard measures that may be applied, however. If a nation that has liberalized 
financial services does restrict capital inflows or outflows, that nation could be 
subject to a dispute filed by another nation-state. In addition, trade sanctions can 
be put in place if the nation is found in violation of WTO rules.
In contrast, and unlike the treaties of other industrialized countries, US BITs 
and FTAs do not permit restrictions on inflows or outflows. If a nation does 
Table 8.1 Policy space for cross-border financial regulations
iMF WTo us biTs/FTas




Current account No No No No
Capital account
Inflows Yes Noa No No
Outflows Yes Noa No No
Safeguard provisions?
Current account Yesb Yesb Yesb Yesb
Capital account
Inflows N/A No No Yes
Outflows N/A Yes No Yes
Number of countries covered 186 69 58
Dispute resolution format Member vote State-to-state Investor state Investor state






Note: BITs, bilateral investment treaties; FTAs, free-trade agreements; IMF, International Monetary Fund; N/A, not 
applicable; WTO, World Trade Organization.
a Regulations fully permissible for nations that have not committed to liberalize cross-border trade in financial 
services.
b Permitted only under IMF approval.
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restrict either type of capital flow, it can be subject to investor-state arbitration 
whereby the government of the host state pays for the “damages” accrued to the 
foreign investor. The BITs and FTAs of other major capital exporters, such as 
those negotiated by the European Union, Japan, China, and Canada, either com-
pletely carve host-country legislation on capital account regulations out of the 
agreements (therefore, permitting them) or allow regulation as a temporary safe-
guard on inflows and outflows to prevent or mitigate a financial crisis. The trea-
ties with the United States do not have either measure, except in a few cases that 
include a grace period in which foreign investors are not allowed to file claims 
against a host state until after the crisis has subsided.
EMDs were able to preserve such policy space at the WTO because the nature 
of the institution allows for consensus and, thus, interesting coalitions among 
EMDs have arisen (for a good discussion of policy space, see Mayer 2009). In 
contrast, in both FTAs and BITs between an industrialized countries and EMDs, 
asymmetric bargaining power and collective action problems often lead EMDs 
to trade away their ability to reregulate cross-border finance.
In this chapter, I trace how, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies, industrialized nations moved the forum for capital account liberalization 
to the trading regime; I also analyze the extent to which nations must liberalize 
the capital account and the extent to which nations have the ability to regulate 
cross-border financial flows under the WTO, BITs, and FTAs. I then examine how 
some nations are attempting to reclaim or preserve their policy space for regulat-
ing cross-border finance in the wake of the global financial crisis and discuss the 
political economy factors that led some countries to trade away the policy space 
to regulate cross-border finance.
The World Trade organization
By the late 1990s, industrialized countries were also effectively restricting the 
ability of EMDs to regulate capital flows through their trade and investment trea-
ties; this has been almost completely overlooked in the literature on the political 
economy of governing capital flows. Most industrialized countries granted each 
other market access through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS; 
a WTO treaty that came into force in 1995), particularly through the Annexes 
on Financial Services to the GATS, agreed on in 1997 and put into effect shortly 
thereafter.
The United States had spearheaded a move to include services in global 
trade negotiations for the WTO Uruguay Round (1986–1992). Because of the 
strong US financial lobby, the United States particularly took the lead role in the 
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Box 8.1: General Agreement on Trade in Services Modes 
and Financial Services
Mode 1: Cross-border supply is defined to cover services flows from the territory 
of one Member into the territory of another Member (e.g., banking or architec-
tural services transmitted via telecommunications or mail);
Mode 2: Consumption abroad happens when the consumer travels outside of 
the country to access a service such as tourism, education, health care, and so forth;
Mode 3: Commercial presence occurs when the user of a financial service 
is immobile and the provider is mobile, implying that the financial service sup-
plier of one WTO Member establishes a territorial presence, possibly through 
ownership or lease, in another Member’s territory to provide a financial service 
(e.g., subsidiaries of foreign banks in a domestic territory); and
Mode 4: Presence of natural persons are when financial services are supplied 
by individuals of one country in the territory of another.
 liberalization of financial services (Hoekman and Kosecki 2009). Indeed, ser-
vices used to be referred to in the economics literature as nontradables but were 
reconstructed as “trade in services” in the GATS under four modes of supply 
(see box 8.1) Under the GATS, nations can liberalize across these four modes of 
financial services. The two most important modes in terms of the capital account 
are Mode 1 (the cross-border supply of financial services) and Mode 3 (the estab-
lishment of a commercial presence by financial service providers).
The GATS provides a general framework for disciplining policies affecting 
“trade in services” and establishes a commitment for periodic future negotia-
tions. The GATS is divided into “General Obligations” and “Specific Commit-
ments.” General obligations bind all members. These include the obligation to 
provide most-favored-nation treatment to all WTO members (Article II) and 
some disciplines on nondiscriminatory domestic regulations that are still being 
fully developed (Article VI). Specific commitments apply only to the extent that 
countries choose to adopt them by listing them in their country-specific sched-
ules. These cover primarily the disciplines of Market Access (Article XVI) and 
National Treatment (Article XVII) (Raghavan 2009).
Generally speaking, GATS negotiations and commitments follow a “posi-
tive list” approach, in which nations commit to bind only to specified sectors to 
GATS disciplines. This stands in contrast with a “negative list” approach, which 
is more common in goods negotiations and in most FTAs. In a negative list (or 
top-down) approach, negotiators assume that all sectors will be covered in some 
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way, except a handful that are listed by particular nations. WTO members have 
recourse to binding dispute settlement procedures, in which perceived violations 
of GATS commitments can be challenged and retaliatory sanctions or payments 
can be authorized as compensation.
For this discussion, I focus on three effects of the GATS:
• Nations that did not make Mode 1 or Mode 3 commitments under the 
GATS are free to regulate cross-border capital flows.
• Nations that did make Mode 1 or Mode 3 commitments are not permit-
ted to regulate cross-border finance if it is part of the service that has been 
liberalized.
• Member countries may be able to temporarily derogate from such com-
mitments through two exceptions written into the GATS.
Capital Account Liberalization, Cross-Border Financial 
Regulations, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
Unbeknownst to many, GATS commitments require the opening of the capital 
account. Nations that make commitments under Modes 1 and 3 for financial 
services are required to permit capital to flow freely to the extent that such capital 
is an integral part of the service provided. GATS Article XVI on Market Access 
references capital liberalization:
If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the 
supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subpara-
graph 2(a) of Article I [i.e. Mode 1] and if the cross-border movement 
of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Member is thereby 
committed to allow such movement of capital. If a Member undertakes 
a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service 
through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article 
I [i.e. Mode 3], it is thereby committed to allow related transfers of capital 
into its territory. (Article XVI, footnote 8; emphasis added)
Liberalizing financial services under the GATS does not require the wholesale 
liberalization of the capital account per se. Sydney Key notes that “the bottom 
line is that if a country makes a commitment to liberalize trade with respect to 
a particular financial service in the GATS, it is also making a commitment to 
liberalize most capital movements associated with the trade liberalization com-
mitment” (2003, 20). In 2010, the WTO reiterated that liberalizing cross-border 
trade in financial services (Mode 1) may need an open capital account to  facilitate 
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such trade that, of course, results in international capital flows. A similar scenario 
can be outlined for Mode 3 liberalization. A loan extended by a foreign bank to 
a domestic client requiring capital to be transferred from the parent company 
of the foreign bank to its subsidiary abroad would also require an open capital 
account (WTO 2010).
The IMF cites the following Mode 1 example, where a loan extended by a 
domestic bank to a foreign customer using internationally raised capital creates 
international capital flows and international trade in financial services. To the ex-
tent that a financial services transaction involved an international capital trans-
action, the capital account needs to be opened for the former to take place freely 
(Kireyev 2002). Another paper by an IMF official provides examples of how the 
GATS Mode 1 essentially requires the liberalization of a capital account:
to the extent that a member restricts its residents from borrowing from 
non-residents, a member’s commitment to allow banks of other mem-
bers to provide cross-border lending services to its nationals would re-
quire a relaxation of this restriction. Similarly, if a member also makes 
a commitment to permit non-resident banks to provide cross-border 
deposit services, such a commitment would require the member to lib-
eralize restrictions it may have imposed on the ability of residents to 
hold accounts abroad. In these respects, the GATS serves to liberalize 
the making of both inward and outward investments. (Hagan 2000, 24)
That said, if a nation has not listed cross-border trade in financial services 
(Mode 1) or the commercial presence of foreign services (Mode 3), that coun-
try may be free to regulate capital flows as it sees fit. Indeed, numerous EMDs 
have listed neither the liberalization of cross-border trade in financial services 
nor Mode 3 commitments under the GATS. According to the WTO, the major-
ity of EMDs made relatively fewer commitments in financial services related 
to capital markets (WTO 2010). At the conclusion of the GATS, IMF analysts 
found that about sixteen countries had significant Mode 1 commitments in fi-
nancial services, while around fifty had significant Mode 3 commitments for the 
 sector—this included most OECD countries and just a few EMDs (Valckx 2002; 
Kireyev 2002).
Table 8.2 lists the nations that are most committed to open capital accounts 
under the WTO-GATS. These thirty-seven nations have committed to schedul-
ing the liberalization of some combination of Modes 1, 2, and 3 under the last 
round of GATS negotiations. (New negotiations are currently underway; Valckx 
2002). These are also the nations that are most prone to being disciplined under 
the GATS. Note that there is not a reassuring record of countries successfully 
invoking exceptions at the WTO.
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If the capital account regulations of a member nation are found to be in 
violation of its GATS commitments, the ability of the nation to invoke one or 
more of the exceptions in the GATS text is a matter of significant legal debate 
and is thus far untested by an actual WTO tribunal. A first option may be to 
claim that the measure was taken for prudential reasons under Article 2(a) 
of the Annex on Financial Services. This exception reads, “Notwithstanding 
any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from 
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of inves-
tors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed 
by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions 
of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s 
commitments or obligations under the Agreement.” It is also possible to argue 
that inflows controls, such as unremunerated reserve requirements or inflows 
taxes, were of a prudential nature, especially given the new economics of capital 
controls (see chapter 9).
Legal scholars and EMDs have expressed concern that Article XII may not 
pertain to regulations on inflows to prevent crises and that the language in the 
prudential carve-out may pertain only to microprudential (individual financial 
institution) stability rather than macroprudential financial stability (Hagan 2000; 
Viterbo 2012; Tucker 2013). Moreover, the sentence stating that prudential mea-
sures “shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or 
obligations under the Agreement” is regarded by some as self-cancelling and thus 
of limited utility (Tucker and Wallach 2009; Raghavan 2009). Others, however, 
Table 8.2 Countries most vulnerable to actions against regulating capital flows 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
Argentina Kuwait Qatar
Australia Kyrgyz Republic Romania
Bahrain Latvia Sierra Leone
Canada Macau Singapore
Ecuador Malawi Solomon Islands
Estonia Mauritius South Africa
Gabon Mongolia Switzerland
Gambia Mozambique Tunisia
Hong Kong New Zealand Turkey
Hungary Nigeria United Arab Emirates
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do not see the measure as self-contradictory but rather as a means of catching 
hidden opportunistic and protectionist measures masquerading as prudential 
(Van Aaken and Kurtz 2009). Nations have requested that the WTO elaborate 
on what is and is not covered in the prudential exception, but such requests have 
fallen on deaf ears (Cornford 2004).
If the capital account regulations of a member nation are found to be in 
violation of its GATS commitments in financial services, it may also be able to 
invoke Article XII, “Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments,” which 
states:
In the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial dif-
ficulties or threat thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain restrictions 
on trade in services on which it has undertaken specific commitments, 
including on payments or transfers for transactions related to such 
commitments. It is recognized that particular pressures on the balance 
of payments of a Member in the process of economic development or 
economic transition may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, 
inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for 
the implementation of its programme of economic development or 
economic transition. (Article XII, para. 1)
The next paragraph in this article of the GATS specifies that such measures 
can be deployed as long as they do not discriminate among other WTO mem-
bers, are consistent with the IMF Articles (thus, pertain only to capital account 
controls), “avoid unnecessary damage” to other members, do “not exceed those 
necessary” to deal with the balance-of-payments problem, and are temporary 
and phased out progressively.
It may be extremely difficult for a capital account regulation to meet all these 
conditions, especially the hurdles dealing with the notion of “necessity,” a slip-
pery concept in trade law that countries have had difficulty proving. Moreover, 
concern has been expressed about the extent to which the balance-of-payments 
exception provides nations with the policy space for restrictions on capital in-
flows that are more preventative in nature and may occur before “serious” 
 balance-of-payments difficulties exist (Hagan 2000; Viterbo 2012; Gallagher and 
Stanley 2013).
In a nutshell, if a nation has not committed to liberalizing Modes 1 or 3 fi-
nancial services, then it is free to regulate cross-border finance as it sees fit. If it 
has made such commitments, it will find cross-border finance more difficult to 
regulate, although some untested exceptions may apply. What about for FTAs 
and BITs?
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us bilateral investment Treaties and Free-Trade 
agreements in comparative Perspective
FTAs and BITs, especially those engaging the United States, increasingly restrict 
the ability of nations to regulate capital flows. The investment provisions of US 
trade treaties (which are mimicked in US BITs) require that all forms of capi-
tal “move freely and without delay” among the parties to the treaty. Moreover, 
whereas GATS negotiations are of a positive list variety, FTA and BIT negotia-
tions deploy a negative list approach. At the GATS, disputes are settled between 
nation-states, but trade and investment treaties increasingly have provisions for 
an “investor-state” dispute settlement that allow a private investor to directly 
file a claim for damages against a signatory nation that regulates capital flows. 
Perhaps most concerning is that, for the most part, there are no exceptions or 
safeguards in the US treaties. This stands in contrast to EU, Japanese, and Cana-
dian treaties that provide exceptions for the use of capital controls under certain 
circumstances or carves them out altogether.
Investment Provisions in US Bilateral Investment  
Treaties and Free-Trade Agreements
The United States has engaged in investment treaty-making since its War of 
Independence through what were called Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation treaties. The successors to those agreements are the BITs, which the 
United States has been negotiating since 1977. The United States did not in-
vent BITs; Europeans had BITs going back to 1959. Indeed, there are now more 
than 2,000 BITs in existence. Beginning with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, US FTAs also have investment provisions analo-
gous to those found in BITs. In addition, BITs and FTAs include provisions on 
financial services.
BITs and the investment provisions in US FTAs have evolved over time. Nor-
mally, through an interagency process and with input from outside experts and 
interests, the United States puts together a Model BIT1 that serves as the template 
for negotiations for BITs and FTAs: “The model would be tendered to the other 
party at the beginning of negotiations with the hope that agreement would be 
reached on a text that did not differ substantively or even in a significant stylistic 
1. US Model BIT. Washington, DC, 2004. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.
pdf.
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way from the model. If too many departures from the model were demanded by 
the other party, then no BIT would be concluded” (Vandevelde 2008, 1).
Scholars have characterized the model BITs and subsequent treaties as oc-
curring in three waves:” from 1981 to early 1989, when thirty-five BITs were 
negotiated; from the early 1990s to 2002, when the NAFTA and a handful of BITs 
were signed; and from 2002 to the present, when FTAs with Chile, Singapore, and 
Central America were negotiated (Vandevelde 2008). In 2009, the United States 
engaged in a review of the 2004 Model BIT that formed the core of most US BITs 
and investment components of FTA. A new model was released in 2011.2
In terms of coverage, whereas the earliest BITs and FTAs focused almost 
solely on foreign direct investment, contemporary (third-wave) treaties cover 
both inflows and outflows of virtually all types of investment, including equi-
ties, securities, loans, derivatives, sovereign debt, and the financial services fa-
cilitators of such flows. According to Kenneth Vandevelde (2008), there are five 
general components of US BITs and subsequent provisions in US FTAs (listed in 
box 8.2). In addition to these core elements, US treaties often include some “ex-
ceptions,” such as for essential security and for matters related to taxation (gov-
erned under another body of US international law). Finally, post-2004 BITs have 
putative limitations on the ability of host states to reduce environmental or labor 
laws to attract foreign investment.
Box 8.2: Key Provisions of US Bilateral Investment Treaties
Minimum standard of treatment. An investor should enjoy a minimum stand-
ard of treatment, including national treatment and most-favored nation-states in 
both the preestablishment and post-establishment rights. On an absolute level, US 
investors are to receive “fair and equitable treatment and full protection in accord-
ance to customary international law.”
Restrictions on expropriation. BITs and FTAs strictly forbid the direct or indi-
rect expropriation of US investments absent prompt and full compensation.
Free transfers. US nationals and firms must be permitted to freely transfer pay-
ments in and out of a host country “without delay.”
No performance requirements. US BITs forbid nations from imposing perfor-
mance requirements such as local content rules, joint-venture and research-and-
development requirements, export requirements, and rules related to personnel 
decisions.
2. US Model BIT. Washington, DC, United States Department of State, 2010.
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Investor-state arbitration. In stark contrast to dispute settlement under the 
WTO and all other aspects of FTAs other than investment rules, US firms have 
the right to binding arbitration of disputes related to violations of the agreements. 
As is the case with most BITs worldwide, foreign firms do not have to file claims 
through governments but can take a claim to an arbitral panel, often the Inter-
national Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the World 
Bank, for any perceived violation of the principles.
Source: Vandevelde (2008).
Before we move forward, it should be underscored that these treaties elevate 
foreign investor rights over domestic investors in that they do not require the 
host-country firms to liberalize their investments, nor do they permit host- 
country investors to use investor-state arbitration (Hagan 2000).
Capital Account Regulations in US Trade  
and Investment Treaties
The United States has concluded forty-six BITs since 1977, and more recently it 
has used language that is very similar to BIT wording as part of the investment 
chapters of twelve US FTAs (Vandevelde 2008). These US-style investment rules 
include many more limitations on the ability of nations to regulate cross-border 
finance. Specifically, US investment rules:
• Do not permit restrictions on both capital inflows and outflows.
• Provide no clear safeguards for balance-of-payments exceptions, although 
some FTAs provide a grace period for filing investor-state claims.
• Elevate the rights of US capital investors over domestic capital investors. 
US investors can file claims against violating parties through an investor-
state dispute settlement process and receive financial compensation for 
violations, but domestic investors do not have this right.
The free transfer of funds to and from the United States is a core principle of 
US BITs and FTAs, as well as those of most other capital-exporting countries. 
When a host nation violates that principle, or if capital transfers violate the other 
principles, the host nation could be subject to an investor-state arbitration claim 
and be sued for damages. All US BITs and FTAs, therefore, restrict the ability of 
host nations to regulate capital flows (Anderson 2009a; Gallagher 2011), and all 
US BITs and FTAs require host nations to permit free transfers without delay of 
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all types of covered investments. Moreover, financial services are covered in BITs 
and are included in a separate chapter in FTAs. Analogous to the GATS, if a na-
tion commits to liberalizing financial services, it commits to the free flow of such 
investment as well. Note, however, that under the services chapters of US FTAs, 
dispute resolution is state to state.
Over the years, US treaties have listed numerous types of investments as being 
covered, such as securities, loans, FDIs, bonds (both sovereign and private), and 
derivatives. Treaties also make a point of stating that such a list is not exhaus-
tive. Taken together, the transfers provisions, along with the other principles of 
the agreements, ensure that an investment can enter and leave a nation freely. If 
the investment is restricted for some reason, the host nation can be subject to 
investor-state arbitration.
With one exception (NAFTA), US treaties do not include a balance-of-payments 
exception, as does the GATS. They do, however, have a prudential exception, similar 
to the one found in the GATS Annex on Financial Services (2010):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Treaty, a Party shall not be 
prevented from adopting or maintaining measures relating to financial 
services for prudential reasons*, including for the protection of inves-
tors, depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial services supplier, or to ensure the integrity and 
stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform 
with the provisions of this Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of 
avoiding the Party’s commitments or obligations under this Treaty.
* It is understood that the term “prudential reasons” includes the main-
tenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial responsibility of 
individual financial institutions or cross-border financial service sup-
pliers.
Many have expressed the same concerns about this exception as they have about 
the one in the GATS. Like the GATS, the last sentence of this prudential exception 
may be self-canceling (Key 2003; Raghavan 2009; Tucker and Wallach 2009; Van 
Aaken and Kurtz 2009; see also Robert Stumberg’s congressional testimony3). 
Even more concerning is that the term prudential reasons has a footnote that 
specifically defines it as “the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or 
3. Testimony of Robert Stumberg: Reform of Investment Protections. US House Committee on 
Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade. Washington, DC, May 14, 2009. http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/media/pdf/111/stumberg.pdf.
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financial responsibility of individual financial institutions or cross-border finan-
cial service suppliers.” Thus, the more macroprudential regulations of inflows of 
capital do not apply to US treaties (Gallagher et al. 2013).
Indeed, the United States has repeatedly said as much to its negotiating part-
ners. As discussed earlier, Chile deployed capital account regulations with some 
success. The United States negotiated FTAs with Chile and Singapore at the turn 
of the twenty-first century, and both went into force in 2004. But the limits on 
capital account regulations included in the US model became major sticking 
points for both Chile and Singapore. In fact, Robert Zoellick, head of the Of-
fice of the US Trade Representative (USTR), had to intervene with the finance 
minister of Chile to salvage the negotiations over this issue (Saez 2006). During 
those negotiations, the United States negotiated a “compromise” (the inclusion 
of a “cooling-off” provision under which a US investor cannot file a claim for a 
period of one year after the provision has been deployed) that, with some varia-
tions, has also been used in agreements with Singapore, Peru, and Colombia. 
Interestingly, however, it has not become a matter of practice. Such a cooling-
off period was not included as a provision in the 2004 or 2011 Model BIT or in 
the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA) or the FTAs with Panama and other nations.
The compromise cooling-off periods are illustrated in an Annex to the invest-
ment chapter of some agreements, such as the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement. 
The rationale is that the host nation may need to address or stem a financial 
crisis and that it should not be subject to claims in the middle of such action. 
However—and this is important—the cooling-off period allows a foreign inves-
tor to sue for damages related to capital controls that were deployed during the 
cooling-off year, although the investor cannot file the claim until after that year. 
To be clear: the claim for damages can be for a measure taken by the host country 
taken during the cooling-off year (Hornbeck 2003). Note also that these provi-
sions are not mutual. The cooling-off period is only for investors filing claims 
against “a Party other than the United States.”
Two US treaties do stand out. The NAFTA has a balance-of-payments excep-
tion and the South Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) has 
an annex to its investment chapter that grants South Korea the ability to deploy 
temporary capital account regulations. Article 2014(1) of NAFTA is the balance-
of-payments exception and is very similar to the GATS exception; it can be in-
voked when the host states “experience serious balance of payments difficulties, 
or the threat thereof.” Like similar exceptions at the WTO, use of the exception 
must be temporary and nondiscriminatory. The NAFTA provisions have thus 
raised concerns similar to those voiced about the balance-of-payments exception 
in the GATS. Although it may be possible to regulate the outflow of capital under 
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this provision when there is a serious crisis, regulating inflows as a preventative 
measure may be more difficult (Nadal 1996).
Beyond the academic community, the IMF has expressed concern that US 
FTAs and BITs do not provide enough flexibility to regulate the capital account. 
Around the time of the Chile and Singapore negotiations, senior IMF officials in 
the legal department wrote articles arguing that BITs should have at least tem-
porary derogations for balance-of-payments difficulties and that the cooling-
off period was not sufficient. Sean Hagan (2000) expressed concern that, if one 
nation forbids a host country from using capital controls on a temporary basis 
but the host country is permitted to use controls under agreements with other 
nations, then the controls will be discriminatory in nature and lead to distor-
tions. Deborah Siegel (2004), who called the cooling-off provisions “draconian,” 
expressed concern that the US transfers provisions raised jurisdictional issues 
with the IMF. The US provisions call for free transfers of all current transactions, 
but unlike WTO treaties and those of other capital exporters, the US provisions 
do not include mention of the ability of the IMF to recommend capital con-
trols as part of a financial program. Siegel argues that FTAs “create a risk that 
in complying with its obligations under the FTA, a member could be rendered 
ineligible to use the Fund’s resources under the Fund’s articles” (2004, 4). As we 
have seen in chapter 6, the IMF institutional view states, “The limited flexibility 
afforded by some bilateral and regional agreements in respect to liberalization 
obligations may create challenges for the management of capital flows. These 
challenges should be weighed against the agreements’ potential benefits. In par-
ticular, such agreements could be a step toward broader liberalization. However, 
these agreements in many cases do not provide appropriate safeguards or proper 
sequencing of liberalization, and could thus benefit from reform to include these 
protections” (IMF 2012b, 8).
Not only does US policy deviate from the GATS, but the investment provi-
sions in US FTAs and of US BITs stand in stark contrast to the treaties of other 
major capital-exporting nations. The European Union, Japan, Canada, and in-
creasingly China are major capital exporters. Each of these capital exporters has 
numerous BITs and FTAs with nations across the world. And loosely, the BITs of 
these nations have the same general characteristics found in US BITs. In contrast 
to the US treaties, however, regarding the use of capital account regulations to 
prevent and mitigate financial crises, all BITs and investment provisions of the 
FTAs of these exporters contain either a broad balance-of-payments safeguard 
exception or a controlled-entry exception, which allows a nation to deploy its 
domestic laws pertaining to the management of capital flows. Examples of the 
balance-of-payments approach can be found in the European Union–South Af-
rica and European Union–Mexico FTAs, the Japan–South Korea BIT, and the 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreements. The Japan-Korea 
BIT has language that clearly allows for restrictions on both inflows and outflows, 
presumably inspired by the 1997 crisis. The BIT states that the nations may vio-
late the transfers provisions (Salucuse 2010; Viterbo 2012).
As mentioned, another way capital account regulations are treated by other 
capital exporters in their FTAs and BITs is a controlled-entry exception (in which 
the domestic laws of the host nation regarding cross-border financial regulations 
are deferred to). The FTAs that Canada and the European Union have with Chile 
and Colombia each have a balance-of-payments safeguard and a controlled- 
entry deferment. As an example of a controlled-entry exception, is in the Annex 
of the investment chapter of the FTA between Canada and Colombia: “Colombia 
reserves the right to maintain or adopt measures to maintain or preserve the 
stability of its currency, in accordance with Colombian domestic legislation.”4
Controlled-entry provisions are to be found in BITs as well. The European 
Union does not sign many BITs as an entity, but its member states do. For ex-
ample, the China-Germany BIT states that transfers must comply with Chinese 
laws on exchange controls (Anderson 2009b). China has to approve all foreign 
inflows and outflows of short-term capital (IMF 2009b).
Interestingly, EU member-state BITs vary a great deal. Some, such as the 
China-Germany BIT and the UK-Bangladesh BIT, allow for a nation to defer to 
its own laws governing capital controls. In contrast, Sweden and Austria at one 
time had US-style BITs with no exceptions whatsoever. But the European Court 
of Justice ruled in 2009 that these BITs of Sweden and Austria with EMDs were 
in violation of their obligations under the EU treaty. Although the EU treaty 
requires EU members to allow for free transfers, it also allows members to have 
exceptions. The Court found that the Swedish and Austrian treaties were incom-
patible with the EU treaty and that such treaties must be renegotiated to include 
exceptions to the transfer provisions (Salacuse 2010).
It should be clear from the our discussion so far that the regulation of cross-
border finance is in fundamental violation of the core principal of US trade and 
investment treaties requiring the free transfer of funds without delay. That said, 
the United States does not have a large number of treaties at the time of this 
writing. Table 8.3 lists the countries that currently have the full policy space to 
regulate capital flows because they have not liberalized financial services under 
the WTO and do not have a trade or investment treaty with the United States. 
4. Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. Winnipeg, Canada, 2009. http://www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-
can-colombie.aspx.
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The first column of table 8.4 lists countries that may have the least amount of 
policy space to regulate capital flows; they have signed and ratified US FTAs or 
BITs with the United States. Only one of those countries, South Korea, has suc-
cessfully negotiated a controlled-entry clause for its regulations on cross-border 
finance. A handful of countries have annexes that allow for the cooling-off period 
for investor state disputes. Mexico, under the NAFTA (signed in 1994), is the 
last nation that the United States granted a balance-of-payments exception to. 
Table 8.3 Nations with the most policy space to regulate capital flows
Afghanistan Guinea-Bissau Russian Federation
Algeria Guyana Rwanda
Angola Haiti St. Kitts and Nevis
Antigua and Barbuda India St. Lucia
Bahamas Iran, Islamic Republic of St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Barbados Iraq Samoa
Belarus Kenya San Marino
Belize Kiribati São Tomé and Príncipe
Benin Kosovo Saudi Arabia
Bhutan Lao People’s Democratic Republic Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Lebanon Seychelles
Botswana Lesotho Slovenia
Brazil Liberia Somalia
Brunei Darussalam Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Sudan
Burkina Faso Macedonia Suriname
Burundi Madagascar Swaziland
Cambodia Malaysia Syrian Arab Republic
Cape Verde Maldives Tajikistan
Central African Republic Mali Tanzania
Chad Malta Thailand
China Marshall Islands Timor-Leste
Comoros Mauritania Togo




Equatorial Guinea Nepal Vanuatu
Eritrea Niger Venezuela
Ethiopia Pakistan Vietnam
Fiji Palau Yemen, Republic of
Gabon Papua New Guinea Zambia
Ghana Paraguay Zimbabwe
Guinea
Sources: IMF, “IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors,” March 2014, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm; OECD, “Member and Partners,” n.d., http://www.oecd.
org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html; Export.gov, Helping U.S. Companies Export, 
“Enforcement and Compliance, July 2012, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Trea 
ties/index.asp; Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Free Trade Agreement, n.d., http://www.ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.
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Table 8.4 Countries with US free-trade agree-
ments and bilateral investment treaties, current 
and pending
raTiFieda PendinG TiFa (selecTed)
Chileb Brunei Angola
Colombiab Malaysia Algeria
Costa Rica Vietnam Bahrain
Dominican Republic India Brazil










Republic of Koread Thailand
Singaporeb South Africa
Uruguay
Note: TIFA, trade and investment framework agreement.
a Countries most vulnerable to actions related to regulating cross-
border finance.
b Treaty includes cooling-off provision.
c Treaty includes balance-of-payments exception.
d Treaty includes partial carve-out for home-country regulations.
The second column in table 8.4 lists countries with pending negotiations under 
BITs and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) as of January 2014. The 
third column is a longer wish list of countries with which the United States cur-
rently is holding preliminary discussions.
reclaiming and Preserving Policy space  
after the Global Financial crisis
As nations have sought to reregulate capital flows in the wake of the global finan-
cial crisis, many have attempted to reclaim or preserve the policy space to do so in 
trade and investment treaties. Between 2010 and 2012, there was an assessment of 
the GATS exceptions under the WTO. In terms of FTAs and BITs with the United 
States, there was a concerted effort by EMDs to preserve their policy space under 
two East Asian trade and investment treaties.
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In the wake of the global financial crisis, Ecuador led an effort for the WTO to 
adopt interpretations of existing treaty language to ensure that existing treaties 
granted policy space for a variety of financial regulations. Both the WTO and 
FTAs/BITs have a process for including interpretive notes or amendments that 
could clarify or change existing language in current treaties. Article IX: 2 of the 
GATS allows the Council for Trade in Services to make official interpretations 
that can be adopted by either the WTO Ministerial Conference or the General 
Council, with a three-quarters majority vote. For example, an interpretive note 
could clarify that language under the GATS so that the balance-of-payments ex-
ception and the prudential carve-out would cover the use of cross-border finan-
cial regulations.
Ecuador engaged with the Committee on Financial Services in a process that 
would have led to an interpretation of this kind. Ecuador had put in place a num-
ber of regulations on the financial sector following the global financial crisis. In 
that process, the country found that capital was fleeing to nations without such 
regulations and thus began to control the outflow of capital. In response, the 
flow-recipient nation threatened to file a WTO case against Ecuador on grounds 
that Ecuador was violating the GATS. The process at the Committee on Financial 
Services was hotly contested. It centered around the vague prudential measures 
exception in the GATS that I have outlined. Ecuador and many global civil society 
organizations wanted an illustrative list of regulations that would be permitted 
under this exception. On the other side, industrialized countries (including the 
United States) and EMDs such as Brazil argued that it was better to leave the 
language vague. They worried that listing some measures and not others would 
implicitly disfavor those that were not listed. In the end, this loose agreement 
between some EMDs and the industrialized nations outnumbered the countries 
supporting the Ecuadorean proposal. This outcome could be positive for na-
tions hoping to regulate capital flows, given that disputes are settled between 
nation-states using a state-to-state dispute-resolution system at the WTO, rather 
than the investor-state system in US FTAs and BITS. Thus, countries such as the 
United States can keep their word, or be held to their word, in the Committee on 
Financial Services meetings because the state is the actor that makes the decision 
about whether to file a claim. In FTAs and BITs, in contrast, governments and 
regulators have no say about when a private investor will file a claim.
Cross-border financial regulations also became contentious issues in two East 
Asian trade negotiations with the United States. The first was the South Korea–
United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). KORUS was negotiated during 
the George W. Bush administration but did not enter into force until 2012. As 
noted previously, South Korea has an open capital account but has long reserved 
the right of the Finance Ministry to regulate capital flows under its Foreign 
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Exchange Transactions Act. As Chile, Colombia, Singapore, and other nations 
had proposed during their negotiations with the United States, South Korea 
asked for a controlled-entry clause for its law in the FTA. Unlike Chile and the 
others, however, South Korea (almost) got its way.
The KORUS, Chapter 11, deals with investment, and its Annex 11-G pertains 
to transfers. The annex is essentially a controlled-entry clause stating that nothing 
in the financial services or investment chapters of the treaty will restrict the abil-
ity of South Korea to use the special powers under its Foreign Exchange Transac-
tions Act. The treaty imposes some limitations on the ability of South Korea to 
use the act, however. The annex notes that the measures cannot be imposed for 
more than one year and that they are subject to the “national treatment” provi-
sions in the KORUS—thus making it harder for Korea to discriminate based on 
residence.5 Nevertheless, this annex is the first time in the history of US trade 
policy that such a carve-out has been permitted.
The second contentious negotiation began in 2008, when the United States 
was negotiating a FTA—the TPP—with several Pacific Rim countries. The na-
tions engaged in the negotiations (at the end of 2013) were Brunei, Chile, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and 
Japan. As in previous negotiations, the United States proposed investment lan-
guage based on its Model BIT. The language required that all capital move freely 
and without delay among the parties to the agreement and did not include an ex-
ception for regulating the inflow of capital or a balance-of-payments exception. 
Furthermore, the agreement specified investor-state dispute resolution.
During the TPP negotiations, Chile sought to obtain a controlled-entry clause 
for its Encaje legislation, which permitted Chile to deploy its unremunerated 
reserve requirement (URR) when necessary. Chile had obtained this flexibility 
under its agreements with Canada and the European Union, but not the United 
States. Given that the TPP was likely to supersede the United States–Chile FTA, 
Chile hoped that the TPP would rectify the FTA limitations. In an opinion article 
published in a Peruvian newspaper, coinciding with TPP negotiations, Rodrigo 
Contreras, the outgoing Chilean chief TPP negotiator, said, “Our countries need 
the flexibility that has been recognized by multilateral trade negotiations on is-
sues such as intellectual property, environmental protection, capital controls, and 
the proper balance between the rights of investors and the state”; furthermore, 
“The International Monetary Fund has reiterated that one of the main challenges 
for Latin America is to restore the ability to apply financial safeguards. In the TPP 
5. South Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement. Washington, DC, 2012. http://www.ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text.
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it does not make sense to further liberalize capital flows, or deprive countries of 
legitimate tools to safeguard financial stability” (Contreras 2013).
Malaysia tabled a balance-of-payments clause to the TPP. The clause, as con-
firmed by leaked text of the chapter under Article XX.3, is very analogous to the 
balance-of-payments wording found in the GATS and many Asian FTAs.6 Such 
a safeguard would allow the use of regulations on the outflow of capital during 
a crisis, as Malaysia had done in the wake of its crisis in 1997–1998 (Gallagher 
et al. 2013).
The USTR received significant push-back on this issue throughout the pe-
riod 2008–2013. Moreover, as of 2013 the United States had not changed its 
position that the TPP should not include a prudential measures exception that 
covered cross-border financial regulations, should not include a balance-of- 
payments exception, and should not include a controlled-entry clause for Chile 
(as the KORUS with South Korea does); in addition, it should not even include a 
 cooling-off provision, which had been included in smaller US FTAs in the past.
Barack Obama, when he was a candidate for the presidency, committed to 
renegotiate the NAFTA and also said he would not sign NAFTA-like deals when 
in office. To that end, he appointed several interest-group representatives and ex-
perts to lead a reevaluation of the US Model BIT and to make recommendations 
to the president that would lead to the new Model BIT. The group was referred to 
as the Subcommittee on Investment of the US State Department Advisory Com-
mittee on International Economic Policy. Among other issues, the group was 
specifically asked to examine whether US treaties should be adapted in the wake 
of the financial crisis. Some members of the subcommittee immediately zeroed 
in on the limited nature of the prudential exception (and the language of the 
cooling-off provision) and the lack of a balance-of-payments exception. Other 
members of the subcommittee, who represented financial and business interests, 
were vehemently opposed to changes or reinterpretations of the language on 
these matters. In the end, the subcommittee remained split on the issue and was 
not able to provide uniform advice to the president on this matter.7
One group of civil society organizations and academic experts issued its own 
set of recommendations. That document recommended that future US BITs 
6. Leaked text of the TPP Investment Chapter. Citizens’ Trade Campaign. 2012. www.citizen 
strade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf.
7. “Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on International 
Economic Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment.” Washington, DC, September 30, 2009. 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131098.htm. The author was appointed to this subcom 
mittee.
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and FTAs include a safeguard provision to allow the imposition of temporary 
capital controls, as well as a balance-of-payments safeguard (Anderson et al. 
2012). The State Department and the USTR took all these inputs and released 
the 2011 Model BIT, which did not contain an expanded prudential exception or 
a  balance-of-payments safeguard. The US position on these issues regarding the 
TPP was thus codified in the new model BIT.
Members of the US Congress and others in the civil society that hotly con-
tested this policy throughout. Representatives Barney Frank and Sander Levin 
(D-Michigan) wrote numerous letters to the USTR and to the Treasury Depart-
ment and met with senior staff at the both departments as well.
Also in 2011, more than 250 economists from across the globe signed a let-
ter informing the US government of the new economic evidence on the effi-
cacy of regulating cross-border finance and calling on the United States to place 
safeguards in its trade treaties (Global Development and Environment Institute 
2011). In response, lobby groups representing eighteen different interests groups 
also wrote a stiff letter to the US government arguing that its existing regime was 
already flexible enough. They noted that nations could indeed impose regula-
tions when they saw fit but would have to compensate private investors for doing 
so if the investors sued those states in private investor-state tribunals. They also 
argued that capital controls hurt US jobs and cited evidence suggesting that regu-
lating cross-border financial flows was ineffective. The groups signing this letter 
included the Financial Services Roundtable, the National Association of Manu-
facturers, the Business Roundtable, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the US 
Council for International Business.
In rebuttal, Representatives Frank and Levin cited the new thinking at the IMF 
and in academia about capital controls (specifically mentioning the letter) and the 
need for a more stable world in the wake of the crisis. Frank enjoyed significant 
clout on the issue given that he was the co-author of the Dodd-Frank legislation 
on reregulating the US financial industry after the crisis. Letters were exchanged 
and meetings were held in the beginning of 2012 and then in late 2012 after the 
IMF changed its institutional view on regulating cross-border finance. In formal re-
sponses to the representatives and the economists, Timothy Geithner, then secretary 
of the treasury, echoed the concerns of the financial sector, saying that US treaties 
already gave nations the leeway to regulate. Moreover, Geithner argued that other 
measures, such as interest rate manipulation, capital requirements, and reserve ac-
cumulation, were more appropriate for nations looking to manage capital flows.
When this book went to press, negotiators had completed work on several 
provisions of the TTP. But several key issues such as intellectual property, en-
vironment and labor, investor-state dispute settlement, and safeguarding cross-
border financial regulation were still “bracketed” (i.e., under contention).
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The Political economy of Policy space for capital 
account regulations in the Trading system
The United States, backed by financial interests, sought to bring issues of the 
capital account into the strong international standards of the trade and invest-
ment regime. How did the issue of capital account liberalization move into the 
trading system, and why did so many nations agree to liberalize their capital ac-
counts under trade and investment treaties? I next explore how the nature of the 
trade and negotiating institutions, issues of market power, and ideas integrate to 
explain the various outcomes. The key factors are summarized in table 8.5.
At the WTO, many EMDs were able to refrain from committing to the lib-
eralization of financial services because of the nature of the WTO negotiating 
system, because they had more bargaining power there, and because their do-
mestic constituencies were still freshly concerned about the myriad financial 
crises that had hit the developing world in the 1990s. This also led to EMD coali-
tions that crafted some of the exceptions discussed earlier. The United States is 
able to extract more concessions in its FTAs and BITs because of the asymmetric 
bargaining power it has relative to the nations with which it negotiates, the very 
strong financial lobby in the United States, and the fact that it has signed treaties 
largely with nations that view capital account liberalization in the same way as 
the United States.
The World Trade Organization–General  
Agreement on Trade in Services
The GATS negotiations had limited reach with respect to EMD commitments 
in financial services. The GATS negotiations on financial services liberalization 
were the result of domestic lobbying efforts by financial firms that (rightly) 
Table 8.5 Political economy of capital account regulation and the trading  system
WTo FTas/biTs
Institutions One country–one vote Small number of parties
Positive list approach Negative listapproach
Power interests Bargaining power less asymmetric Asymmetric bargaining power
US financial interests US financial interests
Emerging market coalitions Collective action problems
Ideas New classical macroeconomics New classical macroeconomics
The idea of history Coalition of the willing
Note: BITs, bilateral investment treaties; FTAs, free-trade agreements; WTO, World Trade Organization.
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 convinced the US government that it had a comparative advantage in the export 
of financial services. But, with the exception of the handful of EMDs, most of 
the commitments were made by industrialized nations that had already opened 
their capital accounts.
By and large, EMDs did not liberalize trade in financial services because of 
“fears of the implications of liberalization for weak domestic financial institu-
tions, a perceived absence of reciprocity given that many developing coun-
tries are importers and not exporters of financial services. Another concern 
revolved around the implications of GATS rules for the management of capi-
tal flows and prudential regulation and supervision” (Hoekman and Kostecki 
2009, 349). EMDs were able to exercise such preferences at the WTO because 
of the nature of the institution. The positive list approach tilted the negotiating 
table toward a discussion of liberalizing those sectors that a nation already saw 
as ready or willing to liberalize. Many EMDs exercised intra-forum leverage 
(see chapter 6). They refused to liberalize financial services but were still able 
to put together a larger WTO deal because there were other sectors (within 
services negotiations and, more important, in manufacturing) that EMDs were 
willing to liberalize and that the United States and other industrialized nations 
coveted.
EMDs also crafted significant coalitions to help block proposals by the in-
dustrialized countries and to craft some of the exceptions. The prudential ex-
ception in the Annex on Financial Services was initially submitted during the 
negotiations by the South East Asian Central Banks and Monetary Authorities 
(SEACEN), a coalition headed by Malaysia and consisting of Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thai-
land. These negotiations occurred at the height of the East Asian financial crisis 
(Narlikar 2003). These exception clauses were also supported by financial regula-
tors in the United States (Key 2003; Hoekman and Kostecki 2009).
Furthermore, key EMDs such as Brazil and India agreed to enter into long-
term discussions about the liberalization of financial services but did not commit 
at the time. The WTO negotiations as a whole were seen as a grand bargain. In-
dustrialized nations agreed to liberalize tariffs in textiles and apparel and agreed 
to eventually reduce agricultural subsidies; in exchange, EMDs agreed to liberal-
ize manufacturing tariffs and agreed to eventually liberalize services (Narlikar 
2003).
US Free-Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties
The United States was frustrated by its inability to forge a consensus at the WTO, 
where decisions must be made on consensus, and at the turn of the twenty-first 
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century, it largely abandoned multilateral trade liberalization in favor of a new 
strategy officially referred to as “competitive liberalization.” The goals of the strat-
egy, adopted under US President George W. Bush and continued by President 
Barak Obama, are to “overcome or bypass obstacles; exert maximum leverage for 
openness, target the needs of developing countries, especially the most commit-
ted to economic and political reforms” (Evenett and Meier 2008, 36). Explicitly, 
the United States wanted to sign FTAs and BITs with nations that would be will-
ing to negotiate on the deeper issues (such as investment) where the United States 
was not gaining ground at the global level.
As we saw earlier, limiting the ability of nations to regulate cross-border fi-
nance has been a cornerstone of US trade policy. The United States has been 
able to accomplish this using FTAs and BITs, and not at the WTO, because of the 
asymmetric bargaining power it enjoys in such negotiations, compared to those 
at the WTO; also, many of the nations that chose to sign such agreements with 
the United States have the same idea about capital account liberalization.
Capital account regulations and FTAs became a highly controversial issue 
during negotiations between the United States and Chile and between the United 
States and Singapore in the early 2000s. Chile is well known for its URR (under 
which a certain percentage of capital inflows must be deposited in the Central 
Bank for a minimum period of time). This measure has been shown econometri-
cally to have buffered Chile from the acute crises that struck the region in the 
1990s. The requirement was also quite controversial among EMD partners. Chile 
pushed hard for an exception to the investment chapters of FTAs so that it could 
use its famed capital account regulations. It had succeeded in its negotiations 
with Canada to have its law carved out of their agreement. Indeed, Canada was 
one of the few nations that did not support amending the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment to liberalize capital flows precisely because it had safeguarded the ability of 
Chile to deploy regulations under a trade treaty (Chwieroth 2010a). In contrast, 
the United States would not budge on this issue, and the Chilean authorities had 
to settle for the cooling-off provisions. In the 2013 TPP negotiations, Chile tried 
to re-open the issue, hoping that an exception in the TPP would supersede the 
older United States–Chile FTA.
Singapore saw that Malaysia had successfully deployed controls on outflows 
in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and wanted to reserve that option. The 
Bush administration negotiated similar deals with Peru, Panama, South Korea, 
and Colombia. The Obama administration maintained the position taken by the 
Bush administration. As discussed previously, in response to a letter signed by 
more than 250 economists urging the Obama administration to provide flex-
ibility for capital controls in US trade deals, the United States replied that it did 
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not intend to change its treaties in that direction. This position was echoed by 
numerous financial services coalitions in the United States (Drajem 2011).
The cooling-off language triggered controversy in the United States, leading 
to hearings specifically on the subject back on April 1, 2003, before the Sub-
committee on Domestic and International Monetary, Trade and Technology of 
the US House Committee on Financial Services.8 The committee was chaired 
by Representative Michael Oxley (R-Indiana), the majority head; the minority 
head was Barney Frank (D-Massachusetts). In general, the hearings revealed that 
most Republicans were against the use of capital controls, whereas Democrats 
favored more flexibility. The hearings were very lively, to say the least. The leading 
advocate for restricting capital controls was John Taylor, then undersecretary for 
international affairs of the US Treasury in the Bush administration. As a Stanford 
University economist, he had become famous for the Taylor rule, which sets a 
formula for inflation targeting. Insiders thus began referring to the cooling-off 
provisions as the “Taylor provisions.” Interestingly, the hearings included harsh 
rebuttals to Taylor by Nancy Birdsall of the Center for Global Development, Jag-
dish Bhagwati of Colombia University, and Daniel Tarullo, then of Georgetown 
University and now on the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System. 
These individuals are staunch supporters of free trade in goods but argued that 
capital account liberalization without exception is dangerous from both eco-
nomic and foreign policy perspectives. Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-New 
York; now chair of Joint Economic Committee) argued in favor of flexibility. 
At the hearings, Barney Frank famously remarked that “ice is in the eyes of the 
beholder,” arguing that the cooling-off period still effectively restricts Chile and 
Singapore from using capital controls. In the end, the Democrats and their sup-
porters were outnumbered.
Hirschman (1945) showed more than a generation ago that asymmetric bar-
gaining power and influence can play a big role in determining the outcome 
of trade negotiations. Kirshner (1993) extends such logic to monetary affairs. 
Negotiators from large nations with large markets have significant leverage over 
negotiators from smaller countries. The average size of the US economy rela-
tive to its negotiating partners is orders of magnitude larger. Therefore, trade 
negotiations at the bilateral or regional level in large part focus on the classic 
market-access-for-regulatory-reform equation (Shadlen 2005, 2008; Gallagher 
8. Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary, Trade and Technology of the US 
House Committee on Financial Services. “Hearing on Opening Trade in Financial Services—The 
Chile and Singapore Examples.” Washington, DC, April 1, 2003.
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2008). At the WTO, this is more balanced because of the one country–one vote 
and consensus nature of the institution and because of the newfound market 
power held by many larger EMDs. Now it is access to the EMD markets that the 
West really covets.
At the WTO, many smaller EMDs could coalesce around Brazil, India, and 
China on these issues, but that is much more difficult in a two-country negotia-
tion. Of course, when a nation such as the United States negotiates a deal with a 
nation such as Uruguay, Uruguay has little bargaining power and a Hirschman-
like analysis (rightly) predicts that Uruguay will pretty much have to “sign on 
the dotted line” on US proposals—this is true especially when a small country 
has to deal with the negative list negotiating format in which everything must be 
liberalized except those sectors pinpointed by an EMD to be protected.
This power is accentuated by collective action problems. From a national wel-
fare perspective, it is in the interest of any government negotiator to ensure that 
his or her country has the policy space to ensure financial stability. But financial 
stability is more of a public good; thus the losers in trade deals that restrict the 
ability of the government to regulate capital flows (the general public) are dis-
persed. In contrast, the winners are concentrated—they are the highly organized 
banks and firms that will not have to bear the cost of regulation (Shadlen 2008; 
Gallagher 2008).
The US trade deal with South Korea was different, however. South Korea is a 
large and growing market, with many capital goods sectors where powerful US 
firms sell goods as inputs; it also provides a large consumer market and a hub for 
shipping services. Remember that, when Chile negotiated with the United States, 
it wanted a special carve-out for its Encaje, but the United States would not grant 
an exception. In the case of the KORUS, however, the United States (against its 
wishes) allowed South Korea to carve its Foreign Exchange Transactions Act out 
of the agreement. The United States had enough market power of its own to push 
back but not as far as it could in the agreement with Chile. The United States 
grants South Korea the ability to deploy its law, but under certain conditions. 
One of those conditions is that the act be deployed in a manner consistent with 
national treatment (Kelsey 2011).
Nations that believe capital flows should be regulated have been successful 
at keeping the policy space to do so when they have significant market power—
or can form coalitions with other nations that do—in institutions where that 
power can be channeled. The WTO has a one country–one vote voting sys-
tem and nations have to reach a consensus on all provisions in an agreement. 
Large nations such as Brazil and India can leverage their newfound economic 
power to avoid making significant commitments under the GATS. Doing this in 
TradinG aWaY Financial sTabiliTY      195
bilateral negotiations is difficult, as Hirschman pointed out so many years ago. 
Nevertheless, South Korea has many sectors that the United States coveted, and 
its market power and trading across issues caused the United States to make an 
unprecedented concession on capital account regulations in their FTA that other 
nations in the TPP negotiations were seeking to duplicate in 2014.
196
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THE FUTURE OF COUNTERVAILING 
MONETARY POWER
As we have seen, many emerging-market and developing countries (EMDs) were 
able to reregulate cross-border finance and to create more policy room to ma-
neuver in global economic governance institutions. These significant changes in 
policy, however, did not result in significant enough economic outcomes to fully 
mitigate the surges and sudden stops of capital flows in the wake of the crisis. 
The domestic and international political forces that some countries were able to 
countervail are the reason that some nations were not able to regulate at home 
and why there is still inadequate policy space to regulate capital flows under the 
current system of global economic governance.
reregulation of cross-border Finance
During the surges of capital flows that led to the financial crises of the 1990s, most 
EMDs either liberalized their capital account further or managed capital flows 
through less controversial means, such as intervening in the currency markets. 
If countries did put regulations in place on the inflow or outflow of capital, they 
were ridiculed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US Treasury De-
partment, and the financial press. The 2008 global financial crisis was a different 
matter. In the wake of the crisis, many EMDs reregulated cross-border finance to 
handle the surges in cross-border financial flows. Significantly, this time the inter-
national financial institutions and industrialized countries did not ridicule EMDs 
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for taking such actions. In fact, many tacitly supported this new ad hoc regime in 
which the industrialized countries pursued loose monetary policies and EMDs 
buffered the harmful effects of such policies using capital account regulations.
Regulation enjoyed greater legitimacy in the eyes of the economics profession 
because of breakthroughs in economic thinking that now saw the regulation of 
capital flows as market-correcting mechanisms to achieve stability and growth—
not as distortionary moves to defer necessary adjustment. Moreover, years of 
econometric analysis proved that capital account liberalization was not strongly 
correlated with economic growth and tended to trigger banking crises in na-
tions that had weaker institutional frameworks. Economists were even modeling 
the regulation of capital flows and recommending that countries cooperate on 
regulation on both ends of the capital flow cycle. Pioneering economists such as 
Nelson Barbosa in Brazil, Hyun Song Shin in South Korea, Anton Korinek in the 
United States, and Jonathan Ostry at the IMF all translated this new thinking for 
their respective policymaking circles.
These control measures met with some success. Nations that had regulations 
in place when the global financial crisis occurred were among the least hard hit. 
And the majority of the research shows that countries that reregulated cross-
border finance after the crisis were able to change the level of inflows, reduce 
exchange rate pressure, have a more autonomous monetary policy, and grow 
faster than countries that did not.
EMDs also sought to ensure that they had enough policy space to deploy such 
regulations under the global economic governance institutions. At the IMF, the 
BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) worked to defend 
the regime of cooperative decentralization, in which, under the IMF Articles of 
Agreement, member states may regulate capital flows as they see fit. At the G20, 
EMDs elevated the importance of regulating cross-border finance to the highest 
level by inserting it into communiqués and negotiating an explicit document 
granting legitimacy to reregulating capital flows. In the trading regime, a regime 
with strong international standards where some countries have moved the dis-
cussion of capital account liberalization, many EMDs have been less successful. 
Large countries such as Brazil have been able to avoid commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that make it harder to regulate 
capital flows, and countries that already have commitments may have recourse 
to exceptions under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In contrast, countries 
that have chosen to engage in free-trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs), especially with the United States, have traded away their 
ability to regulate cross-border finance without being subject to claims under 
those treaties. South Korea is an exception to this; it has been able to carve some 
of its regulations on capital flows out of its FTA.
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But these changes in domestic and global policy were not enough to sig-
nificantly change economic outcomes. Yes, many EMDs would have been even 
worse off from the post-crisis surges and sudden stops of capital flows than if 
they hadn’t regulated those flows. Still, the regulations had only a modest effect 
because of their lack of strength and the lack of cooperation between source 
(mostly, industrialized) countries and EMDs. The result was what Grabel (2011) 
refers to as productive incoherence, where many positive developments have 
been tempered by the lack of political and policy space to effectively regulate 
capital at both ends.
countervailing Monetary Power
The EMDs that were able to reregulate cross-border finance and maintain the 
related requisite policy space under the global economic governance institutions 
were able to do so, in part, by exercising countervailing monetary power. As we 
have seen in chapter 1, countervailing monetary power can operate in two arenas. 
At the national level, countervailing monetary power can be used by a country 
to overcome political and economic forces and counter the structural power of 
global capital markets. At the international level, countervailing monetary power 
can be used by relatively weaker states to counter the realist power and institu-
tions crafted by stronger states.
On the home front, EMDs that were successful in regulating cross-border fi-
nance exerted countervailing monetary power supported by five pillars: domes-
tic institutions that allowed financial authorities to regulate flows in a timely 
and countercyclical manner, the backing of exporters who were more concerned 
about the exchange rate than access to global finance, the backing of workers 
(and worker parties) motivated by job security over short-term consumption 
benefits, the backing by a general public haunted by the collective memory of 
past crises, and the ability to translate economic ideas to decision makers and 
the general public. Countries that were not able to put adequate regulations in 
place did not have the support of enough of these five pillars to overcome the 
traditional obstacles to regulation.
First, in both Brazil and South Korea, there were institutions in place that 
allowed the governments to channel new ideas and political backing into cen-
tral bank policy. Although both countries had independent central banks, they 
had institutions that gave financial authorities a partial say as well. Second, in 
Brazil, exporters were more sensitive to the exchange rate than to a loss of inter-
national financing because Brazil offered several public and privately regulated 
options for finance. Thus, when the exchange rate rose during a surge in inflows, 
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 exporters were more disposed to regulating finance for material reasons. When 
exporters rely on international finance for the majority of their financing needs, 
regulations on the inflow of capital will hurt their ability to raise capital and 
strengthen the political alliance between industry and finance, which will be op-
posed to regulation. Third, in Brazil organized labor (which forms the core of the 
party in power) was more concerned that exchange rate volatility would threaten 
their employment prospects than they were about the temporary benefits of ex-
change rate appreciation during a surge. Fourth, in both Brazil and South Korea, 
policymakers drew on the collective memory of financial trauma to gain political 
backing for their actions. Both countries had been plagued with severe crises that 
are very alive in the memories of workers and citizens. Under normal circum-
stances, workers and citizens enjoy exchange rate appreciation because it allows 
them to purchase more goods. In these two countries, however, workers and citi-
zens knew too well that exchange rate pressure and credit bubbles can lead to lost 
jobs, high debt, and inflation. And fifth, policymakers had the idea of expanding 
the mitigation toolkit to include cross-border financial regulations and were able 
to gain support for their actions by framing it in the new economics of capital 
controls (see chapter 3). In Brazil, the Finance Ministry, although coming from 
a Minskian developmentalist framework, reframed its rationale for regulation 
to the Central Bank as “externalities” to conform to the language of the Central 
Bank. In South Korea, Hyun Song Shin and others framed regulations as prag-
matic approaches to stem systemic risk at the major source—cross-border bank-
ing operations. Moreover, when South Korea spoke about its measures to the 
world, it defined them as macroprudential regulations on the foreign exchange 
derivatives market, not as capital controls on global finance (as Brazil had).
Many EMDs, especially the BRICS, also led a charge in global economic gov-
ernance institutions to expand or preserve their policy space to regulate cross-
border finance and to gain the cooperation of the source countries of the capital 
flow. As summarized in table 9.1, the global statecraft aspects of countervailing 
Table 9.1 Pillars of countervailing monetary power
National level Institutions for timely countercyclical regulation
Less reliance on global finance
Strong organized labor and affiliated parties
Evocation of the collective memory of past crises
Reframing control as macroprudential regulation
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monetary power also have five pillars: nations need policy space to regulate under 
global economic governance institutions, nations are more apt to gain policy 
space as they gain market power in the global economy, nations can concentrate 
such market power by forming coalitions, these coalitions can leverage the frag-
mentation of global governance to their benefit, and they can leverage global 
governance through the translation of new economic ideas.
EMDs were able to obtain or preserve the most policy space at the WTO and 
the G20. In both these institutions, at least on paper, members adhere to a one 
country–one vote system that operates by consensus. Of course, equal voting 
power does not translate fully into more power. Perhaps even more important 
than the institutional structure in these two forums was the ability of EMDs to 
use their increased market power to the most advantage within the institutional 
structures. At the WTO, Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (Russia did not 
join the WTO until August 2012) all had large markets that were coveted by the 
industrialized countries. In a one country–one vote system operating by consen-
sus, these countries were able to employ intraforum leverage significantly—they 
would not liberalize services unless the industrialized countries did so on agri-
culture. What is more, EMDs formed numerous coalitions at the WTO. At the 
G20, they were able to do the same. BRICS formed a coalition within the G20 
and were able to employ intraforum leverage, getting concessions in exchange 
for being willing to discuss EMD participation in the euro crisis. By negotiat-
ing an alternative BRICS reserve pool and development bank on the sidelines of 
the G20, they were also able to employ extra-forum leverage to get the G20 to 
acknowledge the negative spillovers of the monetary policies of the industrialized 
countries.
The increasing EMD market share also played a role at the IMF. In contrast to 
the late 1990s, when all BRICS countries (except China) had undergone an IMF 
country program and they collectively had 9 percent of global GDP, in 2012 no 
BRICS had a country program and they represented 34 percent of GDP. The IMF 
quota system had been improved in this light but only slightly, and some reforms 
were yet to get through the US Congress during the proceedings of the IMF insti-
tutional view. On an institutional level, significantly, the IMF management and 
staff took an initial position that already met the EMDs halfway on capital ac-
count regulation. The spirit of new thinking at the IMF and the diffusion of new 
ideas throughout the staff were key on this issue. This was a complete contrast to 
the 1990s, when the IMF management and staff and the industrialized countries 
were all pursuing capital account liberalization. This time, the management and 
staff were in charge of setting the agenda and endorsed the kinds of capital ac-
count regulations pursued by EMDs. Moreover, the industrialized countries had 
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been nudged toward viewing more favorably capital account regulations used for 
prudential reasons, although they were still vehemently opposed to regulations 
used to mobilize domestic finance through a heavily managed exchange rate re-
gime. BRICS were able to use intraforum leverage by strategically siding with the 
IMF staff during key parts of the process. They also employed extra-forum lever-
age by using their gains on capital account regulation made at the G20 to wedge 
their positions into the IMF deliberations.
Of course, the distribution of power and institutional structures also explain 
why EMDs didn’t fully achieve their goals and, in some cases, lost more policy 
space. At the WTO, smaller states had to liberalize much of their financial services 
sectors. At the IMF, the industrialized countries were able to temper language 
that called for the industrialized countries to regulate capital flows at the source 
of the capital flow cycle. The most significant case is the use of FTAs and BITs 
by the United States. Bilateral negotiations between a large economy and a small 
one are tilted in favor of the large economy because the large economy can make 
agreeing with its objectives a condition of access to its markets. The United States 
was able to put such conditions into its FTA with Chile, even though Chile had 
managed to avoid such conditions in its treaties with Canada and the European 
Union. In contrast, South Korea had a larger economy than Chile and had many 
sectors that the United States wanted access to. As a result, South Korea was able 
to use intraforum leverage and make maintaining its innovative law granting 
its financial authorities the ability to put capital account regulations in place a 
condition of entering into an FTA with the United States.
Policy recommendations for  
countervailing Monetary Power
EMDs can put in place several policies and strategies that can accentuate their 
ability to exert countervailing monetary power at the national and international 
levels. There are ten policies or strategies that may help these states regulate the 
structural power of capital markets in their own economies and maintain or 
expand the policy space for regulation and cooperation in global economic gov-
ernance institutions.
1. Put in place permanent but countercyclical regulations on cross-border 
finance.
Both Brazil and South Korea have legislation in place that grants the finance min-
istries the authority to make quick decisions on the regulation of cross-border 
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finance. This is politically important because it avoids wasting time on major 
legislative battles in the midst of a boom, when the political forces against regula-
tion may be strongest. Such regulations should be made permanent but should 
be countercyclical in nature. The regulations should be tightened when there is a 
rise in inflows or systemic risk related to cross-border finance, and they should be 
eased as capital becomes scarcer. Countries also have to build the institutional ca-
pacity to fine-tune regulations as the capital cycle persists. Both Brazil and South 
Korea were constantly adjusting their regulations on inflows (see chap ter 4). That 
said, it appears that the capacity of South Korea to regulate flows is the stronger 
of the two because South Korea did not experience a sudden stop in capital flows, 
as Brazil and other nations did in 2014.
2. Foster institutions to diversify sources of finance.
Economic diversification is, of course, the key to long-run growth and devel-
opment. If such diversification is fueled by a variety of financing sources, both 
public and private, then sectors in the industrial economy will not be as tied to 
the international financial sector. This is important for economic reasons—the 
real economy will be less susceptible to the surges and sudden stops of interna-
tional finance. It is also very important politically—industry may be less likely 
to collude with international finance against regulation because it will be more 
sensitive to exchange rate volatility than to its links to the international finan-
cial sector. The development of domestic bond markets is essential here, but not 
enough. In early 2014, 50 percent of domestic debt in EMDs was held by foreign 
investors and can thus be subject to surges and sudden stops as well. Reviving 
national development banks is yet another way to provide domestic financing, 
as in Brazil, along with regulations requiring the private banks in the country to 
earmark certain types of long-run investments on favorable terms.
3. Foster institutions to enable organized labor to collectively bargain and 
engage in political parties. Leaders should emphasize job security over 
exchange rate benefits.
If there is a relatively small industrial working class and the workers are not orga-
nized, politics may favor households and consumers driven by consumer benefits 
rather than job security. Organized labor tends to concentrate on job security 
and wages, and sees exchange rate fluctuation as a threat to those objectives. 
Households and consumers, in the short term, often see exchange rate apprecia-
tion as an income and sometimes as asset boost and thus organize against regula-
tion. Therefore organized labor should be supported to this end.
4. Engage with the general public to evoke the collective memory of past 
financial crises.
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Financial crises have been associated with significant trauma. Remembering this 
trauma can help the general public take a longer-run view of certain policy out-
comes. As we have seen, the collective memory of past financial crises really reso-
nates in Brazil and South Korea—two nations that have been plagued with severe 
crises. The general public can sometimes be re-oriented from what might seem 
rational in the short term toward longer-run objectives. That is, lack of regula-
tion of capital flows may benefit individual citizens in the short term through 
an appreciated exchange rate, but if the public is reminded that the financial 
amplification effect can kick, with the rising exchange rate tied to job losses and 
its subsequent fall causing massive inflation, citizens are more apt to support the 
regulation of cross-border finance.
5. Reframe the need to regulate cross-border finance at home and abroad.
It is important to devise country-specific regulations that target where the cross-
border financial risk is coming from. Sometimes it will be the foreign exchange 
(FX) derivatives market, the bond market, equities market, or the currency mar-
ket itself. Sometimes hard, quantity-based capital controls are the best way to 
prevent and mitigate the risk associated with cross-border finance; at other times, 
price-based second-generation regulations are more appropriate. Increasingly, 
third-generation regulations on the FX derivatives market, on highly intercon-
nected banks, and other sectors may be more appropriate. This family of regu-
lations are better referred in a broader sense for economic as well as political 
reasons. If the measures are reframed as regulations to maintain stability for 
productive growth that are inherently corrective, rather than distortionary, such 
framing may go a long way to making them acceptable at home and abroad. Bra-
zil branded its regulations in this manner to gain the acceptance of the Central 
Bank. Yet when Brazil announced its policies to the world at large, it called them 
“capital controls” to stem a “tsunami” of money from US monetary policy. This 
put the investment community on alert, tempting investors to exercise their exit 
option. Indeed, as capital flowed out of Brazil in 2013, many investors, when 
asked to come back to Brazil, asked for a guarantee against future capital controls. 
In contrast, South Korean authorities, both internally and externally, framed and 
referred to their policies as macroprudential policies aimed at stemming sys-
temic risk being transmitted through cross-border banking. This conformed to 
the language of the new economics of capital controls and the new lingo in the 
global financial regulatory reform circles—and put investors and the industrial-
ized countries alike at ease.
6. Build on coalitions of market power.
The BRICS coalition and other EMD coalitions in the WTO can be built on and 
better coordinated to preserve and gain the policy space for regulation in global 
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economic governance institutions. The outcomes of agreements are often deter-
mined by the distribution of market power among parties to the agreement—
those having the most market power obtain the largest benefits. EMD market 
power has increased significantly since 2000, and consolidating that power via 
coalitions can help EMDs leverage their objectives in a more optimal manner.
7. Continue to push for quota reform at the IMF.
As we have seen, the more say that EMDs have in deliberations, the more their 
policy objectives will be achieved. As EMDs, in general, and the BRICS coalition, 
in particular, gain economic momentum, they should strive to increase IMF quo-
tas along with those increases in economic output.
8. Continue to build alternative institutions, and leverage those institu-
tions for a more balanced global system.
In addition to quota reform at the IMF, EMDs should continue to develop and 
expand alternative institutions that better serve their mission and needs. This will 
not just help EMDs provide each other with the public goods they are not ob-
taining through the traditional international financial institutions. For example, 
the creation of a BRICS development bank and a BRICS reserve currency pool 
helped those countries to employ extra-forum leverage in the traditional institu-
tions to achieve their goals and to balance quota systems.
9. Reform the trade regime for stability-supported trade and investment.
When there is national legislation in hand, it is easier to leverage such legislation 
in international trade and investment negotiations. At the WTO, a nation can 
make notifications that such new regulations are in place and that the member 
country sees them as prudential in nature and thus falling under the WTO excep-
tion for prudential measures. In further negotiations, such regulations should 
not be offered in a future positive list for liberalization; the country should at-
tempt to have them carved out of FTAs and BITs, as Chile did in its FTAs with 
Canada and the European Union, and South Korea has been able to do in its FTA 
with the United States. For nations without regulations already in place, strong 
balance-of-payments exceptions and prudential measure exceptions are needed 
in future treaties and probably should be inserted into past or renegotiated trea-
ties.
10.  Devise and propose coordination mechanisms to regulate cross-border 
finance on both ends.
The global financial crisis has reinvigorated the rationale for cooperation in the 
regulation of cross-border finance on both ends. For pragmatic reasons, EMDs 
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alone cannot carry the burden of regulating flows, given their institutional ca-
pacity relative to the size and sophistication of global capital markets. Advances 
in economic theory also justify regulating cross-border finance at both ends. 
Although there are sophisticated new rationales for regulating at both ends, a 
clear set of policy proposals regarding what that cooperation might look like is 
still lacking. Previous proposals have included controls on outflows of capital 
in source countries and an ad hoc cooperation mechanism based on the global 
anti–money laundering regime (see Helleiner 2002). Recent articulations have 
suggested that, under the auspices of the G20, the cooperative in cooperative de-
centralization be emphasized. At the G20, all countries agreed to coordinate their 
financial regulatory reform efforts so as not to cause negative spillover impacts 
caused by the actions of individual countries. As noted in previous chapters, if the 
G20 simply coordinated and mandated regulations on FX derivatives for banks 
and nonbanks, such an action would go a long way toward achieving cooperation 
at both ends. At this writing, there has been little official coordination, and do-
mestic regulation has been driven by domestic politics. The truth is no clear and 
coherent proposals with a particular emphasis on the instability of cross-border 
finance have come forth in the wake of the crisis. This is an important topic for 
many of the new institutions to take up, and for the UNCTAD and IMF as well.
The countries that were most successful in the post-crisis period had some 
combination of these ten policies, which are largely drawn from the ten tenets of 
the theory of countervailing monetary power outlined in this book. That said, 
with perhaps the exception of South Korea, no country has used such policies 
to their full potential. In late 2013 and early 2014, when the US Federal Reserve 
Bank began moving away from its loose monetary policy, there was a sudden 
stop in many of the countries we have discussed. At this writing, it appears that 
South Korea will prove to be the most resilient during the sudden stop; however, 
the measures used by Brazil, Chile, and South Africa do not seem to be enough 
to stem the outflow of capital and subsequent financial fragility. These nations 
needed a stronger policy—and coordination with the West.
According to most accounts, at least five of today’s EMDs will be among the 
ten largest economies in the world by 2050. Most projections put China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia among the largest economies in the world at that 
time (for projections and a review of the literature, see Dadush and Shaw 2011). 
If these nations continue to exercise countervailing monetary power to craft na-
tional policy and to balance global economic governance institutions, they may 
be able to achieve a more stable international monetary system than the one 
that has been orchestrated by the great powers since the demise of the Bretton 
Woods system. For a truly balanced system, they will need to remember what it 
was like to be vulnerable to the economic policies of large powers. Thus, on the 
206      cHaPTer 9
way up, they need to craft new institutions and reform the traditional ones to en-
able countries to maximize the benefits and mitigate the risks of cross-border fi-
nance. If they follow the path laid by the great powers since the demise of Bretton 
Woods, there may be even more instability and polarization in the future world 
economic system. It is my hope that this volume can shed light on how weaker 
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